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Part I – General 
 
1 Introduction    
 
 
Head of State who commits murder and other grave crimes is chargeable with all the evils, all the horrors, 
of the war; all the effusions of blood, the desolation of families, the rapine, the violence, the revenge, the 
burnings, are his works and his crimes. He is guilty towards the enemy, of attacking, oppressing, 
massacring them without cause, guilty towards his people, of drawing them into acts of injustice, exposing 
their lives without necessity, without reason, towards that part of his subjects whom the war ruins, or who 
are great sufferers by it, of losing their lives, their fortune, or their health. Lastly, he is guilty towards all 
mankind, of disturbing their quiet, and setting a pernicious example.1  
 
 
Under traditional international law governed by the concept of state sovereignty, any alleged 
responsibility for international wrongdoings used to be attributed to the state alone. Indeed, the 
role of an individual in traditional international law was marginalized. This position of an 
individual in international law began to change from the 20th century. Responsibility of 
individuals for breaches of international law started to be addressed in a relatively new branch of 
international law: international criminal law.  
 
International criminal law qualifies certain types of conduct as crimes under international law2 
incurring individual criminal responsibility. In this context, the 20th century witnessed 
development of various international and hybrid judicial mechanisms for prosecution of 
individuals who commit these crimes. What if these individuals happen to be heads of state?  
 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility for crimes under international law is firmly 
established.3 However, the enforcement of this principle can, in some circumstances, be 
frustrated by operation of another well established principle, immunity of a Head of State based 
largely on the notions of sovereign equality of states.4  
                                                 
1 E. de Vattel, quoted in: Q. Wright, ‘The Legal Liability of the Kaiser’, (1919) 13 American Political Science 
Review 20, p .126.   
2 The term crimes under international law will be used interchangeably with the terms international crimes and core 
crimes. These crimes include: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
3 Issue of individual criminal responsibility is addressed in Chapter 5.1. 
4 C. Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (Selected Pertinent Issues), 
Springer (2008), pp. 263-357. 
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Traditionally, heads of states were not subject to the jurisdiction of national courts for whatever 
acts they may committed and there were no international courts which would have jurisdiction 
over heads of state. Until recently, the immunity of high ranking state officials who engaged in 
commission of such crimes was absolute, based on traditional rules safeguarding the sovereignty 
of states.5  
 
Nevertheless, the interests of the international community in the maintenance of effective and 
smooth functioning of international relations between states are being increasingly confronted 
with the interests of bringing alleged perpetrators of international crimes to justice. These two 
interests are fulfilling different functions of international law. Which interest should prevail if the 
accused is a Head of State?  
 
It is apparent that judgments of the last years of both international and national courts in the 
context of immunity have turned on whichever of these two divergent interests prevails for 
judges.6 Different approaches adopted by judges well characterize this tension of interests and the 
outcome depends to a large extent on the legal basis of the respective court (i.e. national or 
international court) and on the status of the high ranking official (i.e. former or incumbent 
official).7  
 
Various cases regarding the issue of the immunity of high ranking officials have recently reached 
both national and international courts. Following list of cases8 serves as an illustration of the 
increasing frequency in attempts to institute prosecutions for international crimes. Main examples 
include (a) former or incumbent presidents: Manuel Noriega9 (Panama), Augusto Pinochet10 
                                                 
5 A. Cassese, ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality’, in: 
C. Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. Kleffner (eds.), Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, 
Cambodia and Kosovo, Oxford University Press (2004). 
6 Chatham House, ‘Immunity for Dictators?’, A summary of discussion at the International Law Programme 
Discussion Group at Chatham House, 9 September 2004. 
7 R. Cryer, ‘A ‘Special Court’ for Sierra Leone?’ 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 435 (2001). 
8 This list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
9 United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506, 1511 (S.D.Fla.1990), and The United States v Manuel Antonio 
Noriega, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, Nos.92-4687; 96-4471, (7 July 1997). 
10 R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998) (Pinochet I); 
R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999) (Pinochet II); 
R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (2000) 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (Pinochet III). 
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(Chile), Slobodan Milosevic11 (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), Hissene Habre12 (Chad), 
Muammar Qaddafi13 (Libya), Fidel Castro (Cuba) and last but not least Charles Taylor14 
(Liberia) and (b) other high ranking officials: Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi15 (Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) or Jean Kambanda16 (Prime Minister 
of Rwanda). 
 
This thesis will focus on the case of Charles Taylor, who was only the second Head of State in 
history after Slobodan Milosevic, and the first African head of state to be indicted for crimes 
under international law at the international level. The Taylor case well illustrates collision of the 
two above mentioned interests in contemporary international law: the growing need for 
international accountability for crimes under international law and a system of immunities 
deriving its origins, as most often claimed, from principle of sovereign equality of States.  
 
The case is a fascinating one, and contains many points of major legal interest. This thesis 
explores some of the implications the case might have in international law.  The central issue of 
this thesis is whether Taylor as an incumbent president of Liberia at the time of issuance of the 
indictment was entitled to claim immunity before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
given the fact that the SCSL had been established by a bilateral treaty between the Republic of 
Sierra Leone and the United Nations (UN). Liberia was not a party to this agreement.  
 
This legal issue is important also from the practical perspective for similar cases which may arise 
before other courts. The topicality of this issue can be especially seen in the increased activities 
of the first permanent criminal court, the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The same questions 
                                                 
11 Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic (IT-99-37-PT), Decision on Preliminary Motions, 8 November 2001. 
12 Cour de Cassation du Senegal (Premiere chambre statuant en matiere penale), Aff. Habre, Arret n. 14, (20 March 
2001). 
13 Chambre Criminelle, Frech Supreme Court, Criminal Division, Paris, Arret n. 1414, Mar. 13, 2001, Gaz. Pal. 
(2001), 2, somm. 
14 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004.  
15 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.), 14 February 2002, I.C.J. 21, (hereinafter 
‘the Yerodia case’). 
16  Prosecutor v Kambanda (ICTR 97-23-S), Judgment and Sentence, 4 September 1998.   
 4 
in the context of immunities of third states not parties to the Rome Statute may appear before the 
ICC.17 
 
This thesis consists of three main parts: (1) general part which provides an introductory insight 
into the topic; (2) identification of the SCSL’s legal basis and (3) its implications for immunity of 
Charles Taylor. The second part of this thesis will focus on identifying the legal basis, which has 
important implications for the nature and extent of immunity afforded by contemporary 
international law to, at the time of the issuance of indictment, an incumbent Head of State.  
 
The considerable attention which is given to the legal basis of the SCSL is justified firstly by the 
fact that the SCSL is a novel and unique mechanism for dealing with prosecution of violations of 
international criminal law. It represents a development of a new legal basis. It is the first time in a 
history when the court has been established by the agreement between UN and a state (Sierra 
Leone).  
 
This development inevitably brings various legal challenges and issues of real juristic doubt and 
difficulty. Some of them can be turned into following questions: is the SCSL an international, 
national or hybrid court? What are the implications for the purposes of immunity? Does the 
SCSL have jurisdiction to try an incumbent head of State of a country other than Sierra Leone 
even if proved that it is indeed an international court? Does the bilateral agreement suffice for 
denying immunity to a serving Head of state of a country not party to this bilateral agreement?  
 
Secondly, the issues brought by the Defence counsel for Taylor in the motion challenging the 
jurisdiction of the SCSL themselves turn to a large extent on the process of the establishment of 
the SCSL, its legal basis and implications of this legal basis for its international jurisdictional 
reach. Accordingly, the proper assessment and identification of the SCSL’s legal basis is of 
                                                 
17 Supra note 6. See the case of the current President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, the situation in 
Sudan was referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII, can refer a specific situation “in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed” to the Prosecutor. This mechanism can trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC without consent of the 
concerned State (which is not a party to the Rome Statute). For deeper discussion see, V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The 
Relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Weltpolitik (2001), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/crisis/2001relationship.htm (last 
accessed 17 February 2008). 
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central importance for drawing conclusions with respect to availability of immunities before such 
court.   
 
After analyzing the exact legal basis of the SCSL, the third part of the thesis reveals the close 
interconnection of the legal basis with the issue of withdrawal of immunity for incumbent Head 
of State. Since the SCSL, relying on the International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s decision in the 
Yerodia case, connected the issue of denying the immunity to Taylor with international legal 
basis of the SCSL, it was necessary for the judges to determine that the SCSL is indeed an 
international criminal court.18  In this context, the impact of the Yerodia case on the reasoning of 
judges in the Taylor case with regard to the question of legal basis of the court will be critically 
assessed.  
 
It goes without surprise that the SCSL found that it is an international court which can, on the 
basis of its Statute, deny immunity to the president of Liberia while still in the office.19 While the 
SCSL’s decision to deny immunity ratione personae to Taylor may be welcomed, the legal 
reasoning on the basis of which the SCSL arrived at the conclusion will be subject to criticism. 
The validity of the SCSL approach in its decision will be critically examined. This examination 
will assess whether the arguments and reasoning of the SCSL comply with the current state of 
international law with respect to immunities for crimes under international law.  
 
The SCSL’s decision about immunity available to Taylor will be put in the larger context of 
developments on both personal and functional immunities in international law. Based on these 
developments, some weaknesses both in the ICJ’s and SCSL’s reasoning will be subject to a 
critical review. It is claimed that the SCSL did not appreciate its special legal basis and therefore 
failed to properly assess what are the implications of its legal basis for the rules of international 
law on incumbent head of state immunity. However, the aim of this thesis is not just to criticise 
the SCSL’s decision. In a concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to present a cautious way 
forward by identifying suitable solutions.  
                                                 
18 M. Frulli, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Testing the Water. The Question of Charles Taylor’s Immunity. 
Still in Search of a Balanced Application of Personal Immunities?’. (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal 




The general part of the thesis will firstly present various criminal judicial bodies for prosecution 
of international crimes and offer an explanation as to why the legal basis matter. Secondly, the 
events leading to the establishment of the SCSL will be briefly described. Thirdly, the SCSL’s 
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction20 in the Taylor case will be introduced. 
 
 
1.1 Legal Basis of Mechanisms for Prosecuting Violations of International Criminal Law  
 
Firstly, various mechanisms for prosecuting violations of international criminal law will be 
introduced. Secondly, a definition of international, national and internationalized courts will be 
offered. The reason for this approach lies in the fact that the entitlement to immunity for core 
crimes does not have uniform application within different legal regimes and in front of various 
judicial bodies.21 It is therefore necessary to clarify the respective terminology and categorization 
in order to subsequently determine the SCSL’s legal basis for the purposes of lifting immunities 
to a serving head of state of a country other than Sierra Leone.  
 
This all began with the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals more than a half a 
century ago. The beginning of the 1990s then witnessed a new evolution of various mechanisms 
for prosecuting violations of international criminal law, starting in 1993 with the establishment of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and followed by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.22 In 1998, the Rome Statute for the 
ICC was adopted.23  
 
At the same time, other models referred to as ‘hybrid’, ‘mixed’ or ‘internationalised’ courts came 
into being.24 As examples can serve the Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia25, the 
                                                 
20 Prosecutor v. Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004.   
21 I. Bantekas, ‘Head of Sate Immunity in the Light of Multiple Legal Regimes and Non-Self-Contained Systems 
Theories: Theoretical Analysis of ICC Third Party Jurisdiction Against the Background of the 2003 Iraq War’, 10 
Journal of Conflict & Security Law 21 (2005). 
22 UN Security Council Resolutions 808, 827 (1993) and 955 (1994) respectively. 
23 The Rome Statute of the ICC, A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998. 
24 For an overview of some practical and legal problems internationalized courts might face, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of such courts, see A. Cassese, ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in 
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Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo26, the District Court of Dili in East Timor27 or 
category of national courts with international influence such as the Iraqi Special Tribunal28, the 
Ethiopian Special Prosecutor’s Office and the War Crimes Chamber in the State Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.29  
 
These various judicial mechanisms dealing with crimes under international law are characterised 
by different legal regimes and applicable law. Some will apply primarily or only domestic 
criminal law into which crimes under international law might or might not be incorporated.30 
Other mechanisms might be international ones and applying only international law. These can be 
either treaty-based such as the ICC or resolution-based (Resolution adopted under Chapter VII 
powers of the UN Security Council) such as the ICTY and the ICTR. These courts and tribunals 
are limited by their Statutes.31 Last but not least, we have a newly emerging trend of so-called 
hybrid or mixed courts which further complicate the picture. The qualification of the exact legal 
basis of hybrid courts especially is not always clear cut.  
 
Hence, it is useful to start the discussion by defining the terms ‘international court’, ‘national 
court’ and ‘hybrid/mixed/internationalized’ court. The term ‘international criminal court’ is 
frequently used in academic literature and jurisprudence, without however much consideration 
given to what it actually means.32 At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Fight Against International Criminality’, in: C. Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. Kleffner (eds.), Internationalized 
Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia and Kosovo,  Oxford University Press (2004).  
25 Also being referred to as ‘Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea’. See General Assembly Resolution 57/228 A, 187 December 2002. 
Orentlicher uses the term ‘court, established under Cambodian law but operating with substantial international 
participation’, D. Orentlicher, ‘The Future of Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture of Transitional Justice’, 
in: S. Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes (2003), at 219. 
26 In cases of Kosovo and East Timor the UN promulgated regulations on the establishment of the panels. The 
authority to promulgate these regulations came from the SC Resolution adopted under Chapter VII powers, which 
therefore served as the legal basis, albeit indirectly. “Nevertheless, these international instruments did not directly 
establish the courts, but granted the UN administration the authority to promulgate domestic laws. The regulations 
establishing these courts should be considered as domestic instruments.”, in: S.M.H. Nouwen, ‘‘Hybrid courts’, The 
hybrid category of a new type of international crimes courts’, 2 Utrecht Law Review 2, December, (2006).  
27 UNTAET, Resolution No. 2000/15, 6 June 2000.  
28 Also named ‘Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal’. 
29 The High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina promulgated the Law on the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on 12 November 2000. The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted this law on 3 July 2002.  
30 E.g. Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
31 See supra note 18.  
32 Supra note 4. 
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definition of what constitutes an international court as opposed to national or hybrid court may 
vary significantly depending on factors taken into account, on the purposes of this identification 
and on those who are in charge of identification. Also, it should be noted that the following 
definitions are not intended to be conclusive; they will rather serve as guidance for determination 
of the legal basis of the SCSL in the context of immunities analysis.  
 
There is no universally accepted definition of an international criminal court in international law  
and the recent jurisprudence considering this issue has not proved particularly insightful, 
including for our purposes the important decision of the ICJ in the Yerodia case, where the ICJ 
simply stated that in ‘certain international courts’ (ICTY, ICTR, ICC) an incumbent or former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs could be subject to criminal prosecution, without providing any 
further guidance whether term ‘certain’ international courts excludes some other international 
courts.33  
 
Nevertheless, the ICJ in the Yerodia case held that an international court is a court that is 
established by two or more states or by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII mandate 
of the United Nations Charter.34 Though the ICJ did not mention the following possibility, it is 
submitted that a state and an international organization can also establish an international tribunal 
(as in the case of the Special Court).  
 
Damgaard points to the following factors as important for indication of international nature (a) 
international court is not part of the judiciary of one single State (b) it applies international 
criminal law, the fact that it also applies domestic law does not disqualify it being international 
(c) its jurisdiction rationae materiae and rationae personae is international (d) its decisions are 
binding.35 The first three factors are easy to approve. It is however not clear how does the binding 
nature of a decision contributes to the international character of the respective court. 
  
                                                 
33 Ibid.  
34 See supra note 15, para 61. 
35 Damgaard at 333. Damgaard also mentions an option of establishing an international criminal court by amendment 
to the UN Charter. 
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A hybrid court, according to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of  the 
SCSL, is one that has mixed jurisdiction and composition.36 This means that the court may have 
the jurisdictional privileges of applying both municipal and international law and may also have 
both local and foreign prosecutors and judges participate in its judicial process.37 Nevertheless, it 
is submitted that the mixed composition and jurisdiction does not of itself identify/determine the 
legal basis of the court.38 Such a description and judicial arrangement can be indeed described as 
a mixed judicial system. However, the legal basis of any court is rather determined by its 
constitutive instrument and authority of the body establishing the court.  
 
There is no bar to have local judges, prosecutors and other personnel participating in proceedings 
of the court whose legal basis is e.g. an international treaty or resolution and which is therefore 
by its essence international. Equally, the fact that the legislative authorities of a particular state 
decide to include into the composition of its national court some personnel from other countries 
does not make “that court any less a ‘national court’.”39  
 
The War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina can serve as a useful   
example. The Defence in Stankovic 40 submitted that the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court 
is incapable of characterization as a ‘national court.’ It was assumed that to be a national court it 
must be composed of judges who are nationals of the State concerned. However, the ICTY held 
that no authority is offered for this proposition.41  
 
                                                 
36 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (S/2000/915), 4 October 
2000, para. 9.  
37 D. Orentlicher, ‘International Justice Can Indeed Be Local’, Washington Post, 21 December 2003. 
38 See a different view, Judge Robertson in his Separate Opinion in Kondewa case stated that ‘[...] the Special Court 
[...] is not accurately described in the Secretary-General’s report as a court of ‘mixed jurisdiction and 
composition’[...] is in reality an international court onto which a few national elements have been grafted.’, in: 
Kondewa (SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E)), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Establishment of 
Special Court Violates Constitution Sierra Leone, (25 May 2004), para. 15. 
39 Prosecutor v. Stankovic (IT-96-23/2-PT), Decision on referral of case under rule 11bis, Partly Confidential and Ex 




The view of the Referral Bench42 of the ICTY was that in the relevant context, which is Article 
9(1)43 of the Statute of the Tribunal, there is no apparent justification for giving to the phrase 
‘national court’ any meaning other than the normal connotation, which is ‘a court of or pertaining 
to a nation’. The ICTY stated that the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which the War 
Crimes Chamber is a component, is a court which has been established pursuant to the statutory 
law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is thus a court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a ‘national court.’  
Despite the conclusions made above, the qualification of the exact legal basis of hybrid courts is 
admittedly not straightforward; there exist considerable uncertainty and diverse views on this 
topic. For example, Nouwen considers the Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia, 
the Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo and the District Court of Dili in East Timor as 
all being part of the domestic system and their legal status that of a domestic court.44 Ambach on 
the other hand suggests that the Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo and the District 
Court of Dili in East Timor were set up by the UN Administration, and therefore are by nature 
international.45  
 
Terminological and conceptual difficulties of hybrid courts lay exactly in their combined/hybrid 
nature. On the one hand, if hybrid courts are incorporated into the domestic judicial structure of 
the state, they cannot be considered as international institutions “since they lack international 
legal personality”.46  On the other hand, they cannot be qualified as national courts “since apart 
from having a considerable amount of international personnel and exercising jurisdiction over 
                                                 
42 The establishment of the Special War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina enabled 
cases to be transferred from the ICTY to national judicial authorities. For a case to be referred to the SWCCh 
pursuant to Rule 11bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Referral Bench must be fully satisfied that 
the accused would be tried in accordance with international standards and that neither the level of responsibility of 
the accused nor the gravity of the crimes alleged in the indictment were factors that would make a referral to the 
national authorities inappropriate. According to Rule 11bis a referral may be made to a State: (a) in which the crimes 
were committed; (b) the accused was arrested; (c) or which has jurisdiction and is willing and adequately prepared to 
accept the case.   
43 Article 9(1) of the ICTY Statute reads as follows: “The International Tribunal and national courts shall have 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.” 
44 See supra note 25 for Nouwen’s detailed explanation of this issue. 
45 P. Ambach, ‘The Overlapping Jurisdictions between the International Criminal Court and Hybrid International 
Tribunals’, Bofaxe, No. 298E (2006), 




international crimes,”47some of them are established through an international treaty with the 
UN.48  
 
It needs to be borne in mind that these so-called hybrid courts have each a very different legal 
basis. Yet, they are ultimately established either under national law or international law.49 Still, 
the presented views already indicate the uncertainty with regard to finding the origins of their 
legal basis. This uncertainty may negatively affect the functioning of these courts in many 
areas,50 including the area of immunities, as we shall see below. 
1.2 Why Does the Legal Basis Matter? International v. National Courts Practice with 
Respect to Head of States 
 
The premise which will guide the following discussion is that the legal basis of the judicial 
bodies is crucial for granting or withdrawing immunities to heads of State. The discussion below 
serves only as an introduction to these issues which will be addressed and analyzed in more detail 
in the following chapters. Accordingly, the SCSL stated that ‘[t]he nature of the Tribunals has 
always been a relevant consideration in the question whether there is an exception to the principle 
of immunity’. Is a claim to immunity to be treated differently before international courts as 
opposed to national courts?  
 
As regards the practice of national courts, scholarly opinions vary significantly. The most 
important factor appears to be whether the senior official is serving or former one. Most of the 
legal scholars suggest  that  the operating principle in general international law is that a serving 
head of state is entitled to absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts, unless it has 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48  E.g. the SCSL or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
49 Nouwen thus suggests that “the manner of establishment is what distinguishes these courts from one another, not 
what unites them.” She is opposing calling hybrid courts ‘hybrid’ because of their hybrid roots as it, according to her, 
only confuses the picture. In: S.M.H. Nouwen, ‘‘Hybrid courts’, The hybrid category of a new type of international 
crimes courts’, 2 Utrecht Law Review 2, December, (2006). 
50 For example “the current hybrid courts, as part of a domestic system or established by an international agreement 
not binding on third States, do not benefit from compulsory cooperation as does the ICTY or ICTR. Also, there is a 
question of reconciling the international legal standards to be applied with the local laws and regulations. For 
example in case of Kosovo, the UN Secretary-General in his Report of 15 December 2000 stated that significant 
outstanding issues include a lack of clarity among local judges as to whether international human rights standards 
were supreme law in Kosovo.” In: A. Cassese, ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight 
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been waived by the State concerned. This appears to be the dominant view, but it is not the only 
view.51  
 
Some argue that the discussion about the legal nature of various courts and tribunals, national or 
international, would not have been necessary if the question of whether immunity applies to 
serving officials depended on factors other than the nature of the tribunals, for example, on the 
nature of the crime. In their opinion the focus should be made on the nature of the crime rather 
than the nature of the respective tribunal. 52  
 
This might be a relevant argument if one argues that crimes under international law remain 
crimes under international law regardless of whether they are prosecuted before international or 
national courts. In other words, international law remains to be equally applicable be it before 
international or national courts. Nevertheless, two counter-arguments can be raised in this 
respect.  
 
Firstly and most importantly, it is submitted that the relevant State practice and opinio iuris do 
not yet confirm this argument, specially with respect to prosecution of crimes under international 
law  committed by serving  Heads of State or senior state officials before national courts.  Serving 
officials such as Yerodia Ndombasi, Fidel Castro and Muammar Qaddafi were all said to enjoy 
immunity before national courts. Arguably were Augusto Pinochet still incumbent president, he 
would have enjoyed immunity as well. Thus, there is as yet no single case of indicting, 
prosecuting and convicting a serving Head of State in before national courts. 
 
And why do not State practice and opinio iuris confirm the above argument about the nature of 
the crime under international law prevailing over the nature of the tribunals and courts? In order 
to be able to prosecute crimes under international law before national courts, the state concerned 
                                                                                                                                                              
Against International Criminality’, in: C. Romano, A. Nollkaemper and J. Kleffner (eds.), Internationalized Criminal 
Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia and Kosovo,  Oxford University Press (2004).  
51 For different views see P. Sands, ‘Immunities before international courts’, Guest Lecture Serious of the Office of 
the Prosecutor (18 November 2003); A. Cassesse, ‘Why May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International 
Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, European Journal of International Law 13 (2002), pp. 
853-875. 
52 See S. M. H. Nouwen, ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest Warrant Case 
Continued’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), pp. 645–669.     
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has to have jurisdiction to start with. Usually the courts pursuing the prosecution are courts other 
than courts of the state of the accused. Therefore, on which basis do they assert jurisdiction if 
crimes are not committed on their territory, and the accused is not a national of that state? Here 
comes into play universal jurisdiction, which is by no means indisputable.53 In the view of the 
shortage of a direct international authority, it is difficult to establish the current international law 
relating to immunities before national courts. 
 
Many scholars and non-governmental organizations regard universal jurisdiction as 
uncontroversial and undisputable. It is often regarded as “one of the magic bullets in the 
campaign against impunity.”54 Still, nobody has been imprisoned recently as a result of the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction.55 Regardless of the seriousness of crimes under international 
law, states usually do not initiate prosecution unless there is either territorial or personal nexus, or 
a treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite.56   
 
It is not the aim of this thesis to deal with universal jurisdiction in detail.57 Moreover, the 
consideration of this problem is not strictly necessary to answering the question of Taylor’s 
immunities before the SCSL if the international nature of the SCSL is accepted. Thus, issues such 
as universal jurisdiction, together with an inter-connected issue of immunities before national 
courts will be discussed only in the context of, and to the extent necessary in, the Taylor case. 
Only arguments raised by the parties in this context will be addressed more deeply.    
 
As regards the practice of international courts, amicus curiae invited by the SCSL stated that “in 
respect of the jurisdictional immunities of serving heads of state both international law and 
practice has generally distinguished between proceedings before national and international courts. 
As regards the international courts and tribunals which have been established, practice has been 
                                                 
53 As Schabas puts it: “The exercise of universal jurisdiction reminds us of Mark Twain’s famous comment about the 
weather:Everyone talks about it, but nobody does anything about it.”. In: L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction, 




57 For deep survey and analysis of universal jurisdiction see L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction, International and 
Municipal Legal Perspectives, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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consistent, in that no serving head of state has been recognised as being entitled to rely on 
jurisdictional immunities.”58 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the argument that immunity can never be pleaded before 
international tribunals is an oversimplification of the issue. It is certainly true that there is a 
significant difference between proceedings before international as opposed to national courts in 
the context of immunities. Nonetheless, there is no general rule in international law which would 
provide for immunities only before national courts, would it be so, there will be little need for 
international courts and tribunals to justify in their Statutes derogation from immunities.  
 
The immunities should serve to prevent foreign states from interference into the affairs of other 
states and from exercising jurisdiction over another state.59 As long as the state concerned has not 
consented to the exercise of the jurisdiction, there is, according to Akande, no difference whether 
the exercise of this jurisdiction is done unilaterally by a foreign state or through some collective 
judicial body.60 He adds that to claim nonexistence of immunities before international tribunals 
without the consent by the relevant state will allow a subversion of the policy underpinning 
international law immunities.61  
 
Judge Shahabuddeen equally argued in his Dissenting opinion in Krstic that there has to be some 
indication in the establishing instrument of the international tribunal which allows for abrogation 
of immunities existing otherwise under international customary law:  
 
In my view, [...] there is no substance in the suggested automaticity of disappearance of the 
immunity just because of the establishment of international criminal courts [...].International 
criminal courts are established by States acting together, whether directly or indirectly as in the 
case of the Tribunal, which was established by the Security Council on behalf of States members 
of the United Nations. There is no basis for suggesting that by merely acting together to establish 
such a court States signify an intention to waive their individual functional immunities. A 
presumption of continuance of their immunities as these exist under international law is only 
                                                 
58 See Sands supra note 48. Moreover, it can be argued that this ‘consistent’ practice is supported only by one 
example of international court, i.e. the ICTY with respect to indicting then president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic. Yet, at the time of the decision, Milosevic was already a former Head of State. At 
least to the author’s knowledge, there is no other example of what is referred to as a consistent practice.      
59 D. Akande, ‘International law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’, American Journal of 




offset where some element in the decision to establish such a court shows that they agreed 
otherwise.62  
 
The proposition that immunities do not apply before international tribunals depends on the 
following factors which have to be considered: (i) The manner of the court’s establishment and 
identification of the exact legal basis for denying immunity. In other words, does the Statute of 
that international court deny immunity to a Head of State?63 (ii) The establishing instrument of 
the court must bind the concerned state.64 These factors will guide the analysis in an appropriate 
chapter below. 
 
The legal basis of the SCSL and the manner of its establishment is therefore of central 
importance in determining whether the SCSL can lawfully issue an indictment against a serving 
Head of State of country other than Sierra Leone who is alleged to have committed acts which 
fall within the SCSL’s subject matter, temporal and territorial jurisdiction.  
 
1.3 Brief History of the Conflict and Events Leading to the SCSL’s Establishment  
 
In 1991 Sierra Leone was invaded from Liberia by a rebel group which brought the country into a 
civil war lasting a decade. The civil war causes differ depending on those providing explanation. 
The following factors which likely contributed to the conflict were offered by the International 
Centre for Transitional Justice:   
 
1. “Sierra Leone had become a ‘failed state’, or the conflict was a crisis in government 
mainly driven by years of one-party rule and a small ruling elite’s exploitation of the 
country, widespread corruption and lack of accountability, and the disempowerment and 
militarization of youth. 
2. The conflict was driven by various internal factions wanting control of the country’s rich 
diamond mines. 
3. The conflict was a war driven by the personal political agendas of Charles Taylor, then-
                                                 
62 Prosecutor v Krstic (IT-98-33-T ), Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen,  (17 September 2003), 
paras. 11-12 (emphasis added). 
63 See Chatham House supra note 6.   
64 See Akande supra note 56.  
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president of Liberia, and Muammar al-Qadhafi, president of Libya. 
4. The conflict was a subtle ethnic conflict between the Mende-dominated Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP) and the Temne-dominated All People’s Congress (APC).”65 
 
In January 2002 a cease-fire was finally declared and the Lome Peace Agreement was signed.66 
Despite the peace agreement, fighting broke out again. It was soon recognized that the Lome 
Peace Agreement would not bring the conflict to an end. Foday Sankoh, leader of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), one of the main fighting factions, was ultimately taken into 
custody.  The government was however afraid that any trials of Foday Sankoh and other rebels 
from the RUF would aggravate the conflict. Therefore, President of Sierra Leone Kabbah wrote 
on 12 June 2000 to the Secretary-General of the UN and requested the assistance of the 
international community in order to create a court to try senior RUF officers.67 
 
In 2002, the SCSL was established with the mandate to try those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for the crimes committed during the conflict in that country. The seat of the SCSL 
was deliberately established in Freetown, in the country where the crimes occurred so that justice 
be not only done, but be seen to done, by and for the people of Sierra Leone. 
 
The SCSL is one of the latest versions of these mechanisms to address crimes under international 
law, taking place directly in the country where the crimes occurred in contrast with the 
proceedings in front of the ICTR and the ICTY taking place in Tanzania (Arusha) and The 
Netherlands (The Hague) respectively.  
 
2   The SCSL’s Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction in the Taylor case 
 
2.1 Facts and Procedure-History of the Case  
 
                                                 
65 T. Perriello, M. Wierda, ‘The Special Court for Sierra Leone under Scrutiny’, Prosecution Case Studies Series, the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (2006). 
66 For a deeper overview of the conflict see: No Peace Without Justice, ‘Conflict Mapping in Sierra Leone: 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law from 1991 to 2002’ (10 March 2004). 
67 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (S/2000/915), 4 October 
2000. 
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Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997. He remained Head of State until August 
2003. His tenure of office covered most of the period the SCSL has temporal jurisdiction 
pursuant to its mandate to try those primarily responsible for the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.68 
 
The Indictment against the first African incumbent Head of State was approved in March 2003. 
He was only the second head of State69 to be indicted while in office. The Indictment initially 
included 17 counts in which Taylor was accused of planning, instigating, ordering, committing or 
otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of crimes such as 
terrorizing the civilian population and collective punishments, unlawful killings, physical and in 
particular sexual violence, use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labour, looting and 
burning and attacks on peacekeepers.70 The Indictment claims, inter alia, that Taylor was acting 
with intent to gain access to the mineral wealth of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond wealth 
and to destabilize the state.71  
 
Subsequently, an international arrest warrant and order for Taylor’s transfer and detention were 
issued by the SCSL. The prosecutor decided to reveal the indictment and arrest warrant while 
Taylor was attending and participating in peace negotiations in Ghana in June 2003. Taylor 
stepped down from office in August 2003, only after strong international pressure.  
 
Taylor’s subsequent efforts to secure the arrest warrant withdrawal for his resignation were not 
successful. Therefore, Taylor accepted asylum that was offered by Nigeria. Taylor was offered 
the asylum on the basis that he will not interfere in Liberian and regional politics while in 
Nigeria. However, there was growing international concerns about Taylor’s activities in Nigeria, 
from where he allegedly continued to interfere in Liberian affairs which could have had a 
destabilizing effect in the Liberian peace process and the West African region as a whole.72  
                                                 
68 K. Novotna, ‘No Impunity for Charles Taylor’ (David Davies Prize Winning Article), Aberystwyth Journal of 
World Affairs 2 (2004), p. 90. 
69  First Head of State indicted while still in office was Slobodan Milosevic, President of the former Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.   
70 Prosecutor v. Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I), Indictment, 7 March 2003. The Indictment was amended on 16 March 
2006, reducing the number of counts to 11.  
71 Ibid. 
72 See Novotna supra note  65. 
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In response, the Nigerian authorities issued a statement warning Charles Taylor that the 
authorities would not tolerate any violations of the terms of his exile, which forbade all 
interference in Liberian affairs.73 According to the statement, Charles Taylor had not been 
granted immunity and was subject to Nigerian law, indicating that he could be arrested if he 
continues to violate these terms.  
 
The UN Security Council issued on 9 October 2003 a press statement74 expressing concern about 
attempts by Charles Taylor to influence events in Liberia, noting that his continued interference 
could threaten the carefully constructed peace agreement in Liberia.75 A year later, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1532 (2004), which demanded Taylor’s assets to be frozen. 
The Resolution expressed concern that Taylor has continuing access to misappropriated funds 
and property, which are used by him (and his associates) in order to engage in activities that 
undermine peace and stability in Liberia and the region.  
 
Except the involvement of the UN Security Council, the European Parliament and the US were 
also actively engaged. In 2005, the European Parliament passed a resolution which called on the 
European Union and its member states to act immediately in order to secure Taylor’s appearance 
before the SCSL.76 The US administration was urged by the US Congress to increase pressure on 
Nigeria to extradite Charles Taylor to the SCSL.77 All these events and international pressure led 
at the end (after Taylor’s attempt to escape) to Taylor’s apprehension and extradition to the 
SCSL.   
 
Submissions of the Parties and the SCSL’s Decision 
 
The parties’ submissions to the SCSL fall into two categories. The first category includes 
arguments of Defence counsel challenging the SCSL’s jurisdiction to try incumbent Head of 
                                                 
73 Ibid.  
74 Press Statement - U-N/Liberia (L-O), No. 2-308435 (by Peter Heinlein). This statement took into account a report 
presented by Hedi Annabi, the Head of the UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Resolution of EP (2005) is available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/ (last accessed 21 July 2007). 
77 See, inter alia, H.CON.RES.127, passed 4 May 2005 in the US House and on 10 May 2005 in the US Senate. 
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State and corresponding counterarguments by the Prosecution. In sum, Defence argued that by 
issuing an indictment and a warrant of arrest for President Taylor, various rules governing 
jurisdiction, immunity, and sovereign equality under international law were violated.  
 
The second category of arguments deals with the national law of Sierra Leone. In particularly it 
deals with the legality of the actions taken by the Prosecutor and the SCSL and their consistency 
with provisions of the Sierra Leone Constitution of 1991. This thesis will discuss only the 
international law aspects of the case. 
 
 
2.2 Defence Submissions on the Preliminary Motion  
 
The relevant part of Taylor’s Defence Motion was summarized in the Appeals Chamber of the 
SCSL (Appeals Chamber) decision as follows: 
 
1. Citing the judgment of the ICJ in the case between the Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium 
(‘Yerodia case’), as an incumbent Head of State at the time of his indictment, Charles Taylor 
enjoyed absolute immunity from criminal prosecution; 
2. Exceptions from diplomatic immunities78 can only derive from other rules of international law 
such as Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (‘UN 
Charter’); 
3. The Special Court does not have Chapter VII powers; therefore judicial orders from the Special 
Court have the quality of judicial orders from a national court; 
4. The indictment against Taylor was invalid due to his personal immunity from criminal 
prosecution.79 
 
The key submission of the Defence was thus that Taylor was entitled to absolute personal 
immunity from criminal prosecution as Liberia's incumbent Head of State at the time of his 
indictment. The Defence claimed that the immunity which attached to Taylor shielded him from 
prosecution whether on official business in a foreign State (Ghana) or in office in Liberia. 
                                                 
78 The distinction between ‘diplomatic immunity’ as opposed to ‘Head of State immunity’ is explained in Chapter 5.   
79 Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 14, para. 6.       
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Further, the Defence argued that immunity is not nullified by any exceptions arising under other 
international law rules, such as resolutions enacted by the Security Council pursuant to its 
Chapter VII powers permitting international criminal tribunals to indict incumbent Heads of State 
for serious international crimes. 
 
According to the Defence, because the SCSL was a Sierra Leonean tribunal that lacked Chapter 
VII powers, in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, it had no authority to assert jurisdiction over 
President Taylor since its judicial orders had the same (limited) force as those of a national court.  
 
The Defence analyzed Yerodia and stated that the immunity is more the matter of procedure than 
substance, with procedural immunity subsisting for as long as the official is in office. The 
Defence argued that the principles enunciated by the ICJ in Yerodia case establish that only an 
international court may indict a serving Head of State.  
 
The Defence noted that the SCSL does not meet the criteria of an international court and 
concluded that “the emphatic nature of the decision and the size of the majority endorsing it send 
a clear signal that the main judicial organ of the United Nations does not wish to subject the 
stability of international relations to disturbances originating from the decentralised judicial 
investigations of crimes, no matter how object they be.”80 It was argued that the SCSL’s approval 
of both the indictment and the arrest warrant failed to account for the ruling of the ICJ in Yerodia 
case. 
 
Furthermore the Defence submitted that the Pinochet case has a restricted impact in international 
law and only stands as evidence of the practice of the United Kingdom in relation to the 
application and interpretation of the Torture Convention of 1984. 
 
2.3 Prosecution’s Response 
 
In response to the substantive issues raised by the Defence, the Prosecution submitted, inter alia, 
that:  




1. Yerodia concerned  “the immunities of an incumbent Head of State from the jurisdiction of  the 
Courts of another state“ (which is not the case here) 
2. customary international law permits international criminal tribunals, of which the SCSL is an 
example, to indict serving Heads of State;  
3. the lack of Chapter VII powers does not encumber the SCSL’s jurisdiction over Heads of States 
because the International Criminal Court, which does not posses Chapter VII powers, similarly 
denies immunity to  Heads of States in respect of international crimes  
4. Taylor's indictment is for crimes committed within Sierra Leone rather than elsewhere; 
5. In the Yerodia case the ICJ enumerated the number of circumstances in which a Minister of 
Foreign Affairs could be prosecuted for international crimes, including international criminal 
courts where they have the jurisdiction. The Special Court is such an international criminal court 
and therefore has jurisdiction. Article 6(2) of the Statute clearly envisages that the Special Court 
has the power to try a Head of State.81 
 
2.4 The SCSL’s Decision – Legal Basis Part  
 
In determining its legal basis, the SCSL focused on reviewing two main instruments.  Firstly, the 
SCSL identified Resolution 1315 (2000) of the UN Security Council authorizing the Secretary 
General to negotiate an agreement on the Statute with the Government of Sierra Leone. Secondly, 
the SCSL pointed towards the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council 
pursuant to this resolution.  
 
Referring to Resolution 1315, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL (Appeals Chamber) noted that 
the SCSL is given an international mandate and is part of the international justice machinery. It 
further stated that the SCSL is not part of the domestic judicial system of Sierra Leone. The 
SCSL proceeded to address the availability of immunities for an incumbent Head of State. The 
SCSL first cited the relevant provision of its Statute, Article 6 (2), which lays down the rule that 
“[t]he official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such a person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment”. 
                                                 
81 Ibid., para. 9. 
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The SCSL identified and cited the relevant provisions of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg and the International Law Commission’s ‘Principles of International Law 
Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal’ and 
articles in the Statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. Based on these precedents, the 
Appeals Chamber concluded that “[t]he nature of the Tribunals has always been a relevant 
consideration in the question whether there is an exception to the principle of immunity”.82 
 
The SCSL then focused on the decision of the ICJ in Yerodia, in which the ICJ upheld the 
personal immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affair of the Republic of Congo, 
Yerodia Ndombasi. The SCSL approved this decision while stating that the ICJ had on the other 
hand confirmed the withdrawal of such immunities in relation to ‘certain international criminal 
courts’. The SCSL  provided the following rationale for the distinction to be made between 
international and domestic courts: “the principle of state immunity derives from the equality of 
sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to international criminal tribunals which are not 
organs of a state but derive their mandate from the international community.” 83 
 
The SCSL stated that the irrelevance of immunities before international criminal courts and 
tribunals is in any case an established rule of international law and that Article 6(2) of the SCSL 
Statute does not violate any jus cogens norms. The SCSL therefore concluded that personal 
immunity of Taylor could not constitute a bar to the jurisdiction of the SCSL. 
 
The Appeals Chamber ended its analysis by noting that as Taylor stepped down as Head of State 
prior to this decision, “[t]he immunity ratione personae which he claimed had ceased to attach to 
him. Even if he had succeeded in his application the consequence would have been to compel the 
Prosecutor to issue a fresh warrant”.84  
 
The Appeals Chamber came to the conclusion that: 
 
                                                 
82 Ibid., para. 49. 
83 Ibid., para. 51. 
84 Ibid., para. 59. 
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Although the SCSL was established by treaty, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which were each 
established by resolution of the Security Council in its exercise of powers by virtue of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, it was clear that the power of the Security Council to enter into an agreement 
for the establishment of the SCSL  was derived from the Charter of the United Nations both in 
regard to the general purposes of the United Nations as expressed in Article 1 of the Charter and 
the specific powers of the Security Council in Articles 39 and 41. These powers are wide enough 
to empower the Security Council to initiate, as it did by Resolution 1315 (2000), the establishment 
of the SCSL by Agreement with Sierra Leone.85  
 
The Appeals Chamber stated that Article 39 empowers the Security Council to determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace and emphasized that the Security Council in its Resolution 
1315 (200) indeed reiterated that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region.86 The Appeals Chamber continued that much issue 
had been made of the absence of Chapter VII powers in the SCSL. In the Appeals Chamber view, 
a proper understanding of those powers shows that the absence of the so-called Chapter VII 
powers does not by itself define the legal status of the SCSL.87 The Appeals Chamber stated that: 
 
it is manifest from the first sentence of Article 41, read disjunctively, that (i) The Security 
Council is empowered to ‘decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decision;’ and (ii) it may (at its discretion) call upon the members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures.88  
 
The conclusion was that the decisions referred to are decisions pursuant to Article 39. On the 
basis of its reasoning, the Appeals Chamber underlined that where the Security Council decides 
to establish a court as a measure to maintain or restore international peace and security, it may or 
may not, at the same time, contemporaneously, call upon the members of the United Nations to 
lend their cooperation to such court as a matter of obligation.89 The SCSL pointed out that in 
carrying out its duties under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the Security Council acts on behalf of the members of the United Nations. In this regard 
the Appeals Chamber held: 
 
                                                 
85 Ibid., para. 37. 
86 Ibid. 




the Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone is thus an agreement between all members of 
the United Nations and Sierra Leone. This fact makes the Agreement an expression of the will of the 
international community. The Special Court established in such circumstances is truly international.90 
 
The Appeals Chamber reaffirmed that the SCSL is not a national court of Sierra Leone and is not 
part of the judicial system of Sierra Leone, while determining its own legal basis in a mere six 
paragraphs, it came to the conclusion that the SCSL is indeed an international criminal court. 
 
2.5 Amicus Curiae Submission - Lack of so-called Chapter VII powers 
 
Since the classification of the SCSL as a national or international criminal court was crucial, the 
SCSL invited on the basis of its powers two amici curiae, Professors Sands and Orentlicher, to 
provide their submissions on these issues. The SCSL decided ‘to accept and gratefully adopt the 
conclusions’ reached by Sands. It is therefore useful to briefly recall Sand’s arguments 
supporting the international nature of the SCSL. 
 
Sands submitted that there can be no doubt that Resolution 1315 (2000) is binding, and that it 
expresses the authoritative view of the Security Council that the situation in Sierra Leone 
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.91 Sands went on to note that in  
respect of Chapter VII the SCSL is in no different position from the ICC and yet all three 
tribunals - the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC - were envisaged by the ICJ in the Yerodia case to 
have jurisdiction over a serving head of state.92  
 
Hence the possession of Chapter VII powers in his view may not be relevant at all to the question 
of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction (including in relation to any immunities). However, he 
admitted that the SCSL does not enjoy the consequences of powers which it may have had if it 
had been established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adding 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
91 P. Sands; D. Orentlicher, ‘Submissions of the Amicus Curiae on Head of State Immunity in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor’ (SCSL-2003-01-I), 
available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/Sands.pdf (last accessed 22 February 2008).   
92 Ibid. 
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that the Chapter VII powers may be relevant in order for the SCSL to be able to legally enforce 
cooperation with third States.93  
 
The Secretary-General was requested to address in his report the possibility of sharing the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY or ICTR with the SCSL.94 Even though this possibility was not 
accepted in the end, for Sands this clearly indicates the intention of the Security Council for the 
SCSL to have jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae which would be generally 
analogous to the ICTY and ICTR jurisdictions. In the same context, other amicus curiae of the 
SCSL, Orentlicher, stated that because the Secretary General considered that there was no legal 
obstacle to share the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY or ICTR, the SCSL is correctly considered to 
be an international court similar to the ICTY and ICTR.95  
 
Sands stated that the SCSL is neither part of the judiciary of Sierra Leone nor a national court. 
The SCSL bears, in his view, characteristics usually associated with classical international 
organisations (including legal personality; the capacity to enter into agreements with other 
international persons governed by international law; privileges and immunities; and an 
autonomous will distinct from that of its members).96  He refused the Liberia’s view that the 
SCSL “is not established as an international criminal court” and concluded that “the Special 
Court is an international court established by treaty” and should be thus treated as an international 
criminal court, with all that implies for the question of immunity for a serving head of state. 97 
 
Part II – Determination of the Legal Basis of the SCSL  
 
3 Legal Instruments  
 
The above description of the submissions of the parties, submissions of amicus curiae and the 
decision of the SCSL raises various legal issues. In this part, issues relating to the legal basis of 
                                                 
93 Including, for example, requests for assistance from third State.  
94 SC/2000/1315 (Paragraph 7 of the operative part). 
95 See supra note 88. 
96 See generally P. Sands, P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 5th edition (2001), p. 16. 
97 See supra note 88. 
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the SCSL will be analyzed more carefully before concluding whether the SCS is indeed an 
international court for the purposes of denying immunity to Head of State of third party.  
 
Both the establishment history and the constitutive legal instruments have bearing on the legal 
basis of the SCSL. They indicate the SCSL’s competences and jurisdiction. The SCSL did not 
pay much attention to elaborating on these constitutive instruments. This is especially regretful 
when bearing in mind that until the establishment of the SCSL, it had never been considered that 
the legal basis of an international criminal court could be an agreement between the UN and one 
or more states.  
 
It is therefore necessary to review these instruments more carefully in order to determine the 
SCSL’s legal basis. In the light of the revision of the constitutive instruments the relevant parts of 
the SCSL’s decision will be critically examined. Only then the (non)availability of immunity 
from jurisdiction can be assessed.  
 
3.1 The UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) 
 
UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (Resolution 1315) was adopted on 14 August 2000. The 
preamble expressed concerns about the very serious crimes committed within the territory of 
Sierra Leone and reiterated that “the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security in the region.”98 The SC stressed the need to bring about peace 
and security in the region, and to ensure that “persons who commit or authorize serious violations 
of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for those 
violations and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible 
to justice in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law.”99  
 
The SC further recognised in the preamble that “in the particular circumstances of Sierra Leone, a 
credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes committed there would 
end impunity and would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration 
                                                 
98 SC/2000/1315 (Preamble). 
99 Ibid. 
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and maintenance of peace.” The SC noted “the negative impact of the security situation on the 
administration of justice in Sierra Leone and the pressing need for international cooperation to 
assist in strengthening the judicial system of Sierra Leone.”100 
 
In this context, Resolution 1315 mentioned “the desire of the Government of Sierra Leone for 
assistance from the United Nations in establishing a strong and credible court that will meet the 
objectives of bringing justice and ensuring lasting peace.”101 In particular, the steps taken by the 
Secretary-General in order to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in establishing a special 
court were appreciated. The operative part of Resolution 1315 contains request to the Secretary-
General to “negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an 
independent special court consistent with this resolution…”.102 
  
As for the personal jurisdiction of the independent special court, Resolution 1315 recommended 
the exercise of jurisdiction “over persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission 
of the crimes referred to in paragraph 2 (crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law 
committed within the territory of Sierra Leone), including those leaders who, in committing such 
crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra 
Leone.”103 
 
Importantly, the Resolution 1315 also requested the Secretary-General, if necessary for the 
establishment and functioning of the special court: to include recommendations on concluding 
any additional agreements that may be required for the provision of international assistance. 
Lastly, it requested the Secretary-General to recommend whether the special court could receive, 
as necessary and feasible, expertise and advice from the ICTY and the ICTR. 
 
3.2 The Report of the Secretary-General   
 
                                                 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., (Operative part), para. 1 (emphasis added). 
103 Ibid., para. 3. 
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The Secretary-General was requested to submit a Report104 to the SC on the implementation of 
Resolution 1315, in particular on his consultations and negotiations with the Government of 
Sierra Leone concerning the establishment of the special court, including recommendations.105  
The Secretary-General examined and analysed the specificity and nature of the SCSL’ legal basis 




The legal nature of the Special Court, like that of any other legal entity, is determined 
 by its constitutive instrument. Unlike either the International Tribunals for the Former  
 Yugoslavia or for Rwanda, which were established by resolutions of the Security  
 Council and constituted as subsidiary organs of the United Nations, or national courts  
 established by law, the Special Court, as foreseen, is established by an Agreement 
 between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and is therefore a  
 treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition. […]. As a treaty- 
 based organ, the Special Court is not anchored in any existing system (i.e., United  
 Nations administrative law or the national law of the State of the seat) […]. 
 
 The Special Court has concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy over Sierra Leonean  
 courts. […] The primacy of the Special Court, however, is limited to the national courts  
 of Sierra Leone and does not extend to the courts of third States. Lacking the power to  
 assert its primacy over national courts in third States in connection with the crimes  
 committed in Sierra Leone, it also lacks the power to request the surrender of an  
 accused from any third State and to induce the compliance of its authorities with any  
 such request. In examining measures to enhance the deterrent powers of the Special  
 Court, the Security Council may wish to consider endowing it with Chapter VII powers  
 for the specific purpose of requesting the surrender of an accused from outside the  
 jurisdiction of the Court. Beyond its legal and technical aspects, which in many ways 
 resemble those of other international jurisdictions, the Special Court is Sierra Leone- 
 specific. […].106  
 
The Report also states that the SCSL is established outside the national court system and, along 
with the ICTY and ICTR, operates “independently of the relevant national system…”107 
 
3.3   The Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone  
 
                                                 
104 Report supra note 64.   
105 SC/2000/1315, para. 6. 
106 Part II of the Report supra note 64, paras. 9-11. 
107 Ibid., para. 39. 
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After the breakdown of the Abidjan and the Lome Peace Agreements108 the President of Sierra 
Leone sought international assistance with respect to the establishment of the independent court. 
The SC directed the Secretary-General by Resolution 1315 to report on how to implement this 
idea. The Agreement109 was subsequently concluded on 16 January 2002, after the adoption of 
Resolution 1315 and following the subsequent negotiations between the Secretary-General and 
the Government of Sierra Leone. There was no explicit statement about immunity in the 
Agreement.  Article 1(1) of the Agreement simply provided that “[t]here is hereby established a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996.”110 
 
The Agreement addressed issues such as the functioning of the SCSL in accordance with its 
Statute, its composition and appointment of judges,111 expenses of the SCSL (voluntary 
contributions from the international community), Management Committee, which will be 
established by interested States in order to assist the Secretary-General in obtaining adequate 
funding, and provide advice and policy direction on all non-judicial aspects, the seat of the 
SCSL112 and the important issue of juridical capacities in order to be also able to enter into 
agreements with other States if it is necessary for the exercise of its functions.113 
 
3.4 The Statute of the Special Court  
 
                                                 
108 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 
Lome Accord, 7 July 1999, available at www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html (last accessed 15 March 2007).  
109 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, available at www.sierraleone. org/specialcourtagreement.html 
(last accessed on 6 March 2005) (hereinafter, the Agreement). The Agreement was signed by Hans Corell on behalf 
of the UN and Solomon Berewa, Attorney General, on behalf of the Sierra Leone Government on 16 January 2002. 
110 Ibid., Art. 1(1). 
111 The Secretary-General shall appoint two of the three Trial Chamber judges and three of the five Appeals Chamber 
judges, (Art. 2(2)(a) and (c)). The UN Secretary-General also appoints the Prosecutor (Art. 3(1)) and the Registrar 
(Art. 4(1)). 
112 “The Special Court shall have its seat in Sierra Leone. The Court may meet away from its seat if it considers it 
necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions, and may be relocated outside Sierra Leone, if circumstances so 
require.” In: see supra note 106. Indeed, this situation has already arisen. The SCSL is holding the proceedings 
against Charles Taylor at the premises of the International Criminal Court at The Hague, The Netherlands. 
113 Ibid. 
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The Statute, which is annexed to the Agreement, describes all the applicable rules pertaining to 
the SCSL. Article 1(1) of the Statute provides that “[t]he Special Court shall, except as provided 
in subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing 
such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in 
Sierra Leone.”114 
 
The SCSL may prosecute persons who have committed crimes against humanity (Art. 2), 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Art. 3), 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Art. 4), and certain crimes under Sierra 
Leonean law (Art. 5). Article 6(2), crucial for the treatment of immunity, provides that: “[t]he 
official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment.”115 This provision is identical to the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, and broadly 
similar to that of the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals.  
 
Under Article 8 of the Statute the SCSL has concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts of 
Sierra Leone and primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone in prosecution of crimes 
falling under its jurisdiction. The SCSL can therefore request national courts of Sierra Leone to 
defer to its jurisdiction in certain cases. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR are 
applicable mutatis mutandis to the conduct of proceedings before the Special Court (Art.14). 
According to Article 25, the President of the SCSL is required to submit an annual report to the 
UN Secretary-General and to the Government of Sierra Leone.  
 
3.5 The Sierra Leonean Law of 2002  
 
                                                 
114 Statute of the SCSL, available at www.sc-sl.org (last accessed 28 October 2008). 
115 Ibid., Art. 6(2). 
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The Parliament of Sierra Leone passed the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002.116 
Since Sierra Leone has a dualist system with respect to reception of international law into 
domestic legal system, the Act provides for the implementation of the Agreement into domestic 
law of Sierra Leone. It includes provisions in relation to inviolability, immunity and personality. 
Section 11(2) of the Act deals with the position of the SCSL within the domestic judiciary.  
 
The Act clearly states that the Special Court shall not form part of the judiciary of Sierra 
Leone.117 The crimes before the SCSL are thus not prosecuted in the name of the Republic of 
Sierra Leone. In this respect the SCSL differs from the Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia 
which are established “in the existing court structure” of Cambodia. The same applies for the 
Special War Crimes Chamber established within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
4 Analysis: Bindings Effects of Resolution 1315 and Agreement  
 
4. 1 Legal Significance of the Lack of so-called Chapter VII powers  
 
The considerable attention given to binding effects of Resolution 1315 is justified by the fact that 
the SCSL attempted to establish its legal basis under Chapter VII powers. If it had been indeed 
the case, it would have had important implications for immunity afforded by contemporary 
international law to, at the time of the issuance of indictment, an incumbent Head of State.118 
This part will however reveal some shortcomings and inconsistencies in the SCSL’s reasoning 
and prove that the SCSL’s findings were not correct in this respect.  
 
Arguments of the SCSL relating to the bindings effects of Resolution 1315 were not very 
convincing. Some of them were rather confusing and even contradictory. The two following 
conclusions of the SCSL can serve as an illustration of this contradiction. Firstly, the SCSL 
underlined that where the Security Council decides to establish a court as a measure to maintain 
                                                 
116 (Ratification) Act 2002 is the ratification and implementation bill by the Parliament of Sierra Leone of the 
Agreement between the Government and the UN, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scslratificationact. 
pdf (last accessed 23 June 2007). 
117 Ibid. 
118 The impact of the legal basis of the court on immunities of Head of State is dealt with in the Chapter 5. In short, it 
is suggested that a right to claim immunity (as a part of customary international law) pre-exists also before 
international courts and can be thus lost only under certain circumstances.     
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or restore international peace and security, it may or may not, at the same time, call upon the 
members of the United Nations to lend their cooperation to such court as a matter of 
obligation.119  
 
By invoking the terminology of Chapter VII and terminology used in resolutions establishing the 
ICTY and ICTR, i.e. by using the phrase ‘as a measure to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’, the SCSL clearly tried to bring its establishment under the umbrella of 
Chapter VII powers, despite the fact that the language of Resolution 1315 does not support this 
conclusion. 
 
Secondly, the SCSL at the same time admitted that it was lacking Chapter VII powers by stating 
that the lack of Chapter VII powers “does not by itself define the legal status of the Special 
Court.”120 Similarly, in his amicus curiae submission Sands stated that despite the fact that 
Resolution 1315 was not adopted under Chapter VII, it however reiterated that the situation in 
Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.121 
 
Regarding the SCSL’s status as an international criminal tribunal, the SCSL in its decision 
focused on the UN’s involvement with the establishment of the SCSL. The main attention of the 
SCSL was given to the authority of the Security Council to enter into an agreement with the 
Government of Sierra Leone in order to establish the SCSL. According to the SCSL, this 
authority could emanate from: (1) the general purposes of the UN as expressed in Article 1 of the 
Charter,122 as well as (2) the specific powers under Article 39 and 41 to undertake appropriate 
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.123  
 
When examining the Resolution 1315, the SCSL concentrated on the second scenario, i.e. on the 
Security Council’s specific powers under Article 39 and 41. The Resolution 1315 authorized the 
UN Secretary-General to negotiate the establishment of the SCSL, while reaffirming in the 
preamble that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to constitute a threat to international peace 
                                                 
119 Prosecutor v. Taylor, para. 38.  
120  Ibid.  
121 P. Sands; D. Orentlicher, supra note 88.   
122 Article 1 states that one of the main purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. 
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and security.124 Does the mere reaffirmation in the preamble that the situation in Sierra Leone 
continued to constitute a threat to peace suffice to imply the binding effect of this Resolution?  
 
As opposed to the resolutions establishing the ICTY and the ICTR, which specifically invoked 
Article 41 of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council did not expressly state that 
it was acting under Chapter VII when authorizing the Secretary-General to conclude an 
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone. Even though the Security Council does not have 
to expressly refer to Chapter VII when taking mandatory measures, it has become standard 
practice for the SC to state that it is ‘acting under Chapter VII of the Charter’.125  
 
At the same time it is however true that the SC often determined the existence of a threat to peace 
without a reference to Chapter VII and thus left the legal basis in doubt.126  Accordingly, it may 
be argued that the Resolution 1315 could serve as another example of leaving its legal basis 
unclear. The SC reiterated that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security. But it did so only in a preamble, not in the operative part.  
 
Simma suggests that “unless other factors indicate that action under Chapter VII is envisaged, 
such resolutions should, according to the general rule, be interpreted narrowly.”127 Simma 
concludes that resolutions that cannot be considered as adopted under Chapter VII do not create 
binding effects for member States.128 It is submitted that there were no other factors indicating 
any intention to adopt Resolution 1315 under Chapter VII (except the terminology similar with 
Article 39). Racsmany notes that “instead of using classical Chapter VII verbs such as ‘demands’, 
or the imperative ‘shall’, the language falls even short of ‘calling upon’ states to undertake 
certain measures.”129 
                                                                                                                                                              
123 Prosecutor v. Taylor, para. 37. 
124 C. Jalloh, ‘Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor at the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone’, ASIL Insights (2004), available at http://www.asil.org/insigh145.cfm (last accessed 4 May 2007). 
125 B. Simma (ed.),The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2002), at p. 727. 
126 See e.g., SC Res 502 (1982) (‘breach of the peace’, Falkland conflict), SC Res 393 (1976) (Zambia, ‘armed 
conflic’ by South Africa), SC Res.1227 (1999) (Eritrea and Ethiopia).  
127 Simma, supra note 122, at p. 727. 
128 Ibid., p. 455. 
129 Z. Deen-Racsmany, ‘Prosecutor v. Taylor : The Status of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Its Implications 
for Immunity’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), quoting from P. C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council 
Starts Legislating’, 96 American Journal of International Law 901, p. 902.  
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In order to support the above conclusions, one can further point to the request of the President of 
the SCSL to the Security Council to grant the SCSL Chapter VII powers, which has never 
occurred.130 There would be no need for this request should the Resolution 1315 be already 
adopted under Chapter VII powers. There would also be little need to arrange any subsequent 
cooperation agreements as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the Resolution 1315.131 In subsequent 
resolutions regarding the situation in Sierra Leone, the Security Council has called upon all states 
to ‘cooperate fully’ with the SCSL but has not resorted to Chapter VII mandatory procedure.132  
The SCSL’s conclusions that Chapter VII powers are not determinative of its legal basis (i.e. 
whether it is an international or a national court) were certainly correct. Still, both the SCSL and 
Sands were nevertheless trying to imply the binding nature of Resolution 1315(2000). Why, if the 
international legal basis of the SCSL can be clearly shown by the fact that the SCSL was 
established by international agreement?  
 
It is suggested that proving the binding effects of Resolution 1315 either under Chapter VII or 
under other provisions of UN Charter (e.g. Article 25 in connection with Chapter VI) would have 
crucial implications with respect to issues such as (obligatory) cooperation of states other than 
Sierra Leone with the SCSL or, more importantly for our purposes, withdrawal of immunities of 
serving head of state should the agreement be found unsatisfactory in regulating these issues.133 It 
seems that the SCSL was trying to ‘cure’ shortcomings of a merely bilateral agreement by trying 
to imply binding effects of Resolution 1315 in order to justify the denial of immunity of a Head 
of State of another country. 
 
4.2 No Need for Chapter VII powers? 
 
The above conclusion that Resolution 1315 was not adopted under Chapter VII powers is further 
supported by the argument that, at least initially, there was no need for Chapter VII powers. The 
                                                 
130 See Report supra note 64, para. 10. See also Press Release of the SCSL (11 June 2003), available at www.sc-
sl.org (last accessed 18 October 2007). 
131 “Requests the Secretary-General to include recommendations on the following: (a) any additional agreements that 
may be required for the provision of the international assistance which will be necessary for the establishment and 
functioning of the special court”, at para. 8 of Resolution 1315. 
132 Security Council Resolutions 1478 (2003), 1508 (2003).   
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Security Council can define its involvement in any matter either under Chapter VI or Chapter 
VII. Involvement under Chapter VII powers allows the Security Council to ‘intervene’ in the 
respective state without the consent of that state. It is submitted that, in the case of Sierra Leone, 
there was actually no need to impose measures under Chapter VII.  
 
The SCSL’s establishment was initiated by the President of Sierra Leone. Hence, the Security 
Council’s involvement was based on the invitation and request for international assistance and 
help from the UN by Sierra Leone itself. The government of Sierra Leone was willing to cede 
jurisdiction to the SCSL, although its original request was limited to assistance in conducting 
trials of the RUF.134 The establishment of the SCSL was thus clearly consensual.135 
It is the first time that a court has been established on the basis of an agreement between the UN 
and a member state. Accordingly, there was no need for Chapter VII powers in a sense of 
imposing the establishment of the SCSL on Sierra Leone, as the situation differed significantly 
from the situations in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, where the two ad hoc tribunals were 
established without the consent, or even against the will, of the respective countries.  
 
During the proceedings before the SCSL’s Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor stated that “Chapter 
VII powers were needed in the case of Yugoslavia and Rwanda because there was no agreement 
with the States concerned. Here, in Sierra Leone, that is not the case.”136 Thus, the SCSL is a 
similar creation, but one which is in the Prosecutor’s view is actually more democratic, because 
Sierra Leone has explicitly agreed to its establishment. It was nevertheless acknowledged by both 
                                                                                                                                                              
133 The agreement and its binding effects will be dealt with in the Chapter 4.3. 
134 However, the SCSL itself did not approve the delegation of jurisdiction because it would arguably diminish its 
claim to its international nature. According to the SCSL “the establishment of the Special Court did not involve a 
transfer of jurisdiction of sovereignty by Sierra Leone…the judicial power exercised by the Special Court is not that 
of Sierra Leone, but that of the Special Court itself reflecting the interests of the international community”, in: 
Prosecutor v. Gbao (SCSL-04-15-AR72(E)), Decision on the Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court (25 May 2004), at para. 6. 
135 It can be however argued that the fact that Sierra Leone requested the help with establishment of the SCSL and 
therefore was certainly willing to cooperate in all respects does not mean that other state will be willing to 
voluntarily cooperate as well. Especially when it comes to requests for arrest and extradition of incumbent Head of 
State of another country. 
136 Report on proceedings before the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (1 November 2003), 
available online at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/WhatHappening/ReportAppealHearings01NOV03.html 
(last accessed 8 April 2006). 
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the Prosecutor and the Defence in the Fofana case137 that the SCSL may not enjoy all of the 
consequences which could flow if it had been established by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII.138  
 
While pointing to Chapter VII as the legal basis for concluding the agreement between the UN 
and Sierra Leone, the SCSL did not elaborate any further on the first scenario, i.e. how (or if) the 
general purposes of the UN as expressed in Article 1 of the Charter of the SC applied to its 
establishment.  
 
Article 1 states that one of the main purposes of the UN is to maintain international peace and 
security. Decisions taken under other Articles may be regarded, according to Simma, as 
“implementing such purposes and principles.”139 In his view, international peace and security can 
be promoted and achieved through various policies or measures. This can include (1) measures of 
collective security taken under Chapter VII and (2) adjustment or settlement of international 
disputes or situations under Chapter VI. Thus, Article 1 identifies another path to maintain 
international peace and security.140  
 
Since international peace and security can be achieved through various policies or measures, 
there is no need for the UN Charter to anticipate all possibilities to be used. The UN Charter for 
example also originally did not anticipate peacekeeping missions.141 Despite the fact the UN 
Charter does not explicitly mention peacekeeping, it was suggested that it can be implied from 
the UN’s primary purpose as stated in Article 1, i.e. the primary purpose of the UN being to 
maintain international peace and security.142 The UN therefore must possess powers and means 
                                                 
137 Prosecutor v. Fofana (SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E)), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Illegal 
Delegation of Jurisdiction by Sierra Leone (25 May 2004). 
138 Chapter VII powers are relevant e.g. to the enforceability against third States of acts of the SCSL. 
139 Simma supra note 122. 
140 Ibid. 
141 The UN Charter neither explicitly mentions nor authorizes peacekeeping. As the former UN Under Secretary-
General for Political Affairs stated, “[t]he technique of peace-keeping is a distinctive innovation by the United 
Nations. The Charter does not mention it. It was discovered, like penicillin. We came across it, while looking for 
something else, during an investigation of the guerrilla fighting in northern Greece in 1947.” In: B. Urquhart, ‘The 
United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping’, quoting from A. K. Henrikson (ed.), 
Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy 59, at p. 62 (1986).   
142 J. P. Bialke, ‘United Nations peace operations: applicable norms and the application of the law of armed conflict’, 
Air Force Law Review (2001).  
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in order to be able to fulfil its primary purpose.143 Construing the powers of the UN in the Charter 
too strictly could prevent the UN from acting. The Charter as a flexible legal and political 
document allows for many possible approaches and interpretations, depending upon the given 
international situation.144  
 
There was consensus among many policymakers that peace could be jeopardized if certain 
individuals and factions were not neutralized. The peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone was at 
that time the largest in history and the international community was already investing huge 
financial resources. The international community and the government of Sierra Leone both 
sought to stabilize the country. In this context, the study conducted by No Peace Without Justice 
Initiative noted that “the government wanted the RUF leadership tried without the instability that 
would result from national trials. The international community wanted to prosecute those 
responsible for attacks on UN peacekeepers. While the evaluation criteria have since changed to 
encompass notions of legacy and promoting the rule of law, the Special Court was originally 
conceptualized as central to redressing security concerns.”145  
 
Maintaining peace and security was therefore one of the main motivations for establishing the 
SCSL.146 The Security Council’s role in establishing the SCSL could be thus also justified under 
the general powers of the Security Council under Article 1 and their subsequent implementation 
through Chapter VI.147  
 
                                                 
143 “[T]he Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, 
are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to it in the course of its duties,” see Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11), para. 182. 
144 M. R. Berdal, ‘The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold War’, 7 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 71, 73 (1996). 
145 No Peace Without Justice Conflict Mapping in Sierra Leone: Violations of International Humanitarian Law from 
1991 to 2002 (10 March 2004), at p. 14, available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf. 
146 Ibid. This holds true especially for the United Kingdom, which led the military operations in Sierra Leone. 
147 In the Namibia Advisory Opinion the ICJ noted that “Article 24 of the UN Charter vests in the Security Council 
the necessary authority to take action such as that taken in the present case (i.e. the adoption of Resolution 276 
(1970)). The reference in paragraph 2 of this Article to specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters 
of the Charter does not exclude the existence of general powers to discharge the responsibilities conferred in 
paragraph 1.” See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep. 14, pp. 52–3, 
para. 110. 
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It is submitted that none of the two mentioned sources of authorization for the Security Council 
should be disputed. The power of the Security Council to enter into an agreement for the 
establishment of the SCSL was clearly derived from the Charter of the United Nations. There is 
no reason why the Security Council could not base its authority to act either (1) on the basis of 
the general purposes of the UN as expressed in Article 1 of the Charter or (2) on the basis of the 
specific powers under Article 39 and 41 to undertake appropriate measures to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.  
 
What can be subject to criticism is nevertheless the attempt of the SCSL to imply the binding 
effect of Resolution 1315 based allegedly on specific powers of the Security Council under 
Articles 39 and 41. Resolution 1315 contains just recommendations with respect to the subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction of the SCSL and requests for the Secretary-General 
to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone, to submit a report to the Security 
Council on the implementation of this resolution or to address in his report the questions of the 
temporal jurisdiction of the special court and other issues pertaining to the establishment of the 
SCSL. Resolution 1315 should be rather viewed as another path to promote and maintain 
international peace and security via adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations under Chapter VI (emphasis added).148  
 
While concluding that Resolution 1315 was not adopted under Chapter VII, the question can still 
be raised as to its binding effects. In other words, can resolutions adopted under Chapter VI in 
general, and Resolution 1315 in particular, be nevertheless still binding on the member states? 
The opinions vary, which might be one of the reasons why the SCSL did not wish to enter into 
this discussion and instead tried to bring adoption of Resolution 1315 under Chapter VII powers. 
However, the prevailing view is that under certain specific circumstances, some resolutions even 
if not adopted under Chapter VII, can still have binding legal effects.   
 
                                                 
148 Chapter VI actions usually rest in providing assistance to a state in order to help the state to maintain peace and   
order, however do not include the possibility of enforcement as oppose to actions under Chapter VII powers. 
Racsmany for example suggests that the establishment of the SCSL “is better compared to classical, consensual 
peacekeeping operations. These are generally considered as falling under Chapter VI or between Chapters VI and 
VII of the UN Charter.  Their legal basis is in any case commonly located outside of Chapter VII.” See Z. Racsmany, 
supra note 126, p.308. 
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Article 25 of the UN Charter provides that members of the United Nations “agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” It is 
submitted that Article 25 of the UN Charter does not necessarily apply only to decisions taken 
under Chapter VII (i.e. decisions on enforcement measures). According to Simma “if one 
followed such a narrow interpretation of Art. 25, the whole system set up for the maintenance of 
peace would be weakened, and it would clearly run counter to the overall concept of the Charter. 
Furthermore, Art. 25 would be unnecessary as the binding effect of decisions taken under 
Chapter VII could already be achieved on the basis of Art. 48 and Art 49.”149  
 
To further support this view, one can refer to the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.150 In this Advisory Opinion, the 
ICJ held that “the decisions made by the Security Council […] were adopted in conformity with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24151 and 25. The 
decisions are consequently binding on all States Members of the United Nations which are thus 
under obligation to accept and carry them out.”152 By adopting this contextual approach, the ICJ 
further stated:   
 
It has been contended that Article 25 of the Charter applies only to enforcement measures 
 adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. It is not possible to find in the Charter any support for 
this view. Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but applies to 
“the decisions of the Security Council” adopted in accordance with the Charter. Moreover, that 
Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after Article 24 in that part of the Charter 
which deals with the functions and powers of the Security Council…The language of a resolution 
of the Security Council should be carefully analyzed before a conclusion can be made as to its 
                                                 
149  Simma, supra note 122, p. 458.   
150 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (for a full citation see n. 
144). Compare with statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross in the ICJ Corfu Channel case, where he asserted that 
recommendations “under Chapter VI of the Charter, relating to methods of settling disputes which endanger peace, 
are binding.” He contested the applicability of Article 25 only to Chapter VII, by stating “that position, in my 
submission, is completely untenable. [Even] if one were to disregard […] the preparatory work and the 
commentaries, one could not find in the Charter itself a shred of support for the view that Article 25 is limited in its 
application to Chapter VII of the Charter”, See Corfu Channel Case, Prelim. Objections, Pleadings Vol. III, (1949) 
I.C.J.Rep, 72, pp. 76-77.   
151 In the Fofana case, the SCSL held that Article 24(1) may be invoked as the direct basis for action of the United 
Nations, i.e. for the establishment of the Agreement pursuant to the Resolution 1315 (2000). The SCSL further stated 
that Article 24(2), which refers to the specific powers granted to the Security Council is not exhaustive and must be 
read as fulfilling the function of closing the gaps.  It was argued by the Prosecutor that if the Security Council can 
establish an international tribunal under Article 41, there is no reason why it could not take the same action under 
Article 24 of the Charter when the state affected has consented. See supra note 134. 
152 See supra note 147, p. 53, para. 115.  
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binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers of  Article 25, the question is to be determined 
in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading 
to it, the Charter provision invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in 
determining the  legal consequences of the resolution of the Security Council.153 
 
 
Nonetheless, even if this contextual approach would be adopted and applied to Resolution 1315, 
it can be still concluded that in the light of interpretation of all circumstances (i.e. language and 
terms of the resolution, content, purpose, the discussions leading to its adoption, the Charter 
provision invoked etc.), Resolution 1315 was not intended to have binding effects. Resolution 
1315 contains mere recommendations regarding the subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction of the SCSL and requests for the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with 
the Government of Sierra Leone. 
 
Relevant findings can be summarized as follows:  
1. Proving that Resolution 1315 was indeed adopted under Chaper VII would have crucial 
implications for withdrawal of immunities of serving head of state should the agreement 
be found unsatisfactory in regulating these issues.  
2. It is however suggested that Resolution 1315, which recommended the establishment of 
the SCSL, was not adopted under Chapter VII powers despite the attempt of the SCSL to 
prove otherwise.  
3.  There are some doctrinal opinions154 and advisory opinions of the ICJ155 suggesting that 
the resolution can be still binding under certain circumstances even if not adopted under 
Chapter VII powers, it is however not a case in the context of Resolution 1315. There was 
no intention of the SC to adopt this resolution as binding for reasons provided above.  
4. Moreover, the SCSL was not even established by the SC Resolution (as opposed to the 
ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals). The SCSL was established by a bilateral agreement 
pursuant to Resolution 1315. For the reasons given, it is not possible to imply binding 
effects of the Resolution 1315 for the purposes of denying immunity to high ranking state 
officials as was in the case of the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR. The SCSL should 
instead direct its attention to the binding effects of agreement establishing the court. This 
                                                 
153 Ibid. 
154 See e.g. Simma supra note 122, p. 458. 
155 See supra note 147, the Namibia Case.  
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4.3 Agreement between the UN and the Republic of Sierra Leone and its Binding Effects  
 
Apart from Resolution 1315, attention needs to be given to the Agreement which actually 
establishes the SCSL. Analysis of the agreement is the next important step in order to identify for 
whom the agreement creates obligations under international law, i.e. who is a party to the 
agreement and thus bound by its provisions.  While focusing on the binding effects of Resolution 
135, the SCSL did not pay much attention to the Agreement as such.  
 
The SCSL adopted arguments and conclusions of both of the invited amici curiae.156 According 
to one amicus curiae, Orentlicher, the Security Council by authorizing the Secretary-General to 
negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone was not only carrying out its responsibility to maintain 
peace and security, but “in doing so, it was acting on behalf of all Members of the United 
Nations”.157  
 
Subsequently, the SCSL developed this argument further by stating that since the Security 
Council was acting “on behalf of all Members of the United Nations”, the agreement is to be 
regarded as “between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone”.158 According to the 
SCSL “this fact makes the Agreement an expression of the will of the international 
community”.159 However, it is rather disputable to assert, as the SCSL did, that only by virtue of 
the fact that states are members of the UN, they are therefore parties to the Agreement and 
accordingly are bound by its provisions.  
 
                                                 
156 See supra note 88. 
157 Ibid., para. 12. 
158 Prosecutor v. Taylor, para. 38. 
159 Ibid. 
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Both state practise and scholarly opinions160 show that the conclusion of the SCSL was not 
correct. For example Article 17 of the SCSL Statute states “the Government shall cooperate with 
all organs of the Special Court at all stages of the proceedings”. Article 17 therefore addresses 
obligation to cooperate only for the government of Sierra Leone. Are third states also obliged to 
cooperate with the SCSL? If so, on what legal basis?  
 
It is suggested that the Agreement cannot be interpreted so broadly. For example Damgaard 
claims that such consequences of UN membership were not envisaged when the UN Charter was 
adopted and further suggests that if the agreement was between all the UN member states and 
Sierra Leone, then such member states would assume obligations under such agreement.161 
However, no state expressed that it feels bound by this agreement. In fact, many states acted 
otherwise.162  
 
The SCSL itself approved the limitation of the SCSL when it stated that: “[w]hile acknowledging 
that the ICTY and ICTR have Chapter VII powers of the UN Charter ensuring that there is an 
obligation on all UN members to cooperate, in the case of the Special Court, as the Agreement is 
between the UN and Sierra Leone, its primacy is limited to Sierra Leone alone, as also the 
obligation to co-operate with the Special Court.”163  
 
Under these circumstances it is hard to maintain the position that the agreement is to be regarded 
as ‘between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone’. Becoming a party to a treaty 
                                                 
160 See e.g. “Since the Special Court was set up by treaty between Sierra Leone and the United Nations; no other 
state is party to this treaty and hence is not bound by it”, in: H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (Preface to 
Paperback Edition),  Oxford University Press (2004),  p. 23.  
161 Damgaard, supra note 4. 
162 Examples include: Ghana’s failure to arrest Taylor. Nigeria’s refusal to extradite Taylor. Moreover, Liberia 
initiated proceedings against Sierra Leone before the ICJ. Liberia referred to the Yerodia case and argued that the 
SCSL is not an international court that could deny immunity to its President. Liberia requested the ICJ to declare that 
“the issue of the indictment and the arrest warrant of 7 March 2003 and its international circulation, failed to respect 
the immunity from a criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of a Head of State which an incumbent President of 
the Republic of Liberia enjoys under international law.” Nevertheless, Sierra Leone did not accept the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ pursuant to article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. See ‘Liberia applies to the International Court of Justice in a 
dispute with Sierra Leone concerning an international arrest warrant issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
against the Liberian President’, ICJ Press Release No. 2003/26 (5 August 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/iprlast.html (last accessed 26 July 2008).    
163 Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-PT), Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on 
the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of the Accused Fofana, (3 March 2004), para. 69. 
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‘by interpretation’ does not respect principles of State sovereignty.164 Furthermore, the UN 
possesses separate legal personality and such as “is more than a sum of its members and the 
organization occupies a position in certain respects in detachment from its members.”165 As a 
general matter, member states are not bound by treaties concluded by the UN by the virtue of 
membership alone. 
 
At this point it is useful to reiterate what led the SCSL’s to emphasize the role and involvement 
of the Security Council in the establishment of the SCSL. As already indicated in the previous 
chapter, the SCSL did so arguably in order to imply binding effects of the Resolution and 
therefore by implication also binding effects of the Agreement for all member states of the UN. It 
is nevertheless suggested that individual member states remain third parties and are thus not 
bound by bilateral agreement (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt).  
 
An alternative approach, which was suggested by the Secretary-General in his Report, would be 
the conclusion of a multilateral treaty by all UN member states. On the one hand, this approach 
would allow the treaty to be opened for signature and ratification by all member states.166 The 
advantage of this approach would be the possibility of a detailed examination and elaboration of 
all issues relevant to the establishment of the international tribunal. States participating in the 
negotiation and conclusion of the treaty could then fully exercise their sovereign will, in 
particular whether they wish to become parties to the treaty or not.167  
 
On the other hand, this approach will admittedly require considerable time to establish the treaty 
and subsequently to achieve the required number of ratifications for entry into force.168  Even 
then, there could be no guarantee that ratifications will be received from those States which 
should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effective.169 Therefore, what sounds as legally 
more elegant approach, might prove unfeasible from the practical point of view.   
                                                 
164 See also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International  Organizations 1986 (Convention). Article 34 of the Convention provides that a treaty does not 
create either obligations or rights for a third state without the consent of that State.  
165 Reparation of Injuries Suffered in The Service of the United Nations, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 174. 






The following statements well illustrate the divergence of views on the way of establishment of 
the SCSL. In the Fofana case, applicant argued that the UN illegally delegated its powers in this 
respect and suggested that “the situation may have been different if the court had been set up by 
the agreement involving a wide group of concerned states.”170 In contrast, Judge Robertson 
expressed his views on the establishment of the SCSL through bilateral treaty by stating “it 
cannot in my judgement make any meaningful difference that the Security Council has chosen to 
authorise the Secretary-General to establish the Court with a similar purpose171 by agreement 
with a single state (a state where peace need to be restored) rather than by unilateral action or by 
action in agreement with many states... multilateral agreement would presumably make it more 
difficult for the Security Council to e.g. terminate a court, since it would need the agreement of a 
number of states rather than one.”172  
 
It is respectfully submitted that there is a ‘meaningful difference’ in establishing the court by 
bilateral or multilateral treaty. The SCSL’s legal basis is certainly international regardless of the 
number of parties to the treaty, i.e. whether it is established by bilateral or multilateral treaty.173 
The difference lies in the fact that the bilateral agreement is arguably binding only on Sierra 
Leone, it does not bind any other state. This conclusion has important consequences for the 
purposes of denying immunity of an incumbent head of state of a third country not party to the 
treaty as we shall see in the next chapter dealing with immunities.174  
 
By concluding that it is indeed an international court, the SCSL automatically assumed that it can 
deny immunity to the Head of State of another country.175 It is however submitted that the SCSL 
                                                 
170 Prosecutor v. Fofana, (SCSL-04-14-PT), Defence Reply to The Prosecution Response to the Preliminary Defence 
Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction: Illegal Delegation of Jurisdiction by Sierra Leone (30 November 2003), 
para. 7. 
171 By ‘a Court with the similar purpose’ is meant the ICTY. 
172 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman and Kamara (SCSL 2004-14-AR72(E)), ),Decision on Constitutionality and Lack 
of Jurisdiction, (13 March 2004), Separate Opinion of Judge Robertson, para. 5.  
173 The Secretary-General rightly held that the legal nature of the SCSL, as with any other legal entity, is determined 
by its constitutive instrument.  Since the constitutive instrument is an agreement between a state - Sierra Leone - and 
an international organization - the UN - the legal nature of the SCSL is international.   
174 This issue will be dealt with in more detail in the chapters dealing with immunity.  
175 See however different reasoning provided by Akande in respect to an assertion of jurisdiction over US nationals 
by the ICC, which can usually be interpreted as “a violation of the well-established principle that a treaty may not 
impose obligations on non-parties without the consent of those parties.” Akande however suggests that “there is no 
 45 
ignored the bilateral treaty nature of the SCSL and therefore did not correctly address the 
consequences flowing from such legal basis.176 To be more precise, the SCSL avoided addressing 
whether the court established by bilateral treaty indeed can deny immunity to an incumbent Head 
of State.177  
 
4.4 Hybrid Nature of the SCSL Not Recognised 
 
The SCSL is often referred to as a ‘hybrid court’.178 Some refer to its hybrid nature due to the 
fact that under the SCSL Statute, not only crimes under international law, but also certain crimes 
under Sierra Leonean law can be prosecuted and punished. The mixed composition of both 
internationals and Sierra Leoneans within the SCSL is often emphasized as another sign of the 
SCSL’s hybrid nature. However, as already noted in the introductory chapter, the law applied by 
the Court and the nationality of the staff do not determine the legal nature of the Court.179  
 
The hybrid nature of the SCSL was also emphasized by Richard Holbrooke who has been an 
active supporter of the establishment of the SCSL in the SC. After Resolution 1315 (2000) was 
passed, Holbrook described the proposed character of the SCSL in the following way “This court 
is going to be of a hybrid nature […]. We have not asked the United Nations to set up another 
international war crimes tribunal such as the ones that exist for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, but 
rather we have asked the Secretary-General to work with the Sierra Leone Government for what I 
would call a mixed court, although the actual phrase of this resolution is “Special Court.””180  
                                                                                                                                                              
provision in the ICC Statute that requires non-party states (as distinct from their nationals) to perform or to refrain 
from performing any actions. The Statute does not impose any obligations on or create any duties for non-party 
states. To be sure, the prosecution of non-party nationals might affect the interests of that non-party but this is not the 
same as saying that obligations are imposed on the non-party.” In: D. Akande, ‘International Law Immunities and the 
International Criminal Court’, American Journal of International Law, 98 (3), (2004), pp. 407-433. That might as 
well be, however this proposition can not be approved for the purposes of immunity of the serving head of state 
coming into play.  
176 Frulli supra note 18. 
177  Ibid.  
178 See e.g. S. Linton, ‘Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice’, (2001) 14 
Criminal Law Forum, pp. 185–246, at 231, describing the SCSL as a ‘new species of tribunal’ (internationalised 
domestic tribunals).   
179 See differently, R. Cryer, ‘A “Special Court” for Sierra Leone’, (2001) 50 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, pp. 435–446, at 437, who argues that the applicable law also determines the legal nature of a court. 
180 Statement by US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to the media, following adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution concerning the establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone at August 14, 2000.<http://www.sierra-
leone.org/specialcourt081400.html> (accessed September, 2007) (emphasis added). 
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At the beginning, Resolution 1315 anticipated the possibility for the SCSL to share the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY and the ICTR. However, according to UN Assistant Secretary-General 
Office of Legal affairs Zachlin “the judges in those two courts were very apprehensive of the 
legal efficacy of such an arrangement given the different nature of the two court systems.” He 
explained that the judges “felt that it would be very difficult for an appeals chamber of the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals to be sitting as an appeals chamber for a Sierra Leone Court 
which has its own statute and which is operating on the basis of its own jurisdictional provisions. 
And they felt very uncomfortable with that. And it seems to us that this was a very legitimate 
point.”181 
 
The SCSL’s legal nature, even if international due to its constitutive instrument, is to a large 
extent different from the two ad hoc tribunals or the ICC. The SCSL was labelled a ‘treaty-based 
sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition’.182 The SCSL is indeed Sierra Leone 
specific including the consequences attached to such a nature. Many of the legal choices made 
were intended to address the specificities of the Sierra Leonean conflict. As such, the SCSL has a 
unique place in international criminal justice system.183 Nevertheless, the analysis of the SCSL’s 
legal basis also revealed new legal issues and challenges, including the question of denying 
immunity to the incumbent Head of State of the country not party to a treaty which established 
the court.  
 
It can not be simply concluded that the SCSL is an international court through an attempt to 
compare it with the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. Shortcomings in its establishment via bilateral 
agreement should have been acknowledged and admitted by the SCSL in order not to sacrifice 
legal clarity and certainty. The SCSL is indeed international as for its legal basis. Nevertheless, it 
                                                 
181 Press Briefing by the UN Assistant Secretary-General Office of Legal Affairs, Ralph Zacklin, (September 2000), 
New York, available at www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourt0900.html > (last accessed 16 March 2008). 
182 Report, supra note 64, para. 9. 
183 Ibid. 
 47 
is proposed that the question is not simply whether the court is international as for its legal basis, 
but rather whether the court’s international legal basis allows for abrogation of immunities.184  
 
Undeniably, the SCSL possess various international features. Nevertheless, this identification 
does not precisely define the consequences for the purposes of denying immunity to high ranking 
officials of other states.185 In order to identify whether immunities apply before international 
tribunals depends, inter alia, on the manner of the court’s establishment and on the fact that the 
establishing instrument of the court binds the concerned state.186 Do these findings suggest that 
Taylor is completely immune from the exercise of jurisdiction by the SCSL? No, they rather 
propose that there is a serious legal issue to be discussed in the context of immunities available to 
a serving Head of State.  
 
The central conclusion of this chapter is therefore a finding that a classification of a judicial body 
as an international criminal court does not automatically mean that a state official has no 
immunity from prosecution before that body.187 This conclusion will be now applied to the 
Taylor case and will be supported by analysis of available state practice, relevant jurisprudence as 
well as by scholarly opinions in order to properly evaluate the SCSL’s approach in denying 
immunity ratione personae to a serving Head of State of another country.    
 




5  General Reflections on the Current Status of International Law with regard to the 
Relationship Between Individual Criminal Responsibility and the Law of Immunities 
 
After analyzing the first part of the SCSL’s decision (i.e. identification of its legal basis) and 
                                                 
184 See e.g. the discussion in Chatham House, one of the questions raised was “Could state A get around the 
obligation to provide immunity to the head of state B, by entering into a treaty with state C to set up an 
“international” court?”, supra note 5. 
185 See e.g. Racsmany “it may thus be concluded that the Sierra Leone–UN Agreement cannot endow the SCSL with 
a competence to set aside rights pertaining to other international legal persons under customary international law. 
Accordingly, it does not in and of itself render immunities of foreign officials irrelevant.”, supra note 126,  p. 313. 
186 See Akande, supra note 56. 
187 See Damgaard, supra note 4. 
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coming to the conclusion that the SCSL is indeed an international court, the second part of the 
decision (i.e. the denial of immunity to a serving head of state on its international legal basis) will 
be examined. Only immunities in relation to crimes under international law will be discussed in 
this chapter.188 
 
The analysis of this part of the decision aims at addressing the following issues: (1) competing 
legitimate international values (2) distinction between two kinds of immunities (immunity ratione 
personae and ratione materiae) and their availability to serving or former head of State (3) the 
distinction between national and international courts in the light of the ICJ decision in the 
Yerodia case and Pinochet cases since the SCSL relied on these cases in its reasoning. These 
findings will serve for drawing final conclusions.     
 
5.1 Individual criminal responsibility for crimes under international law 
 
The principle of individual criminal responsibility for crimes under international law is firmly 
established. The submission that international law was not construed to punish individuals and is 
therefore concerned only with acts of States was already rejected  by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
(Tribunal).  In this respect the Tribunal also refused the opinion that individuals who carried out 
acts of State are not responsible due to the protection provided by the doctrine of the State 
sovereignty.  
 
By stating that “international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon 
States has long been recognised”189, the Tribunal confirmed the role of individuals as subjects of 
international law. In its famous quote, the Tribunal further supported the above proposition 
holding that: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”190 
                                                 
188 Immunities in civil proceedings and questions of State immunity will not be discussed as consideration of these 
immunities is not necessary to answering the question of Taylor’s immunities before the SCSL itself. It will thus not 
form part of this thesis. 
189 See the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, Nuremberg 




Half century later, Watts in his 1994 Lectures at The Hague Academy of International Law 
emphasized the general acceptance of this principle while at the same time noting the lack of 
international judicial mechanisms to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes:  
 
States are artificial legal persons: they can only act through the institutions and agencies of the 
state, which means, ultimately, through its officials and other individuals acting on behalf of the 
state. For international conduct which is so serious as to be tainted with criminality to be regarded 
as attributable only to the impersonal state and not to the individuals who ordered or perpetrated it 
is both unrealistic and offensive to common notions of justice. The idea that individuals who 
commit international crimes are internationally accountable for them has now become an accepted 
part of international law. Problems in this area – such as the non-existence of any standing 
international tribunal to have jurisdiction over such crimes – have not affected the general 
acceptance of the principle of individual responsibility for international criminal conduct.191  
 
These rules developed in ‘the framework of an international legal order’ where there was no 
international criminal court and the enforcement was left to national courts.192 By now, the non-
existence of any international criminal tribunal is clearly no longer the problem. However, the 
enforcement of this principle can, in some circumstances, be frustrated by operation of another 
well established principle, immunity of a Head of State.193  
 
5.2 Immunities - A Necessary Evil or Workable Principle?  
 
In order to assess correctly the validity of the SCSL’s reasoning in Taylor, the fundamental 
principles of international law governing immunities of Head of State should be first briefly 
reviewed. The most well-defined area of immunities is that of diplomatic immunities, which has 
                                                 
191 A. Watts, ‘The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Government and Foreign 
Ministers’, in: Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de droit international, 1994, III, p. 82. For more authorities on this 
point see also A. Cassese ‘When May Senior State Officials be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on 
the Congo v Belgium Case’, 13 European Journal of International Law 853 (2002), Institut de Droit International, 
‘Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law’, Resolution 
of 26 August 2001, available at www.idi-iil.org (last accessed 27  June 2008). 
192 P. Sands, ‘International Law Transformed? From Pinochet to Congo...?’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 
16(2003), pp. 37-53. 
193 This is of course specially so before national courts. For example the US Supreme Court has long maintained that 
the courts of the United States are bound by suggestion of immunity. The US Supreme Court declared that the 
Executive Branch suggestion of immunity “must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determinative by the 
political arm of the Government that the court’s retention of jurisdiction would jeopardize the conduct of foreign 
relations.” In: Ex Parte Peru 318 U.S., para. 588. 
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always been regulated by its own regime.194 The contours of Head of State immunity are less 
clearly delineated.195  
  
There is no conventional law (as opposed to diplomatic immunities) and very limited state 
practice on this point. The doctrine of Head of State immunity is largely a matter of custom.196 
The lack of state practice is probably a reflection of the reluctance of states to interfere with 
heads of state.197 It is widely accepted that Heads of State enjoy at least the same immunities as 
diplomats: immunity ratione personae while in office, immunity ratione materiae for official acts 
which were carried out while in office.198 Often, Head of State immunity is indeed treated as a 
diplomatic immunity.199 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations has been used 
extensively in order to determine the treatment of Head of State.200 Nevertheless, it is suggested 
that Head of State immunity should be regarded as a separate category as was also confirmed, 
inter alia, by the ICJ in Yerodia.  
 
Stern provides the classical rationale for existence of immunities, adding however the different 
role of immunities before international courts and tribunals:  
 
It is quite clear that the theory of immunity has developed in order to protect a state and its agents 
from being tried in states’ courts, primarily in the jurisdiction of another state. The immunity from 
arrest as well as the immunity from jurisdiction or execution is based on the sovereign equality of 
states. But naturally, the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a state’s representative from 
being prosecuted before an international court, if this court is given jurisdiction over former or 
acting heads of state” (emphasis added).201 
 
Koller identifies other explanations for possible irrelevance of immunities in front of 
international courts: 
                                                 
194 R. Cryer; H. Frimain; D. Robinson, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge 
(2008), p. 424. 
195 J. L. Mallory, ‘Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Right of Kings,’ 86 
Columbia Law Review 169, 177 (1986). 
196 This was pronounced, inter alia, by the ICJ in Yerodia case. See also Akande, supra note 56; J. Bröhmer, State 
Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1997); A. Watts, supra note 189. 
197 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192. 
198 Ibid., p. 425. 
199 See  e.g. the Defence Submission in Prosecutor v . Taylor, at para. 6. 
200 E. Denza, Diplomatic Law (Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), 3d edition, Oxford 
(2008), at pp. 1 and  8. 
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(i) the ‘internationalness’ argument, which provides that as the rules governing international 
immunities are primarily derived from international law, the international community may 
determine when those immunities are no longer possible; (ii) the ‘world order/constitutional’ 
argument, which argues that as the UN Charter is the constitution of the international community, 
the Un Security Council could bind the entire international community; and (iii) the ‘treaty’ 
argument whereby states which each individually possess the right to waive their own  
immunities, agree by treaty to waive such immunities before an international criminal judicial 
body.202 
 
Piotrowicz also uses the ‘internationalness’ argument while explaining the difference between 
assertion of jurisdiction by international, as opposed to national, courts. Justification of a 
different approach taken by international courts lies, according to Piotrowicz, in the 
‘internationalness’ of the court, then “its assertion of jurisdiction in some way represents an 
interest so important that it overcomes the objections.”203 
 
Immunities are needed for maintaining a smooth conduct of international relations and protecting 
the officials from any possible interference, which could hamper their activities while 
representing the state in one way or the other. At the same time, the availability of immunities 
especially for commission of crimes under international law, can lead to serious injustice.204  
 
The limits of immunities were rarely tested in the past. In recent years, many states became active 
in this area, as illustrated by various cases of high-ranking officials reaching both national and 
international courts.205 As a consequence, “this emboldened State practice has brought to the fore 
many hidden or unresolved questions as to the boundaries between principles of accountability 
and immunity and has engendered a reassessment and restriction of the scope of immunities.”206 
 
The justifications for immunities have changed quite significantly over time. At the same time, it 
                                                                                                                                                              
201 B. Stern, ‘Immunities for Head of State: Where Do We Stand?’, in: M. Lattimer and P.Sands (eds.), Justice for 
Crimes Against Humanity, Hart Publishing (2003), p. 126.  
202 See D., S., Koller, ‘Immunities of Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the Yerodia judgement as it pertains to the 
Security Council and the International Criminal Court’, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 7 (2004), pp. 30-41, quoted from 
Damgaard supra note 4, p. 272. 
203 R. Piotrowicz, ‘Immunities of Foreign Ministers and their Exposure to Universal Jurisdiction, The Australian Law 
Journal 76 (2002), p. 293. 
204 R. Cryer; H. Frimain; D. Robinson, supra note 192. 
205 See the Chapter 1.2. 
206 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 193, at 422. 
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is obvious that not all of these justifications directly correspond and address the rationale for 
Head of State immunity. They can be very briefly summarized as follows. The immunity of rulers 
originally derives from the seventeenth century when states were ruled by Divine Right or feudal 
inheritance.207 At this time, the legal fiction of ‘personification’ was created. On this basis the 
Head of State was personified with the State itself.208  
 
Another legal fiction applying to ambassadors was ‘personal representation’, when the 
ambassador was viewed as an equivalent to his Head of State. Yet another legal fiction was so 
called ‘extraterritoriality’, when the premises of the mission were regarded as an extension of the 
sending State’s territory.209  Some commentators also add for consideration the need for political 
expediency210 and respect for the dignity of the Head of State as stated in the Schooner Exchange 
case by the ICJ.211 Nowadays, the ‘functional necessity’ argument took precedence over previous 
justifications.  
 
In the last century, and especially in recent decades, ‘there has been a considerable 
‘demystification’ in this area’.212 Traditional rationales such as the indignity of putting a head of 
State on trial carry less weight in the twenty-first century.213 The one remaining rationale for 
immunities is their value in facilitating international relations, i.e. functional necessity. This 
rationale remains very important; it has been described by the ICJ in the case of United States 
Diplomatic and consular Staff in Iran214 as the most fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of 
relations between States.215 
 
5.3 Immunity ratione materiae 
 
The term ‘immunity’ covers two distinct types of immunity, i.e. functional (ratione materiae) and 
personal (ratione personae) immunity. They coexist and somewhat overlap as long as the state 
                                                 
207 G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, Penguin Books, Allen Lane (2006), pp. 332-371. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192. 
210 See Tahiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (SDNY, 2001) at 290-1. 
211 See Schooner Exchange v. M’ Fadden 11 US 116 (1812), p. 137.   
212 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192, p. 426. 
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official is in office. It is important to distinguish between functional and personal immunity, and 
as obvious as it may sound, the courts often fail to do so.216  
 
Immunity ratione materiae attaches to all those who carry out duties of state. This immunity 
constitutes a substantive defence (i.e. it relates to substantive law), which means that any breach 
of national law of the foreign country or international law by the state official is attributable to 
the state instead of the state official. Thus, no individual criminal responsibility or civil liability 
can arise.217  
 
In this context, functional immunity as a well-established rule of customary international law 
dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was also restated by the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the Blaskic case in the following terms:  
 
[state] officials are mere instruments of a State and their official action can only be attributed to 
the State. They cannot be the subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that is not private but 
undertaken on behalf of the State. In other words, State officials cannot suffer the consequences of 
wrongful acts which are not attributable to them personally but to the State on whose behalf they 
act: they enjoy so-called ‘functional immunity’.218 
 
Moreover, functional immunity covers official acts of not only de iure, but also de facto state 
officials. This kind of immunity is permanent, i.e. it does not cease with the end of office because 
it is attributable to the state itself. Finally, this immunity may be invoked towards any other state, 
i.e. is erga omnes.219 
 
5.4 Immunity ratione personae  
 
Personal immunity is not limited to any particular conduct; it provides complete immunity to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
215 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192. 
216 See supra note 5, p. 862: Cassese argues that the ICJ failed to recognize the important distinction distinguish 
between the two immunities.   
217 Cassese supra note 48. 
218 Prosecutor v. Blaskic (IT-95-14-AR 108 bis), Objection to Issue of Subpoenae duces tecum, (29 October 1997), 
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219 Cassese, supra note 48. 
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person of certain office holders while they carry out important representative functions. Personal 
immunity is granted only to a comparatively small set of people, such as heads of state and 
diplomats accredited to a host country. It is temporary, in that it lasts only as long as the person is 
serving in that representative role. There is no exemption based on the seriousness of the alleged 
crime, or whether the acts were private or official, since the rationale is unconnected to the nature 
of the act.  
 
The rationale was stated as long ago as of 1740 by Wicquefort: “[…] if Princess had the Liberty 
of proceedings against the Embassador who negotiates with them on any Account, or under any 
Colour whatsoever, the Person of the Embassador would never be in Safety, because those who 
should have a Mind to make away with Him would never want a Pretext.”220 
 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities makes clear (for both types of immunity) that 
the purpose is not to benefit individuals but to protect official acts (immunity ratione materiae) or 
to facilitate international relations (immunity ratione personae).221 It is the state which is the 
beneficiary of the immunity, and it is the state which may waive it, irrespective of the wishes of 
the person claiming the immunity.  
 
However, the significant problem may arise with respect to a distinction between private or 
official acts in the context of international crimes. Where does this distinction leave international 
crimes? And is it useful at all to resort to this distinction in the context of international crimes?  
 
5.5 Private Versus Official Acts – Unanswerable Dilemma?  
 
Immunity ratione materiae can be invoked in respect of acts performed in an official capacity. 
Can international crimes be qualified as committed in an official capacity and hence be 
potentially covered by immunity ratione materiae?222 The problem of identifying a clear line 
                                                 
220 A. van Wicquefort, The Embassador and his Functions (2nd edn, London, 1740) (translated into English by John 
Digby), Ogdon, Juridical Bases 128-129, quoting from Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192, p. 423.  
221 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities, Preamble, paras. 2-4. 
222 It has also been asserted that there is no functional immunity in relation to international crimes before either 
national or international courts because such crimes amount to violations of jus cogens norms which prevail over the 
international rules on immunity because of its hierarchical superiority which overrides any rules of state immunity 
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between what constitutes private, as opposed to official, acts arose in both cases relied on by the 
SCSL (i.e. the Pinochet and Yerodia cases) as well as in the Taylor case as such.  
 
For example, in the Yerodia case, the ICJ held, inter alia, that a national court (providing it has 
jurisdiction) can try a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of another state for acts committed in a 
private capacity. The question is to be raised then whether international crimes are to be regarded 
as committed in a private or official capacity, which is by no means clear-cut.  
 
The origins of this distinction, which emerged historically, can be traced to State immunity.223 
The restrictive approach to state immunity distinguished between governmental actions which 
remained immune (acta iure imperii) and acts of a private or commercial nature, which were 
justiciable in foreign courts (acta iure gestionis). The distinction was never very satisfactory in 
practice, and national courts attempting to apply it came to different decisions on similar subjects. 
It is not surprising that the distinction which proved to cause such confusion in commercial cases 
is even less satisfactory when adjusted and invoked within international criminal law.224  The 
following comments prove this point.  
 
According to Cassese, the ICJ’s resort in the Yerodia case, to the distinction between acts 
performed ‘in a private capacity’ and ‘official acts’, is a distinction that, within the context of 
international crimes “proves ambiguous and indeed untenable.”225 Cassese argues that to hold, as 
the ICJ did, that state officials after leaving office may be prosecuted and punished for 
international crimes perpetrated while in office only if such crimes are regarded as acts 
committed in their ‘private capacity’, is “hardly consistent with the current pattern of 
                                                                                                                                                              
which would otherwise apply. In the view of the author of this thesis, such arguments are erroneous. As was rightly 
observed in Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia “the rule on state immunity is not derogation from the prohibition on 
torture. It is not a rule which authorizes or absolves its perpetrators from liability. There is no clash of norms.” See 
Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Claim No HQ 02 X01805), para. 19 (2). See also, “State immunity is a 
procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict 
the prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement. 
Arguably, then, there is no substantive content in the procedural plea of State Immunity upon which a jus cogens 
mandate can bite:” In: H. Fox supra note 158, p. 525.  However, compare with Robertson arguing that “the rule 
against torture overrides and dissolves the sovereign immunity which customary law granted to officials and heads of 
state”, in: Robertson supra note 205, p. 337. 
223 Compare however Cassese supra note 48, p. 868, arguing that origins of this distinction can be also found in a 
transposition of this distinction from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities.  
224 Robertson supra note 205. 
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international criminality and surely does not meet the demands of international criminal 
justice.”226  
 
Cassese notes that it is not conceivable that high ranking state officials (including both Foreign 
Ministers or Heads of State) may perpetrate crimes such as genocide, torture, war crimes or 
crimes against humanity in ‘a private capacity’. While performing, willingly condoning or 
ordering those acts, high ranking state officials rather act, according to Cassese, in the exercise of 
public functions. As regards crimes committed in private capacity, he gives examples such as 
personal offences which may include killing one’s wife (or husband), beating a servant or 
stealing from a shop.227    
 
Wouters, similarly with Cassese, points to the fact that treating international crimes as private 
acts “ignores the sad reality that in most cases those crimes are precisely committed by or with 
the support of high- ranking officials as part of a State’s policy, and thus fall within the scope of 
official acts.”228 Wirth also opposes the categorisation of international crimes as acts committed 
in private capacity. He provides a different rationale, explaining that this categorisation would 
imply that such acts cannot be attributed to the State for the purposes of State responsibility, 
which would prevent a State being ordered to pay compensation.229  
 
Firstly, it is suggested that the distinction between private and official acts should not be used in 
the context of international crimes. This terminology has different origins. It does not have roots 
in international criminal law230 and therefore causes significant problems not only in a theory, but 
also for national and international criminal courts, as will be illustrated in more detail on the 
Pinochet and Yerodia cases below.  
 
Nevertheless, since courts tend to employ this terminology, it would not be satisfactory and 
                                                                                                                                                              
225 See Cassese supra note 48, p. 867. 
226 A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford University Press (2005), p. 120. 
227 Ibid. 
228 J. Wouters, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case: Some Critical 
Remarks’, 16 Leiden Journal of Intenational Law 253 (2003), p. 262. 
229 S. Wirth, S. ‘Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s judgement in the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 European 
Journal of International Law 877 (2002). 
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useful to close the discussion simply by referring to unsuitability of this distinction. Two possible 
solutions are offered to the issue at hand. The first solution could be to avoid the discussion over 
irrelevance of immunity ratione materiae for international crimes by denying the official nature 
of these acts. International crimes could be then treated as private acts and no immunity ratione 
materiae could arise in this respect. Admittedly, this would be an easier way to proceed. At the 
same time, the legal construct which would turn international crimes into solely private acts 
seems rather artificial.231  
 
The second solution, and it is suggested that a more adequate one, is to consider international 
crimes as most often committed by state officials while holding certain public/official position, 
therefore in an official capacity.232 This position (and means available in such position) in turn 
allows for breaches of international law on such a scale that they can be qualified as international 
crimes. It follows that international crimes are seldom perpetrated in a private capacity. How to 
justify the denial of immunity ratione materiae for international crimes if committed in official 
capacity then?  
 
It is claimed that there exists a customary rule which removes immunity ratione materiae for 
state officials committing international crimes before international courts.233 This hypothesis will 
seek to be confirmed by supporting evidence such as relevant treaty provisions, Statutes of 
international criminal tribunals and also decisions of both international and national courts.234  
 
6 Practice before National and International Courts with Respect to Immunities  
                                                                                                                                                              
230 The original distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis applies to civil (not criminal) 
proceedings before courts of foreign states. 
231 Cassese is giving useful examples of this artificiality: Reich Minister  for Foreign Affairs (1938-1945) Joachim 
von Ribbentrop was convicted for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, which would  have 
to be regarded as ‘private acts’. The Japanese Foreign Minister (1943-1945) Shigemitsu was convicted for failing ‘to 
secure observance and prevent breaches of the law of war.’ In: Cassese, supra note 48, p. 870.  
232 In order to support this view, one may refer to the case of torture. One of the objective elements of the torture (not 
as a war crime or crime against humanity), but in the context of the Torture Convention, is “instigation or consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”(emphasis added). See Article 1 of the 
Torture Convention.   
233 On the other hand, immunity ratione personae proves to be more resilient. So far, this immunity was always 
upheld by national courts. The situation is different before international criminal courts, however, it is claimed that 
this immunity is not denied automatically simply on the international legal basis of the court   
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6.1 Practice before National Courts – The Yerodia Case  
 
Some scholars have criticized the SCSL’s attempt to defend its jurisdiction over Taylor in line 
with the judgment of the ICJ in the Yerodia case. However, the SCSL’s reliance on that judgment 
is simply explained by the fact that the judgment was raised by the Defence in its submission to 
the SCSL as one of its arguments. The Yerodia case was invoked and relied upon by both the 
Defence and the Prosecution in their submissions.  
 
Therefore, the SCSL had to address the legal arguments brought by the Defence while relying on 
the judgement in the Yerodia case. The way the SCSL did so is another matter, which can 
certainly be subject to criticism as well as the judgment and reasoning of the ICJ in the Yerodia 
case itself. The fact that the SCSL had to deal with the judgment in the Yerodia case does not 
mean that the SCSL had to follow this judgment.235 As well known, the judgement in the Yerodia 
case attracted an extensive criticism both in the legal scholarship236 and also in separate and 
dissenting opinions.237  
 
Since the Yerodia case played an important role in the courts reasoning, it is therefore useful to 
start with a brief recollection of the relevant findings of the ICJ in the case. Yet, it will be dealt 
with only in the context of, and to the extent necessary for, drawing conclusions with regard to 
the Taylor case. 
 
On 11 April 2000 Belgium court issued an international arrest warrant in absentia against 
Yerodia Ndombasi. He was charged with crimes against humanity and acts constituting grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. A case was 
subsequently brought to the ICJ by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC 
                                                                                                                                                              
234 Cassese suggests that this customary rule exists also in respect of national courts. See Cassese supra note 48, pp. 
870-874. Equally, Frulli posits that national/international legal basis of the court has no bearing on functional 
immunity as oppose to personal immunity. See Frulli supra note 17. 
235 The decisions of the ICJ are binding only for the parties to the dispute and only for the particular case. This does 
not however deny the high authority of ICJ decisions and often strong reliance on it by other international courts 
including the SCSL.    
236 Cassese, supra note, p. 864 ; Wouters, supra note,  pp. 257, 259–61. 
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disputed the legality of the circulation of an international arrest warrant by Belgium with respect 
to, at the time of the issuance of warrant, its incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yerodia 
Ndombasi. The ICJ had to examine whether Belgium has a jurisdiction under customary 
international law over an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs of another state and whether 
there is any exemption from this jurisdiction on the basis of immunities available to the high 
ranking officials.   
 
The DRC argued that, while in office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs of a state is entitled to 
absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the courts of any other state. According to the 
DRC, immunity has a functional purpose, i.e. to enable the official to carry out his duties without 
any interference. Moreover, the DRC suggested that this immunity covers all acts regardless of 
whether they were committed before the official took office, and also regardless of whether they 
could be characterized as ‘official acts’ or not.   
 
The DRC nevertheless accepted that “the fact that immunity might bar prosecution before a 
specific court or over a specific period does not mean that the same prosecution could not be 
brought, if appropriate, before another court which is not bound by that immunity, or at another 
time when the immunity no longer exists.”238  
 
Belgium argued that despite the existence of immunities of Ministers of Foreign Affairs from 
jurisdiction to be exercised by the courts of another state, in case of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity the incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs cannot claim immunity. Majority 
of judges was however of a different view. At the beginning the ICJ observed that “in 
international law it is firmly established that, as diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of 
high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal.”239 
The ICJ emphasized that immunities granted to e.g. Ministers for Foreign Affairs “are not 
granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on 
                                                                                                                                                              
237 See e.g., the Yerodia case supra note 15, Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad HocVan denWyngaert, paras. 26–8; 
Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paras. 78 and 85.  
238 Ibid., para. 48.  
239 Ibid., para. 51. 
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behalf of their respective States.”240 
 
With respect to the argumentation and distinction made by Belgium with regard to private or 
official acts, the ICJ confirmed the far reaching approach in regard to personal immunity by 
stating that:  
 
[t]he functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, 
he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity 
and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another State which 
would hinder him or her in the performance of their duties. In this respect, no distinction can be drawn 
between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an ‘official’ capacity, and those claimed to 
have been performed in a ‘private capacity’, or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person 
concerned assumed office and acts committed during the period of office.241    
 
The ICJ examined, inter alia, decisions of national courts such as the House of Lords (UK) and 
the Court of Cassation (France), and stated that “the rules concerning the immunity or criminal 
responsibility of persons having an official capacity…do not enable it to conclude that any such 
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts.”242 The ICJ 
considered also the rules concerning immunity in the legal instruments creating international 
criminal tribunals. It found that the relevant provisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charter243 
and of the ICTY244, ICTR245 and ICC246 Statutes denying immunity to high ranking officials can 
not serve as the basis for denying immunity before national courts.247 The ICJ therefore limited 
the possibility of prosecution of international crimes committed by serving state officials only to 
international courts. 
 
Despite criticism in the international legal scholarship, it is suggested that the ICJ’s conclusion is 
in this respect in line with decisions of national courts. Many other national courts have reached 
similar conclusions, dismissing charges against serving Heads of State on the basis of immunity. 
                                                 
240 Ibid., para. 53. 
241 Ibid., para. 54-55.  
242 Ibid. 
243 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremburg, Art. 7, Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6. 
244 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7 (2). 
245 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6 (2). 
246 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 27. 
247 The Yerodia case, supra note 15, para. 58. 
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State practice, one may add unfortunately, so far provides for upholding personal immunity of 
high ranking officials before national courts, despite the attempt of some scholars to prove or 
suggest otherwise.248  
 
Nevertheless, not all of the ICJ’s statements on the matter were very well reasoned or beyond 
dispute.249 The manner in which the ICJ refers to ‘firmly established’ rules of customary 
international law without referring to any examples of state practice, judicial authority (whether 
national or international), or academic commentary suggests that immunity was assumed rather 
than established.250  
 
In sum, the ICJ held that under customary international law a foreign minister (and by extension a 
head of state) enjoys absolute immunity from ‘any act of authority of another State’ regardless of 
the gravity of the charges involved, for as long as he or she remains in office.251  
 
The ICJ has in many respects considerably expanded the protection afforded by international law 
to foreign ministers. It has given priority to the need for foreign relations to be conducted 
unimpaired. The ICJ concluded, by 13 votes to 3, that the issue and circulation of an international 
arrest warrant: “constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards 
the DRC, in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the 
inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the DRC enjoyed under 
international law.”252 
 
Three votes against the majority decision came from Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
in a joint Separate Opinion. The concurring minority considered some of the issues more deeply 
and indeed differently from the majority. Their findings well illustrate the tension which the 
                                                 
248 See e.g. Frulli supra note 17, Nouwen supra note 49. 
249 These conclusions are however not necessary to be examined for the purposes of this thesis.  
250 As Sands has summarized: “The ICJ’s judgment is not accompanied by an identification or assessment of the 
examples which were examined, the process of deduction is not explained.  Without knowing what the ICJ looked at, 
or what it distinguished or applied, it is not possible to form a view as to the basis or merits of the Court’s reasoning 
or conclusion, and in particular its assumption (by way of starting point) that a rule of immunity exists. The overall 
conclusion, which may be correct, but we cannot know on the basis of what is presented, is more of an ex cathedra 
declaration than a reasoned judgment”, in: Sands supra note 88, p.49. 
251 Ibid. 
252 The Yerodia case, para. 78 (2). 
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SCSL was also faced with: “One of the challenges of present-day international law is to provide 
for stability of international relations and effective international intercourse while as the same 
time guaranteeing respect for human rights.” They further add “the international consensus that 
the perpetrators of international crimes should not go unpunished is being advanced by a flexible 
strategy, in which newly-established international criminal tribunals, treaty obligations and 
national courts all have their part to play.”253  
 
This statement can certainly be approved. However, it is suggested that international criminal 
tribunals have a different “part to play” than national courts. This was emphasized in the Separate 
Opinion of Judge Guillame. Judge Guillame referred to Belgium’s citation of the development of 
international criminal courts and opined that “this development was precisely in order to provide 
a remedy for the deficiencies of national courts, and the rules governing the jurisdiction of 
international courts as laid down by treaty or by the Security Council of course have no effect 
upon the jurisdiction of national courts.”254  
 
Importantly for our purposes, in the majority decision the judges also pronounced on situations 
when immunities might be actually irrelevant:  
 
(1) ‘First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their countries, and may 
thus be tried by those countries’ courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law’;  
(2) ‘Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they 
represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity’;  
(3) ‘Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office … he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities 
accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a 
court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts 
committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during 
that period in a private capacity’;   
(4) ‘Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings 
before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
                                                 
253 Ibid., para. 51.  
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Charter, and the future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention.’255  
 
Let us consider these assessments:  
(1) It is suggested that the first scenario is a rather theoretical option, especially considering that 
international crimes are mostly committed in countries with totalitarian regimes. Lord Brown-
Wilkinson supports this view by reasoning that “the fact that the local court had jurisdiction to 
deal with the international crime of torture was nothing to the point so long as the totalitarian 
regime remained in power: a totalitarian regime will not permit adjudication by its own courts on 
its own shortcomings. Hence the demand for some international machinery to repress state torture 
which is not dependent upon the local courts where the torture was committed.”256  
 
(2) The second scenario is possible but exceptional. For example, the Philippines government 
waived the immunity of the former President Marcos. Still, it is difficult to see many 
circumstances, if any, in which a state will waive immunity for a serving foreign minister.    
 
(3) In the third scenario, the ICJ is referring to the possibility to prosecute a former Foreign 
Minister of another state for acts committed in private capacity. However, the ICJ provides no 
assistance as to what would or would not be a private act. Would the court treat international 
crimes as private acts? If so, it would not reflect the reality in which international crimes are 
usually committed. On the other hand, if the ICJ would admit that international crimes can indeed 
be committed in official capacity, how would this finding be reconciled with immunity ratione 
materiae to be claimed before national courts for official acts?257   
 
It seems unlikely that the ICJ intended to prevent possible prosecutions of international crimes by 
                                                                                                                                                              
254 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Guillame, para. 11 (emphasis added). 
255 Ibid., para. 61.  
256 The Pinochet case III, Lord Brown-Wilkinson p. 199. 
257 Cassese suggests that there exists a customary rule which removes immunity ratione materiae for state officials 
committing international crimes not only before international courts, but also before national courts. In this respect, 
he provides an extensive summary of the national case-law from the United Kingdom, Israel, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, the United States, Spain and Mexico. For more see Cassese supra note 48, pp. 870-871. 
Cassese also points to a further element supporting the existence of such a customary rule, i.e. the pleadings of DRC 
and Belgium before the ICJ. The DRC explicitly admitted in the pleadings that there exists individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes even if committed by state official while in office. The DRC stated that on this 
point there was no disagreement with Belgium, Mémoire of 15 May 2001, at 39, para. 60, quoting from Cassese 
supra note 48, p. 871. 
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trying to label them as official acts being covered by functional immunity. Nevertheless, by 
failing to provide much needed explanation and guidance in this area, the ICJ prolongs the 
controversy over the distinction between private and official acts.  
 
(4) The fourth scenario is crucial for our purposes. Accordingly, it will be dealt with extensively 
below.  
 
6.2 The Pinochet Case - Special Status of International Courts With Respect to Prosecution 
of International Crimes and Status of International Crimes (Official versus Private Acts) 
 
The Defence in its submission in Taylor also referred to another case in which immunity was 
invoked – the Pinochet case.  While focusing on the Pinochet case, only those areas relevant for 
drawing conclusions with respect to the Taylor case will be addressed, i.e. the special status of 
international courts and the distinction between so-called private and official acts. This 
distinction has a significant bearing on the application of immunity ratione materiae.  
 
Both theory and practice struggle with proper distinction and qualification of what exactly 
constitutes and distinguishes private and official acts. Proper analysis and assessment of official 
versus private acts proved to be a problem in both the Pinochet and Yerodia cases. Equally, it is 
suggested that should the SCSL have had to address immunity ratione materiae instead of 
immunity ratione personae, the same problem would arise. 
 
The Pinochet case became one of the most important precedents for law on immunities since 
Nuremberg.258 The facts of the case are well known. Spain requested the extradition of the former 
head of State of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, on the basis of his alleged involvement in the 
commission of crimes including torture, hostage taking and conspiracy to murder committed in 
                                                 
258 The worldwide impact of the Pinochet case on the issue of immunities was well summarized by Orentlicher: “It 
took only an instant to reverse centuries of diplomatic practice and unsettle the deepest foundations of international 
law…For centuries, international law and the practice of states had affirmed a bedrock principle of mutual restraint 
among nations: courts of one state would not judge the sovereign acts of another. Now, a former Chilean head of 
state had been arrested by British authorities at the request of a Spanish magistrate on charges that were, at their core, 
about how the accused had governed Chile a quarter of a century before.” In: D. F. Orentlicher, ‘Whose Justice? 
Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles’, Georgetown Law Journal (2004), p. 1070. 
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Chile at the time when he was Head of state.259  
 
 
6.2.1 The Divisional Court’s Reasoning – Where to Draw a Line between Ordinary Versus 
Extraordinary Crimes?  
 
The Divisional Court as the first instance court in Pinochet applied the classical reasoning that a 
former head of State is not entitled to immunity for private acts but continues to enjoy functional 
immunity in respect of public acts performed by him as Head of State. The Nuremberg Charter 
and Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR were recognized not to have any bearing on the proceedings 
before national courts as ‘these were international tribunals, established by international 
agreement. They did not therefore violate principle that one sovereign State will not implead 
another in relation to its sovereign acts.’260  
 
As the court emphasized, Pinochet was charged ‘not with personally torturing or murdering 
victims or causing their disappearance, but with using the power of the State of which he was 
head to that end’.261 The Divisional Court thus found that these acts can be hardly described as 
‘private acts’, which is certainly a correct observation. Judge Collins stated that crimes against 
humanity are committed in the exercise of the official functions because ‘history shows that it has 
indeed on occasions been state policy to exterminate or oppress particular groups.’262 The court 
then concluded with the finding that since these acts had to be treated as official acts, Pinochet 
was entitled to claim immunity ratione materiae. Unfortunately, the court did not approve the 
possibility of an exception to immunity ratione materiae restricted to serious international 
crimes.263  
 
                                                 
259 See e.g. Warbrick, C., McGoldrick, D., Fox, H., ‘The First Pinochet Case: Immunity of a Former Head of State’, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 (1999). Warbrick, C.; McGoldrick; D., Barker, J., C. ‘The Future 
of Former Head of State Immunity after ex parte Pinochet’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 48, 
No.4 (1999). Also Warbrick, C.; McGoldrick; D.; Denza, E., ‘Ex parte Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap?’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (1999). 
260 R. v. Evans, ex parte Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (28 October 1998), Divisional Court (Chief Justice Bingham, 
Justice Collins and Justice Richard), para. 68. 
261 Ibid., para. 58. 
262 Ibid. (Justice Collins). 
263 Ibid., paras. 63-65. 
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In this regard, the court held that the argument about a special nature and seriousness of 
international crimes has ‘some attraction’, but it would be unclear ‘where to draw a line’.264 One 
can respectfully disagree with court on this point. There are clear and strict criteria for act(s) to 
qualify as international crimes (both subjective and objective elements are established in 
international criminal law with respect to crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide). 
Certain acts are thus either qualified as international crimes and accordingly prosecuted as such 
or not. It is up to the Prosecutor to prove its case on the basis of the evidence he/she has. The 
Court then ‘only’ has to draw a line between ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ unless it decides to grant 
immunity.   
 
The House of Lords Hearings    
 
The case in the House of Lords had to be considered twice, as the counsels for Pinochet 
challenged the first decision on the basis of links of Judge Hoffmann (one of the law lords) with 
Amnesty International, one of the interveners in the case. The first decision (Pinochet I)265 was 
thus set aside by the second decision (Pinochet II)266. A different judicial panel then gave a 
different final decision - Pinochet III.267 This final decision was not actually different in the 
outcome as such, Pinochet was denied immunity ratione materiae just as in the Pinochet I. 
However, the legal basis used and the law lords’ reasoning differed substantially.  
 
Although the decision in Pinochet I is not binding, it contains useful legal arguments by persons 
of high authority. Therefore, arguments used both in Pinochet I and III are offered below on the 
basis of the understanding that only legal arguments in Pinochet III are legally binding and 
certainly carry more weight. The following statements by the law lords reveal how the same court 
was divided twice on the same issue. In order to illustrate their approach with respect to areas 
under discussion, the relevant statements will be quoted in their entirety.  
 
                                                 
264 Ibid., para. 63. (Chief Justice Bingham). 
265 15 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC 61. 
266 16 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1 AC 
119. 
267 17 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 
147.). 
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6.2.2 The Pinochet Case I 
 
Three (out of five) judges found that serious international crimes cannot be covered by functional 
immunity. The core of the decision was that certain crimes under international law cannot be 
protected by international law as official functions, because they are at the same time condemned 
by all States as illegal. Furthermore, commission of some of these crimes including torture 
constitutes breach of ius cogens.268 
 
After examining the statutes and case-law of international courts from Nuremberg up to the 
present time, Lord Slynn strictly separated proceedings aiming at the withdrawal of immunity to 
head of states before international tribunals and courts as opposed to national courts. Lord Slynn 
pointed to the fact that no State practice, general consensus or conventional support has been 
shown with respect to the fact that “all crimes against international law should be justiciable in 
National Courts on the basis of the universality of jurisdiction . . . That international law crimes 
should be tried before international tribunals or in the perpetrator’s own state is one thing; that 
they should be impleaded without regard to a long-established customary international law rule in 
the courts of other states is another”(emphasis added).269 He strictly rejected the possibility of 
universality of jurisdiction for commission of international crimes. 
 
Lord Lloyd, the other judge in the minority, added “the setting up of these special international 
tribunals for the trial of those accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity, including 
torture, shows that such crimes, when committed by heads of state or other responsible 
government officials cannot be tried in the ordinary courts of other states”(emphasis added).270 
He noted that if the proceedings against heads of state could be initiated before national courts, 
there would be little need for the international tribunals. 
 
Being both in the minority, Lord Slynn and Lord Lloyd concluded on the basis of the above 
arguments that Pinochet was entitled to immunity before the House of Lords since it is a national 
                                                 
268 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192.  
269 15 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [2000] 1 AC 61, at 
p. 79. 
270 Ibid., at p. 98. 
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court. Hence, while recognizing the possibility to try heads of state for crimes under international 
law, only international criminal tribunals and courts were considered as proper fora for 
addressing these issues.  
 
On the other hand the majority held that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity ratione materiae 
before the House of Lords. Nevertheless, the law lords agreed that if Pinochet was still an 
incumbent head of state, he would have enjoyed immunity ratione personae, i.e. immunity both 
in respect of acts committed in an official and private capacity. Since Pinochet was no longer a 
head of state, only immunity ratione materiae was available for him to be invoked.  
 
For the immunity ratione materiae to be available, the conduct in question has to be qualified as 
committed in an official capacity, as opposed to immunity ratione personae, which is not 
dependent on the conduct in question being an official act. Accordingly, the legal argumentation 
turned to the question whether torture could be considered as an official act giving rise to 
immunity ratione materiae.271  
 
There was some support amongst the law lords in Pinochet I for the notion that despite the fact 
that head of state can commit certain unlawful acts, serious international crimes cannot be 
regarded as official acts. Those law lords in the majority (Lords Steyn, Nicholls and Hoffmann) 
considered that torture can not by its definition be part of the functions of a head of state.  
 
They held that Pinochet could claim absolute immunity only while in office (immunity ratione 
personae), but he could no longer claim immunity while out of office (immunity ratione 
materiae), since his acts could not have been regarded as official acts performed in the exercise 
of his functions. Lord Steyn observed that: “some acts of a head of state may fall beyond even the 
most enlarged meaning of official acts performed in the exercise of the functions of a head of 
state.”272  
 
                                                 
271 Similar discussion arose in the Yerodia case, where the minority gave the following explanation in their Separate 
Opinion “serious international crimes cannot be regarded as official acts because they are neither normal state 
functions nor functions that a state alone (in contrast to an individual) can perform”, para. 85.   
272 See supra note 266, p. 115. 
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Equally, Lord Nicholls considered that: “International law recognises, of course, that the 
functions of a head of state may include activities which are wrongful, even illegal, by the law of 
his own state or by the laws of other states. But international law has made plain that certain 
types of conduct, including torture and hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part of 
anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it does to everyone else; the 
contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international law.”273  
 
It was often claimed that after Pinochet I, international law would never be the same again since 
the majority held that the immunity applied only to those state officials who exercise legitimate 
state functions. ‘By no strech of imagination’, it was said, ‘could widespread torture be regarded 
as legitimate conduct by anyone, let alone a head of state’.274 That is all very well. However, one 
may query for what the immunity would be needed, if not for situations when the state official 
breaches the law?  
 
There would be little need for immunity when the state officials are indeed exercising solely 
legitimate functions of state as suggested by some law lords and approved by some scholars.275 
Therefore, the first part of the argument that certain acts are so unacceptable that they fall outside 
being protected by functional immunity even if executed on behalf of the state is approved. Those 
acts would qualify as international crimes for which individual criminal responsibility exists.  
 
Nevertheless, the second part of the argument that torture can accordingly not fall within 
legitimate functions of head of state is disputed for the following reasons. Torture can certainly 
not be regarded as legitimate function of head of state. Yet, nor can be any other breach of law 
for which immunity exists in the first place. Accordingly, the law lords’ line of argumentation is 
not very convincing in this respect.  
 
The decision of law lords in Pinochet I can be approved to the extent that commission of 
international crimes does not give a rise to functional immunity. In fact, Pinochet I represents a 
revolutionary decision in a sense that functional immunity was denied before national court for 
                                                 
273 Ibid., p. 109. 
274 Robertson supra note 205, p. 337. 
275 Ibid. 
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international crimes on the basis of general international law. But it is also claimed that law lords 
failed to acknowledge that international crimes are most often committed in official capacity.  
Pinochet I shows the reluctance to hold that torture (especially if institutionalized as a part of a 
State’s policy) is indeed committed in official capacity.  
 
Some law lords suggested that international crimes are not ‘official acts’ or ‘can not be regarded 
as part of the functions of head of state’. It is argued that it is possible to reconcile their approach 
in the following way. Committing international crimes in an official capacity does not necessarily 
turn them into ‘official acts’ for the purposes of functional immunity. They represent an 
exception to immunity ratione materiae, which is otherwise granted for all other breaches of 
national or international law which are committed in the name of or on behalf of state.276    
 
It can not be concluded that the holding of office metamorphoses international crimes committed 
while in office into the official acts of state. Moreover, if the state is a party to international 
treaties such as the Torture Convention or the Genocide Convention, it can not at the same time 
recognize acts condemned by these treaties as official functions attracting immunity (as 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Pinochet III).277 These crimes are indeed most often 
committed in an official capacity, however, they do not qualify as official acts. They qualify as 
international crimes implying the individual criminal responsibility of individuals regardless their 
position.  
 
As was already indicated above, the best solution would be to depart from the ‘false 
distinction’278 between private and official acts. International crimes are nor private, neither 
officials acts. They are simply international crimes. Yet, international crimes can be committed in 
official capacity, usually by abusing that official capacity.  
 
                                                 
276 For example, a breach of law which would qualify as an official act for which functional immunity would arise: if 
a state official signs abroad, on behalf of his state, a contract for a purchase of a building (for state’s purposes) and 
then fails to pay, he may not be sued because he will be covered by functional immunity once he leaves the office 
(while in office, he is covered by personal immunity). Cassese supra note 48, p. 869 (fn. 42).   
277 Compare also Article 13 of the Resolution of the 13th Committee of the Institut Droit International stating that 
although a former head of state enjoys immunity for acts committed in the course of his official duties, these do not 
include acts constituting international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes contrary to the Hague or Geneva 
Conventions and a single act of state torture contrary to the UN Convention Against Torture. 
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The emphasis should shift from ‘official’ or ‘private’ act, to a ‘criminal activity’ and its nature. It 
is well acknowledged that the former state official can be prosecuted for criminal activity carried 
out in a private capacity (such as ‘ordinary’ murder).279 It is difficult to see then, why criminal 
activity carried out on a large scale (such as ‘extraordinary’ crimes, e.g. systemic and 
institutionalized use of torture) could not be subject to prosecution. Especially if such acts are, 
due to their nature and seriousness, qualified as international crimes under customary 
international law and, as some claim, even give a rise to the exercise of a universal jurisdiction by 
domestic courts under certain circumstances.280 
 
6.2.3 The Pinochet Case III 
 
Six (out of seven) judges confirmed that a former head of State can be extradited for commission 
of torture.281 Each of the judges issued a separate opinion. Their reasoning was not always 
clear.282 As Cryer put it “As a result, the judgment is one of those gems of the common law 
system in which, however important the decision, it is difficult to identify ratio decidendi.”283  
 
In sum, the majority of the judges denied immunity ratione materiae on the basis of 
argumentation that since the Torture Convention requires the torture to be committed in the 
exercise of official capacity, the functional immunity cannot excuse international crimes (even if 
committed in an official capacity). It can also not coexist together with the granting of universal 
jurisdiction in relation to these acts by the Torture Convention. Otherwise, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in the context of the Torture Convention would have no practical meaning.  
 
The law lords in Pinochet III held that Pinochet would enjoy absolute immunity whilst in office; 
nevertheless since he was no longer in office, his acts could be subject to scrutiny for their 
compliance with the Torture Convention. The decision in Pinochet III can be characterized by a 
                                                                                                                                                              
278 See Nouwen supra note 49.   
279 As confirmed by the Yerodia case. 
280 See the Yerodia case, Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins. Kooijmans and Buergenthal at paras. 59-60 and 79-
85.  
281 See further C. Warbrick; D. McGoldrick; H. Fox, ‘The Pinochet Case No. 3’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 48 (1999).   
282 Cryer; Frimain; Robinson, supra note 192. 
283 Ibid., p. 430. 
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twist of approach to the question at hand. As opposed to Pinochet I, where the law lords decided 
on the basis of international law in general, in Pinochet III the attention was turned to the treaty 
instrument which played a central role-the Torture Convention. Accordingly, the ratio decidendi 
of Pinochet III is much more specific and narrow than Pinochet I.284 It is indeed limited, as also 
claimed by the Defence in the Taylor case, to the effect of the Torture Convention on claims to 
immunity ratione materiae.285  
 
6.2.4 National versus International Courts 
 
As regards the possibility of prosecution of heads of state by national courts, some law lords were 
as sceptical as their colleagues in Pinochet I. In that respect, Lord Browne-Wilkinson reiterated 
the classic principle of international law that one sovereign state can not adjudicate on the 
conduct of another state.286 Lord Goff stated that if the state intends to wave immunity in any 
treaty, it has do so expressly. He further referred to the above-mentioned statement by Watts287 
while emphasizing that Watts does not mention accountability before national courts, but only 
“international accountability.”  
 
On the other hand, Lord Millett took the view that national courts in fact can exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction under customary international law when crimes under international 
law are committed. This requires that courts of the respective state have an extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which in turn depends on the constitutional arrangements including the relationship 
between customary international law and the jurisdiction of its criminal courts.288  
 
                                                 
284 As the result, the law lords dramatically reduced the number of charges against Pinochet and kept only those 
extraditable under the Torture Convention. 
285 Moreover, in Bouzari v Iran, it was claimed that Pinochet III reasoning applies only with respect to criminal 
proceedings. It provides no support for damages for alleged torture in civil proceedings. Bouzari v Iran, Ontario 
Superior Court, (2002), 124 IRL 428, at para. 18. 
286 17 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 
147.), p. 209 (emphasis added). 
287 “The idea that individuals who commit international crimes are internationally accountable for them has now 
become an accepted part of international law. Problems in this area – such as the non-existence of any standing 
international tribunal to have jurisdiction over such crimes – have not affected the general acceptance of the 
principle of individual responsibility for international criminal conduct.” (emphasis added). In: Watts supra note 189, 
p. 82. 
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He noted that prosecution in national courts will certainly remain important even after the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal. With respect to any official position 
held by the accused he stated that “[i]n future those who commit atrocities against civilian 
populations must expect to be called to account if fundamental human rights are to be properly 
protected. In this context, the exalted rank of the accused can afford no defence.”289 The 
establishment of international criminal courts in his view does not in any way change this 
conclusion.  
 
6.2.5 Private versus Official acts 
 
Where the law lords ‘parted intellectual company’ was over whether torture falls outside the 
characterization as an official act (because they could never be a legitimate functions: Pinochet I) 
or whether they were indeed, as the US Supreme Court in Nelson held, ‘paradigm official 
acts’.290 As Robertson observed, “If Pinochet I and Pinochet III established anything, it is the 
unworkability in criminal law of the distinction between ‘public’ (or ‘official’) acts and ‘private’ 
acts - a distinction which the Court in US v. Noriega presciently predicted ‘may prove 
elusive’.”291  
 
In order to fall within the ambit of the Torture Convention, the conduct in question must be 
“inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or a 
person acting in public capacity.”292 It is therefore suggested that for the purposes of the 
definition of torture in the Torture Convention, the approach of some law lords in Pinochet I of 
treating torture as a private act is rather unhelpful. Their approach would be hard to reconcile 
with the definitional criteria set in the Torture Convention, although it is admitted that law lords 
in Pinochet I actually did not base their argumentation by relying on the Torture Convention.   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
288 17 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 
147.) p. 276. 
289 Ibid., p. 279. 
290 Robertson supra note 205, p. 366. 
291 Ibid., “It is easy to accept that Noriega’s drug trafficking while head of Panamian government could not constitute 
public acts done on behalf of the Panamian state. But compare charges against Pinochet-his alleged direction of 
systematic torture by army, police and secret service of his political opponents.” See US v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 
1506, 1521-22 (SD Fla. 1990).      
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In relation to the definitional criteria of torture in the Torture Convention, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson emphasized that: “…as a result all defendants in torture cases will be state officials. 
Yet, if the former head of state has immunity, the man most responsible will escape liability 
while his inferiors (the chief of police, junior army officers) who carried out his orders will be 
liable. I find it impossible to accept that this was the intention.”293 Equally, Lord Saville 
considered a head of state to be a person acting in an ‘official capacity’ for the purposes of the 
Torture Convention and added that he would consider a head of state ‘as a prime example of an 
official torturer.’294  
 
In relation to international crimes, Lord Phillips was of the view that there is no established rule 
of international law which would require immunity ratione materiae to be granted to the accused 
upon his demonstrating that he was acting in official capacity. 
 
While admitting that immunity ratione materiae protects all acts of the head of state which were 
performed in the exercise of his official functions, Lord Hope emphasized that there are two 
exceptions recognized by the customary international law “the first relates to criminal acts which 
the head of state did under the colour of his authority as head of state but which were in reality 
for his own pleasure or benefit … The second relates to acts the prohibition of which has 
acquired the status under international law of ius cogens.”295 
 
Pinochet III represents a unique approach of the majority of judges with regard to the 
interpretation and application of the Torture Convention. No explicit waiver of the immunity of a 
head of state can be found in the Torture Convention. Equally there is no indication that states 
parties to the Convention intended to abrogate immunity of its highest state representatives. Yet, 
this was the way of interpretation of the Torture Convention by the majority of judges.   
 
6.2.6 Impact of the Pinochet case on the Taylor case 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
292 Article 1 of the Torture Convention. 
293 See supra note 286, p. 218. 
294 Ibid., p. 266. 
295 Ibid., p. 243. 
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The decision of the House of Lords was complex and the reasoning of the law lords varied 
significantly. It was for this reason that the decision was used by both supporters and opponents 
of denying immunity to a former head of state. The Defence in Taylor took the opportunity to try 
to diminish the significance of the Pinochet decision by arguing that the case had a restricted 
impact in international law and stands only as evidence of the practice of the United Kingdom in 
relation to the application and interpretation of the Torture Convention of 1984. 
 
Indeed, by focusing solely on the Torture Convention of 1984, the law lords did not approve the 
reasoning of Pinochet I, i.e. that crimes under international law can be prosecuted by national 
courts under customary international law on the basis of universal jurisdiction. But what is 
important for the purposes of Taylor case, despite the significantly differing opinions with regard 
to prosecution of the high ranking state officials before national courts, there seemed to be a clear 
agreement (even within the law lords being in minority) that the situation would be different 
before international courts.  
 
To conclude, whatever the various views on the outcome of the Pinochet and Yerodia judgments 
may be, both of them undeniably confirm that jurisdictional immunities may not be claimed by 
serving high ranking officials before certain international criminal courts and tribunals as 
opposed to national courts. However, since both cases were concerned with immunities before 
national courts, their reasoning does not provide us with sufficient basis in order to draw 
conclusions with respect to immunities claimed before international courts.   
 
To consider this matter further, an overview of existing international courts and tribunals and 
their respective legal basis for denial of immunities is undertaken here, from which conclusions 
for the SCSL may be drawn. International criminal courts and tribunals mentioned by the ICJ in 
the Yerodia case (the fourth scenario)296 will be briefly introduced together with the relevant 
provisions of their Statutes relating to immunities. Scholarly opinions and judicial decisions will 
further serve to develop the analysis.     
                                                 
296 ‘Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before 
certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal 







6.3 Practice before International Tribunals  
 
6.3.1 Before Nuremberg 
 
It has been asserted that it is well established practice that there is no entitlement to rely on 
immunities before international tribunals and courts.297 The introductory part of this thesis 
however suggested that this proposition is oversimplification of issue of immunities. Let us now 
turn to examine the consistency of this claimed practice with respect to immunities before such 
tribunals and courts.  
 
The first effort to try a former head of state occurred during the peace negotiations after the First 
World War. The Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and Enforcement of 
Penalties (“Commission”) in its recommendations to prosecute Kaiser William II stated: “All 
persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without 
distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws 
and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution…”.298  
 
The U.S. representative at the Commission expressed disagreement with these recommendations; 
he did not approve the possibility to charge persons of offenses ‘against the laws of humanity.’299 
Moreover, he held that there are no precedents to be found in the modern practice of nations for 
                                                                                                                                                              
Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future International Criminal 
Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention.’, See the Yerodia case supra note 15, para 61.   
297 Sands supra note 88.   
298 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented 
to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29, 1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L. L. 95, 95–104 (1920) at 117, 
quoting from M., A., Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State Officials for 
Core International Crimes in States Like the United States That Are Not Parties to The Statute of The International 
Criminal Court, (2006) Brookland Journal of International Law 31 (2), p. 482.  
299 This can be viewed as an emergence of the category ‘crimes against humanity’ as later confirmed by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. 
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subjecting a Head of State to such criminal proceedings which could result into a degree of 
responsibility unknown to municipal or international law.300 As a result of complicated 
negotiations, charges against the German emperor Kaiser William II under Treaty of Versailles 
(1919) were framed as “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties” instead of breaches of international law.301   
 
This first attempt to punish a former head of state failed due to refusal of the Government of 
Netherlands to surrender German ex- emperor. The idea of providing for the establishment of a 
first special Tribunal expressed in Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles was not fulfilled at that 
time due to a refusal of the Dutch government. Nevertheless, this first attempt to punish a Head 
of State was an important step ahead in the area of responsibility of high ranking state officials. 
Since then, the notion of individual criminal responsibility for serious crimes before international 
courts started to emerge.  
 
6.3.2 The Nuremberg Trials  
 
Time passed. Yet another war initiated by Germany broke out. And yet another attempt to 
prosecute those responsible was made. The next opportunity to ‘test’ the existence of individual 
criminal responsibility of high ranking state officials for international crimes arose after the 
Second World War. The Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals were 
established. These tribunals were the first ever courts of law tasked with the difficult aim “to 
overcome the confusion of many tongues and the conflicting concepts of just procedure among 
                                                 
300 S.S. Gregory, ‘Criminal Responsibility of Sovereigns for Wilful Violations of the Laws of War’, 6 VA. L. REV. 
400, 414 (1920). In: Summers supra note 295, p. 482. 
301 Article 227 of Treaty of Versailles explicitly provided that: “The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign 
William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees 
essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: 
namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. It will be its duty to fix the punishment 
which it considers should be imposed. The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government 
of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex- Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.” In Treaty of 
Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 136, quoted from Summers supra note 295, 
p. 482. 
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divers systems of law, so as to reach a common judgment.”302 The International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East was established by the military order303 as opposed to the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
which was established by treaty.304   
 
The Nuremberg Tribunal (Tribunal) rejected the submission that international law was not 
construed to punish individuals and is therefore concerned only with acts of States. In this respect 
the Tribunal also rejected the notion that individuals who carried out acts of State are not 
responsible due to the protection provided by the doctrine of State sovereignty.305  
 
By stating that “international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon 
States has long been recognized”306, the Tribunal confirmed the capacity of individuals as 
subjects of international law. In a famous dictum, the Tribunal further reiterated the need for the 
concept of individual criminal responsibility by holding that “crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”307  
 
The Nuremberg Charter (Charter) explicitly confirmed the principle that no accused was entitled 
to claim his official position for purposes of relieving him of individual criminal responsibility 
before those Tribunals. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declared that: “The official position of 
defendants, whether heads of state or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not 
                                                 
302 Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal  of Justice Robert H. Jackson,  in: II Trial of the 
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 98-155 (Nuremberg: IMT, 1947) (‘the Blue Set’) 
available at  http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-7-8-1/ (last accessed 22 September 2007). 
303 Established by command of General  MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the South Pacific. 
304 See e.g. Lauterpacht explanation of  the tribunal’s competence, according to him, the tribunal was: “the joint 
exercise, by the four states which established the tribunal, of a right which each of them was entitled to exercise 
separately on its own responsibility in accordance with international law.” In: H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim’s 
International Law, vol. II, (7th edn. 1952), pp. 580–581. 
305 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgement  - The 
Law of the Charter, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judlawch.htm (last accessed 24 September 2007). 
306 Ibid. 
307 See supra note 303. 
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be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”308  
 
Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter similarly to Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter provided that: 
“Neither the position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to 
order of his government or a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from 
responsibility for any crime with which he is charged but such circumstances may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”309  
 
The Charter is an expression of the fact “that individuals have international duties which 
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State.”310 Even though 
the Tribunal admitted that international law provides under certain circumstances for protection 
of state representatives, it was at the same time emphasized that this does not apply to  acts 
declared as criminal by international law (emphasis added). The official position in such cases 
should in no way be serving as a shelter against punishment.311 The Tribunal expressed the same 
idea in the following part of its findings “He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain 
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action 
moves outside its competence under international law.”312   
 
The Charter was an expression of the practical effort of four victorious states.313 Nevertheless, 
standards set up in the Charter did not reflect only the views of signatories. Seventeen other states 
                                                 
308 United Nations Treaty Series, vol.82, p. 279, London (8 August 1945), quoted from Summers supra note 295. 
309 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo, 19 January 1946, T.I.A.S. 
1589, from Summers supra note 295.  
310 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, vol. I,(1947), p. 223. Quoted from 
‘Document: A/CN.4/L.2, Text of the Nürnberg Principles Adopted by the International Law Commission’, Extract 
from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1950), Vol. II, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l2.pdf. (last accessed 10 October 2008).  
311 See supra note 302. 
312 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (with the 
dissenting opinion of the Soviet Member) - Nuremberg 30th September and 1st October 1946 (Nuremberg 
Judgment), Cmd. 6964, Misc. No. 12 (London: H.M.S.O. 1946), pp. 41-42.  Quoted from ‘Universal jurisdiction: 
Belgian court has jurisdiction in Sharon case to investigate 1982 Sabra and Chatila killings’, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/001/2002/en/dom-IOR530012002en.html (last accessed 25 October 
2008). 
313 Following the decision of the Yalta conference President Truman requested representatives of the U.S. to propose 
an International Agreement. This proposal was submitted during the San Francisco Conference to Foreign Ministers 
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including Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Greece, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Australia, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, New Zealand, Venezuela, and 
India supported the content of the Charter. The Charter and its principles therefore represented 
the will of twenty one states and the shared sense of justice of most of the civilized world.  
 
At the time the acts were committed, there was no judicial precedent for the Charter and for 
principles it incorporated. At the same time, the broad acceptance of the Charter by the action of 
the above mentioned states was perceived as an agreement by the majority of the civilized nations 
to adapt settled principles to new situations. According to Justice Jackson, the Charter was not ex 
post facto legislation but recognition and expression of already existing international law.314 
Nonetheless, it can be also said that international law has been partly revisited in order to meet a 
change in circumstances. 
 
Justice Jackson emphasized in his report to the U.S. president an incorporation of Charter 
principles into a judicial precedent. While quoting Justice Cardozo’s comment that “[t]he power 
of the precedent is the power of the beaten path”, Justice Jackson went on to say that “one of the 
chief obstacles to this trial was the lack of a beaten path. A judgment such as has been rendered 
shifts the power of the precedent to the support of these rules of law. No one can hereafter deny 
or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives 
constitute law and law with a sanction.”315  
 
In December 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 95(1), 
affirming “the principles of International law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.” 316 In addition, the General Assembly by Resolution 
                                                                                                                                                              
of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of France. This proposal has become 
London agreement  with the Charter forming an integral part of this agreement. 
314 See e.g. citation of the UK Supreme Court of Judicature “The recognition that individuals may be held criminally 
responsible for offences against international law goes back at least to principles stated in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg...”.Quoted from R. G. Jones v The Ministry of the Interior Al-Mamlaka 
Al-Arabiya as Saudiya  (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) & Anor (28 October 2004), Transcript of the Handed Down 
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315 International Conference on Military Trials: London, 1945, Report to the President by Justice Jackson  (7 October 
1946), available at  http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/jack63.htm (last accessed 17 November 2008). 
316 G.A. Resolution 95(I) (11 December 1946). 
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177(II)317 directed the International Law Commission (ILC) to “treat as a matter of primary 
importance plans for their formulation.”318  
 
The ILC in 1950 indeed formulated these principles in its report. The key provision for our 
purposes, Principle III, which is actually based on Article 7 of the Charter, declares that: “The 
fact that a person who committed an act which constituted a crime under international law acted 
as Head of State or responsible official does not relieve him from responsibility under 
international law.”319 The Principle III was also supported by General Assembly’s acceptation of 
the ILC report.   
 
The ILC further reaffirmed the Principle III, for the first time in 1954, in its Article 3 of the Draft 
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft Code) providing “The fact 
that a person acted as Head of State or as responsible government official does not relieve him 
from responsibility for committing any of the offences defined in this Code.”320 For the second 
time, in 1991, the Article 13 of the Draft Code similarly provided “The official position of an 
individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind, and particularly the 
fact that he acts as head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal 
responsibility.”321 Finally, in 1996 the article 7 of the Draft Code stated “The official position of 
an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind, even if he acted as 
head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate 
punishment.”322   
 
Accordingly, all these steps led to the recognition that the Nuremberg principles are nowadays 
                                                 
317 G.A. Resolution 177(II), Formulation of the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgment of the Tribunal (21 November 1947). 
318 Ibid. 
319 Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the 
Tribunal, Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, available also at  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_1_1950.pdf. This principle was quoted e.g. by 
Lord Hutton in Pinochet III, p. 258. 
320 International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (28 July 
1954), 9 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 9) p. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).  
321 International Law Commission, Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
(19 July 1991), 46 U.N. G.A.O.R. (Supp. No. 10) p. 238, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991). 
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firmly established in international law.323 Yet, what did these principles exactly establish? What 
is the real meaning of Article 7? Does Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter actually remove 
personal immunity? The content of the Article 7 relates to the fact that a person who committed 
the crimes can be held responsible even if acting in official capacity (in other words, there is no 
immunity ratione materiae for such crimes). Arguably, the focus is on the attribution of criminal 
responsibility only.324   
 
6.3.3 After Nuremberg 
 
We will now proceed to assess further developments in the area of jurisdictional immunities 
before international courts. These developments will then be compared with the approach taken 
by the SCSL in the Taylor case.  
 
The examination of relevant practice of other international tribunals starts with the constitutive 
instruments of those tribunals, i.e. their statutes. The Statutes as one of the most important 
constitutive instruments determine the scope of legitimate action exercised by tribunals. The 
Statutes govern jurisdiction and functioning of the tribunals as such. Therefore, the below 
analysis is helpful in order to assess the correctness of the SCSL approach in terms of a larger 
theoretical and practical framework.  
 
6.3.3.1 Ad hoc international criminal tribunals  
 
Almost a half century after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, two ad hoc international criminal 
                                                                                                                                                              
322 International Law Commission, Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session 6 May - 26 July 1996, 51 U.N. 
G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 22), U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996). 
323 See supra note 318, pp. 374-75. See also, the Supreme Court of Israel in Eichmann held that Article 7 of the 
Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg ‘reflect[s] a rule of customary international law’, in Cassese supra note 48.  
“Number of the Nuremberg principles have been incorpotrated into the army fields manuals of the major political 
powers. National attitudes have been influenced and altered contructively by the Nuremberg proceedings and 
certainly have bearings on subsequent state practice in this field.” In: H., T., King, ‘The Limitations of Sovereignty 
from Nuremberg to Sarajevo’, 20 Canadian-U.S. Law Journal 173 (1994), p. 173. 
324 “Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While 
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional 
immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to 
whom it applies from all criminal responsibility”, in the Yerodia case, para. 60.  
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tribunals were established. Both the ICTY and ICTR were established pursuant to Security 
Council resolutions under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
The provision relevant for our purposes is the Article 7(2) of the Statute, which states that “the 
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor 
mitigate punishment.”325 The Article 6(2) of the Statute of the ICTR is taken verbatim from the 
Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute.  
 
The ICTY in the Blaskic case confirmed that there are some exceptions to the rule of general 
international law based on sovereign equality of States (par in parem non habet imperium), 
which otherwise provides for immunity of high-ranking state officials.326 On the one hand, acts 
committed in official capacity are usually attributed solely to the State, so the individual could 
not be held responsible for these acts.  
 
On the other hand, there are norms of international criminal law which prohibit genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. These norms provide, according to the ICTY, for exception to 
the rule based on sovereign equality, i.e. these acts attract individual criminal responsibility.327 
The ICTY in the Blaskic case held that “under these norms, those responsible for such crimes 
cannot invoke immunity from national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such 
crimes while acting in their official capacity”328 (emphasis added).  
 
But again, same question as with respect to the Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter can be raised. 
                                                 
325 Trial Chambers of the ICTY have held that the Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY ‘reflect[s] a rule of 
customary international law’, in cases of Karadzic and others, Furundzija, and Slobodan Milosevic. See Prosecutor 
v. Karadzic, (16 May 1995), para. 24; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, (10 December 1998), para. 140; Prosecutor v. 
Milosevic (8 November 2001), para 28. 
326 Prosecutor v.  Blaskic (110 ILR 687), Subpoena  (29 October 1997) p.710.  
327 See the ICJ observation in the Yerodia case: “Now it is generally recognised that in the case of such crimes, which 
are often committed by high officials who make use of the power invested in the State, immunity is never substantive 
and thus cannot exculpate the offender from personal criminal responsibility”, at para. 7. 
328 See supra note 325. More recently see the Karadzic case, “According to customary international law, there are 
some acts for which immunity from prosecution cannot be invoked before international tribunals”, para. 17. The 
ICTY considered “it well established  that any immunity agreement in respect of an accused indicted for genocide, 
war crimes and/or crimes against humanity before an international tribunal would be invalid under international 
 84 
What kind of immunity is addressed by Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute? Article 7(2) of the 
ICTY Statute is apparently similar to the wording of the Nuremberg Charter. It arguably relates 
only to the fact that the accused can not claim its official position as a substantial defence. 
Therefore, it can be argued that there is indeed criminal responsibility for such acts (Article 7(2) 
of the ICTY Statute removes functional immunity which cannot coexist with this responsibility), 
however for so long as the Head of State is in power, there is a procedural bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over these acts (Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute preserves personal immunity). 
Admittedly, this is not the only view. 
 
For example Gaeta argues that “...the Statutes of the two ad hoc Tribunals provide for a 
derogation from the legal regulation of personal immunities contained in customary international 
law.”329 While she admits that these Statutes do not envisage any such derogation explicitly, all 
UN member states are obliged to cooperate with the ICTY on the basis of the Chapter VII 
powers. By virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter, these obligations take precedence over 
customary and treaty obligations relating to personal immunity.330 “Consequently, whenever a 
Member State to which the International Tribunal issues an arrest warrant enjoining the detention 
of the Head of State of another UN member who happens to be on its territory executes the arrest 
warrant, by doing so it does not breach any customary or treaty obligations vis-à-vis the foreign 
State concerned.”331  
 
In the Milosevic case, it was assumed that the Security Council resolutions had removed any 
immunity, but the ICTY actually never pronounced on immunity of serving head of State. If the 
ICTY would have to do so, it would have to interpret Article 7(2) as removing also personal 
immunity. Moreover, the ICTY would have to either find that such an interpretation “would be 
compatible with customary international law, like the rules on criminal responsibility, or 
acknowledge that it is a deviation from customary international law, but authorized because of its 
                                                                                                                                                              
law”, Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic (IT-95-5/18-PT), Decision on Accused’s Second Motion fro Inspection and 
Disclosure: Immunity Issue, (17 December 2008), para. 25.   
329 P. Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’, in Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 




Chapter VII legal nature.”332  
 
While the ICTY never decided upon the exact scope of Article 7(2), it nevertheless confirmed the 
general validity of the Article and implicitly interpreted Article 7(2) as not only the attribution of 
criminal responsibility, but also referring to immunity ratione personae.333 Even if such a broad 
interpretation is accepted, the ICTY could arguably adopt a rather flexible interpretation of its 
Statute with Chapter VII backing. It is well known that when the Security Council takes measures 
under Chapter VII it deems necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, it 
can affect the rights of all member states, even against their will or without their consent.334  
 
6.3.3.2 The ICC 
 
As opposed to the two ad hoc tribunals established by the SC resolutions, the ICC was 
established by a multilateral treaty.335 ‘Irrelevance of official capacity’ is the exact title of Article 
27 dealing with immunities and provides that:  
 
“(1) This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.  
 
(2) Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction 
over such a person.”  
 
It is obvious that if compared with the Nuremberg Charter, the ICTY and ICTR provisions, 
Article 27 is the most far-reaching and has a considerable impact on international rules on 
personal immunities. To that extent the Rome Statute is innovative as it added to the criminal 
responsibility in paragraph 1 of Article 27, a second paragraph explicitly denying procedural 
                                                 
332 Nouwen supra note 49, p. 665. 
333 Ibid. 
334 D. Akande, ‘The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from ICC Prosecution?’, Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series (30 July 2008), available at 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Akande.pdf (last accessed 24 May 2007). 
335 The Rome Statute came into force in 9 July 2002 following the 60th ratification. 
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immunity. It represents a clear derogation from customary international law by complete removal 
of both immunities.336  
 
However, this derogation operates by virtue of Article 98(1) “only in the reciprocal relationships 
between States Parties to the Statute. In all other cases, in particular when requests for 
cooperation involve the question of personal immunities of officials of a State not party to the 
Statute, one has to fall back on the traditional legal regulation contained in international 
customary rules. Consequently, the Court may not make requests for cooperation entailing, for 
the requested State, a violation of international rules on personal immunities to the detriment of a 
State not party to the Statute”(emphasis added).337  
 
Article 27 of the ICC Statute is only effective regarding heads of States that are parties to the 
Statute. “Non-parties remain entitled to the immunities that they would possess under customary 
international law. This is because the immunity is a right of the State and not that of the 
individual. Other States cannot remove that immunity or affect the right of that non-party by a 
treaty to which the State possessing the immunity is not a party.”338 This observation has 
important implications for the SCSL and its powers to affect rights of third parties as we shall see 
in the following chapter.   
 
 To conclude, the Nuremberg Principles, the relevant articles in the Statutes of the ICTY and 
ICTR, and Article 27, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the ICC do not explicitly address the issue of 
personal immunity. Yet, the ICTY and ICTR can benefit from the Chapter VII powers and the 
ICC has its Article 27 paragraph 2. When does the SCSL’s Statute stand in relation to personal 
immunities?  
 
7 Submissions of Parties and the SCSL Decision with Respect to Immunities 
 
The first three possibilities mentioned by the ICJ in the Yerodia case with respect to the 
                                                 
336 Most recently, the ICTY in the Karadzic case also referred to Art. 27 of the ICC Statute. See Prosecutor v. 
Karadzic (Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT), Decision on Accused’s Second Motion fro Inspection and Disclosure: Immunity 
Issue, (17 December 2008). 
337 Gaeta supra note 327.  
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irrelevance of immunities evidently do not apply to Taylor’s case.339 However, in the fourth 
scenario, the ICJ indicated its views on the possibility of prosecuting crimes under international 
law before ‘certain international criminal court’. As regards the phrase ‘certain international 
criminal court’, the ICJ explicitly referred to all the international courts and tribunals described 
above. Can the SCSL be also qualified as such an international criminal court for the purposes of 
denying immunity to Taylor?     
 
The arguments of the parties and of the SCSL where already outlined in the first chapter. 
Therefore, they will be only briefly recalled for the clarity of the analysis which will follow. The 
Defence analyzed the Yerodia case and stated that the immunity is more a matter of procedure 
than substance with procedural immunity subsisting for as long as the official is in the office. The 
indictment against Taylor was according to the Defence invalid due to his personal immunity 
from criminal prosecution. The principal argument of the Defence was that Charles Taylor 
enjoyed absolute immunity from criminal prosecution. 
 
The Defence argued that the principles enunciated by the ICJ in the Yerodia case establish that 
only an international court may indict a serving Head of State. According to the Defence the 
SCSL does not meet the criteria of an international court. It emphasized that exceptions from 
diplomatic immunities can only derive from other rules of international law such as Security 
Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (‘UN Charter’). The SCSL 
does not have Chapter VII powers, therefore judicial orders from the Special Court have the 
quality of judicial orders from a national court. 
 
The Defence concluded that “the emphatic nature of the decision and the size of the majority 
endorsing it send a clear signal that the main judicial organ of the United Nations does not wish 
to subject the stability of international relations to disturbances originating from the decentralised 
                                                                                                                                                              
338 Akande supra note 332. 
339 See the Yerodia case, para 61: (1) ‘First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their 
countries, and may thus be tried by those countries’ courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law’; (2) 
‘Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have 
represented decides to waive that immunity’; (3) ‘Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office … he or she will 
no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction 
under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect 
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judicial investigations of crimes, no matter how object they be.”340 
 
According to the Prosecution the Yerodia case concerned “the immunities of an incumbent Head 
of State from the jurisdiction of the Courts of another state which is not the case here”.341 The 
prosecution maintained that the SCSL is such an example of international criminal tribunal for 
which customary international law permits to indict a serving Head of State.  
 
The lack of Chapter VII powers was not viewed by the Prosecution as an obstacle: it argued that 
the ICC equally lacks Chapter VII powers yet denies immunity to Heads of States in respect of 
international crimes. The Prosecution concluded that in the Yerodia case the ICJ enumerated the 
number of circumstances in which a Minister of Foreign Affairs could be prosecuted for 
international crimes, including international criminal courts where they have the jurisdiction. The 
SCSL is in the Prosecution’s view such an international criminal court and therefore has 
jurisdiction. Article 6(2) of the Statute clearly envisages that the SCSL has the power to try a 
Head of State. 
 
The SCSL started by identifiying and citing the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the International Law Commission’s ‘Principles of 
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of 
the Tribunal’ and pertinent provisions of the Statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR, the ICC. Based on 
these precedents, the SCSL concluded that ‘[t]he nature of the Tribunals has always been a 
relevant consideration in the question whether there is an exception to the principle of 
immunity’.342 The SCSL then addressed the Yerodia case. 
 
The SCSL first noted that the ICJ confirmed the personal immunities of incumbent Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs before national courts. At the same time the SCSL interpreted the ICJ’s reasoning 
as meaning that the ICJ however confirmed the irrelevance of immunities in relation to ‘certain 
international criminal courts’. The SCSL justified the different approach on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                                              
of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during 
that period in a private capacity’.    
340 Prosecutor v. Taylor, para. 15. 
341 Ibid., para. 9 (d). 
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distinction between international and national courts by stating that: “the principle of state 
immunity derives from the equality of sovereign states and therefore has no relevance to 
international criminal tribunals which are not organs of a state but derive their mandate from the 
international community.”343  
 
It further stated that it is in any case an established rule of international law which confirms the 
irrelevance of immunities before international criminal courts and that Article 6(2) of its Statute 
does not violate any jus cogens norms. On the basis of the above arguments, the SCSL held that 
there is no bar to the jurisdiction of the SCSL in relation to Taylor’s personal immunity.  
 
Finally, the SCSL concluded that since Taylor ceased to be a Head of State prior to this decision, 
‘[t]he immunity ratione personae which he claimed had ceased to attach to him. Even if he had 
succeeded in his application the consequence would have been to compel the Prosecutor to issue 
a fresh warrant’.344  
 
The findings of the SCSL in line with the Yerodia case are hardly surprising. It was in the very 
interest of the SCSL to define itself as an international criminal court with all ‘the belongings’ 
necessary for denying the immunity. Were these findings actually correct? 
 
7.1 Jurisdiction As a Precondition For Withdrawal of Immunity 
 
Any immunity analysis is necessarily interconnected with establishing the jurisdiction of that 
particular judicial body in the first place. Logically, the question of jurisdiction must be decided 
first before considering the availability of any immunnity. In other words, jurisdiction precedes 
immunity.  
 
The Statute of the SCSL provides the basis for jurisdiction in the Article 1 which states: “The 
Special Court shall . . . have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
342 Ibid., para. 49. 
343 Ibid., para 51. 
344 Ibid., para 59. 
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territory of Sierra Leone, since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing 
such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in 
Sierra Leone”. 
 
Originally, the previous version of the SC resolution drafted by the United States contained a 
phrase restricting jurisdiction only to ‘senior Sierra Leone nationals’; this was later changed to 
encompass ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’. Moreover, Taylor was accused of crimes 
committed within Sierra Leone rather than elsewhere.345 The SCSL of course primarily exercises 
jurisdiction over relevant crimes committed on the territory of Sierra Leone regardless of whether 
these crimes were committed by nationals or non-nationals. Accordingly, Charles Taylor can fit 
both in the category of ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’ for crimes as well as crimes 
‘committed in the territory of Sierra Leone’.  
 
Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the SCSL was clearly established, unlike in the Yerodia case 
where the jurisdiction of the Belgian court over Yerodia was not actually properly examined by 
the ICJ, but rather simply assumed. There was no controversy in this respect in the Taylor case.  
To conclude, despite the fact that the SCSL did not examine whether it has a jurisdiction in order 
to proceed with addressing any exemption from such jurisdiction, its jurisdiction was not 
objectionable and was not actually disputed by the Defence counsel.  
 
As Akande has noted: 
 
Although Liberia has instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that 
the indictment and arrest warrant issued against its Head of State do not respect the immunity that 
international law confers on heads of states, neither Liberia nor any other state appears to have argued that 
Sierra Leone is not able to delegate its criminal jurisdiction to an international court or that the Court is 
not entitled to exercise Sierra Leone’s territorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals.346  
 
 
Whether it can exercise jurisdiction over the serving head of State of country other than Sierra 
                                                 
345 The Yerodia case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Guillame, para. 4: “The primary aim of the criminal law is to 
enable punishment in each country of offences committed in the national territory. That territory is where evidence 
of the offence can most often be gathered. That is where the offence generally produces its effects. Finally, that is 
where the punishment imposed can most naturally serve as an example. Thus, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice observed as far back as 1927 that “in all systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal 
law is fundamental” (Lotus Case) . 
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Leone is however another issue. 
 
7.2 The Analysis of the SCSL’s Reasoning – Immunities Part 
 
It is well known that the decisions of the ICJ are binding only for the concrete case and only 
between the parties. Still, the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia is relevant to other cases relating to 
immunities. Indeed, as Piotrowicz put it “the reality is that whatever it says, whether in the 
operative part of the judgment or not, is going to be scrutinized and used to support claims about 
the state of law.”347 That is exactly what happened in the Taylor case.348  
 
As seen above, the ICJ’s fourth scenario in the Yerodia case was used by both parties as well as  
the SCSL for its reasoning. The defence used it in order to demonstrate that the SCSL is not an 
international court and therefore not entitled to deny immunity to a serving head of state. The 
Prosecution used it to prove that the SCSL is indeed a ‘certain international criminal court’ 
entitled to withdraw immunity from a serving head of state. The SCSL approved the 
Prosecution’s arguments in this respect. Was that a correct conclusion?  
 
It is submitted that the immunity from jurisdiction may be claimed not only before national 
courts, but also before international courts depending on the nature and extent of powers and 
attributes each court possesses. This possibility was entirely excluded by the SCSL, which 
understandably rather adopted the argumentation of one of the amici curiae that “in respect of the 
jurisdictional immunities of serving heads of state both international law and practice has 
generally distinguished between proceedings before national and international courts. As regards 
the international courts and tribunals which have been established, practice has been consistent, 
in that no serving head of state has been recognized as being entitled to rely on jurisdictional 
immunities.”349  
                                                                                                                                                              
346 Akande supra note 56.   
347 R. Piotrowicz, ‘Immunities of Foreign Ministers and their Exposure to Universal Jurisdiction, The Australian Law 
Journal 76 (2002), p. 291. 
348 It is of course important to note that the facts of the Yerodia case differ in many respects significantly in 
comparison with the Taylor case. The Yerodia case dealt with immunity of incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs 
before national courts as opposed to immunity of incumbent Head of State before international court. The ICJ’s 
primarily focus was on the practice before national courts.  
349 Sands supra note 88. 
 92 
This is all well, but to which consistent practice was the amicus curiae referring to? As indicated 
in the introductory chapter, Taylor is only the second in history behind Slobodan Milosevic, and 
the first African head of state to be indicted for crimes under international law at the international 
level.  This ‘consistent’ practice is thus supported by only one example of an international court 
which actually never pronounced on the immunity of a serving head of state, i.e. the ICTY with 
respect to indicting the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan 
Milosevic.350  
 
7.2.1 Significance of the Phrase ‘Involvement of the International Community’ 
 
The central part of the SCSL’s decision for the purposes of denying the immunity to Taylor was 
the distinction between international and national courts. In his respect, the SCSL relied on ‘the 
involvement of a whole international community’ in the establishment of the SCSL in order to 
justify its categorisation as ‘certain international criminal tribunal’. The SCSL emphasized that it 
derives its mandate from the international community and therefore the principle of immunity 
based on the sovereign equality of states has no relevance before international criminal courts 
(and it considers itself an international criminal court). 
  
After establishing its international legal basis, the SCSL proceeded to emphasize the role of 
international community also in the context of the agreement and its binding effects for all UN 
member states. The SCSL’s argued that the Agreement is actually an expression of the will of the 
international community, because in maintaining the international peace and security, the UN 
acts on behalf of all member states.351  
 
The issue of the agreement and its binding effects for third parties was dealt with extensively in 
the previous chapter. Hence, it suffices to briefly summarize that it was emphasized that the UN 
possesses a separate legal personality.352 It is then rather disputable to assert, as the SCSL did, 
that simply by virtue of the fact that states are members of the UN, they are therefore parties to 
                                                 
350 At least to the knowledge of this author, there is no other example of what is referred to as a consistent practice. 
351 See Orentlicher supra note 88, p. 12. Orentlicher stated that the Security Council by authorizing the Secretary 
General to negotiate an agreement with Sierra Leone was not only carrying out its responsibility to maintain peace 
and security, but ‘in doing so, it was acting on behalf of all Members of the United Nations’,  
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the Agreement and accordingly are bound by its provisions. As a general matter, member states 
are not bound by treaties concluded by the UN by the virtue of membership alone.  
 
To conclude, it is submitted that the undeniable involvement of the whole international 
community (i.e. the UN) is not a sufficient criterion in order to determine whether the SCSL can 
ignore the immunities of the Head of State of a country non party to the agreement. Either a 
consent of the states (including the affected state) to be bound by the agreement or some form of 
the Chapter VII powers involvement of the Security Council would be needed. None of these 
grounds were clearly present in Taylor case, yet the SCSL “tried to find a ground for lifting the 
immunity by combining the two grounds for as far as they were present.”353  
 
7.2.2 Significance of the Phrase ‘Certain International Courts’  
 
The ICJ in the Yerodia case confirmed the authority of a suitably constituted international 
tribunal to issue an arrest warrant in respect of a serving or former head of state. As regards the 
phrase before ‘certain international criminal courts’, the ICJ referred to examples of the ICTY, 
ICTR and the ICC.354 The central issue is thus whether the SCSL can qualify as such a ‘certain 
international criminal court’ which is capable of derogating from the principle of immunity. 
 
With regard to the absence of the SCSL in the list of certain international courts mentioned by the 
ICJ, two observations can be advanced. Firstly, it is important to note – as a matter of chronology 
- that the SCSL was not established at the time of the ICJ’s decision in the Yerodia case. The 
court delivered its decision on 14 February 2002. It is therefore understandable that it does not 
mention the SCSL as another example of ‘certain international courts’. The agreement 
establishing the SCSL was concluded only a few weeks before and had not been implemented at 
that stage.355 Secondly, it can also be argued that paragraph 61 of the ICJ’s decision was simply 
obiter dicta, providing a series of examples rather than a closed list.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
352 E.g. H. G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (2003), 1002, para. 1579.  
353 Nouwen supra note ..p. 657.  
354 The Yerodia case, para. 61. 
355 Robertson supra note 205.  
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However, there are crucial differences between the SCSL, on the one hand, and the ICTY, ICTR 
and the ICC on the other. All international courts cited by the ICJ (i.e. ICTY, ICTR and ICC) 
bind more than one state. All members of the United Nations are obliged to cooperate with both 
the ICTY and ICTR by virtue of their establishment under Chapter VII powers, including, inter 
alia, arrests and surrendering of any alleged perpetrators including Heads of States who are 
within their jurisdiction.356 As was clearly established in the first part of this thesis, the SCSL, 
unlike both ad hoc tribunals, does not possess Chapter VII powers.  
 
The third court mentioned by the ICJ was the permanent court – the ICC. Since the ICC is a 
treaty-based court similar to the SCSL, it can actually serve as a very useful example for 
illustrating why the SCSL in the Taylor decision ‘got it wrong’. The SCSL was established by 
bilateral treaty between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone. The ICC was 
also established by international treaty, a multilateral one. States parties to this multilateral treaty 
agreed to deny any potential immunity to their high ranking officials including the Head of State 
in case they commit certain crimes under international law.  
 
Even though the Rome Statute establishing the ICC binds more than one state, it can not bind 
those states not parties to the treaty. It is a well known principle that a treaty cannot create neither 
obligations nor rights for third parties without their consent (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt).357 This is reflected in Article 98, which states: “The Court may not proceed with a 
request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third 
State for the waiver of the immunity.”   
 
In the light of the above, it is clear that the ICC can also come under the pressure of how to 
proceed in the case of immunity invoked by the Head of State of a non-party to the treaty. As 
summarized by Romano and Nollkaemper: “While the Statute of the ICC denies immunity to 
Heads of State, in principle, it cannot affect the immunity of Heads of States of non parties. 
                                                 
356 Ibid. 
357 See also Art. 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “A treaty binds the parties and only the parties; 
it does not create obligations for a third State without its consent”. 
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States that are parties to the Statute would violate international law if they hand over a Head of 
State of a non-party to the ICC.”358 In applying the above findings regarding the ICC to the 
similar context of the SCSL, it can be argued that states not parties to the Agreement establishing 
the SCSL can not arrest and/or extradite an incumbent president to the SCSL without some 
further authority.359   
 
If an international organization, in this case the UN and a state, in this case Sierra Leone decide 
to establish an international criminal court by bilateral agreement, its classification as an 
international criminal court does not automatically mean that a state official of another country 
has no immunity from prosecution before that body. Were that the case, it would arguably be an 
easy way to get around international obligations.360 It might be argued that what Sierra Leone 
could not have done unilaterally, it cannot do by participating in the creation of an international 
court.   
 
In sum, while the jurisdiction (which precedes immunity) of the SCSL was established, the 
possibility to disrespect personal immunity of serving head of state of another country merely on 
the international legal basis of the SCSL is disputed.  
 
Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute, which is a crucial provision for the purposes of immunities, is 
taken verbatim from Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute (which is the same as Article 6(2) of the 
ICTR Statute). These provisions were interpreted as relating to merely immunity ratione 
materiae. Even if a more extensive interpretation of the ICTY ad ICTR Statutes is accepted, the 
important difference is that the ad hoc tribunals were established by Resolution under Chapter 
VII as opposed to the SCSL, which was established by a bilateral agreement.  
 
It is therefore submitted that (1) the SCSL cannot oppose the provision denying personal 
immunity in its Statute towards a third state, i.e. Liberia. (2) Even if it could deny immunity to a 
head of state of another country, such a broad interpretation of Article 6(2) would only be valid if 
                                                 
358 C. P.R Romano, A. Nollkaemper,‘The Arrest Warrant Against The Liberian resident, Charles Taylor’, ASIL 
Insights (2004), available at <http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh> 10.htm ) (last accessed 27 March 2008), p.2. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Nouwen supra note 49. 
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the rule denying personal immunity reflects customary international law, as has already been 
established for the rule on criminal responsibility. (3) If the SCSL would not be able to establish 
such a rule, a provision similar to that contained in Article 27(2) of the ICC Statute is then argued 
to be necessary.361  Next chapter will suggest a more cautious way forward with respect to two 




8 Charles Taylor- Head of State Immunity 
 
8.1 Claimed immunity ratione personae 
 
The fundamental question for our purposes is whether all immunities are irrelevant before any 
court that may be characterized as ‘international’. As shown by State practise, statutes of 
international criminal courts, case-law of both national and international courts and scholarly 
opinions, not all immunities before all courts can be overcome even for prosecution of crimes 
under international law.362  
 
This proposition was also confirmed by the ICJ in Yerodia case, which proved to be central for 
analysis of the Taylor case. Both Yerodia and Taylor were incumbent state officials at the time of 
the issuance of arrest warrants, therefore they invoked immunity ratione personae. Immunity 
ratione personae applies irrespective of the nature of the acts committed, it is so called absolute 
immunity. The underlying justification for immunity ratione personae is the functional necessity 
argument, i.e. in order to carry out its functions smoothly, the state official (representing a state 
itself) needs to be protected from any external interventions. Denial of this kind of immunity 
could be said to negatively affect the fulfilment of the functions of the state official.363  
 
This immunity is recognized by courts and scholars as ‘not merely a relic of the personal 
                                                 
361 Ibid. 
362 Racsmany supra note 126. 
363 Nouwen supra note 49. 
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sovereignty of the ruler.’364 Indeed, immunity ratione personae constitutes a general rule of 
customary international law.365 It has therefore relevance not only before domestic courts, but 
also before international tribunals “unless the status and nature of the international court justifies 
a different conclusion”.366 Any exception to this general rule, which remains so far fully 
applicable before domestic courts367, must be legally justified in the case of international 
courts.368   
 
As was shown in the previous chapter, both ad hoc criminal tribunals and the ICC provides for 
this exception. The legal basis for this exception is either a Security Council Chapter VII 
resolution or an international treaty. Moreover, even if there is an explicit exception in the form 
of waiver of immunity by states parties to the treaty, that immunity arguably applies only to 
contracting parties. A summary by a leading commentator defines well the position of the SCSL 
in relation to denial of immunities to a serving Head of State of another country:  
 
[T]he possibility of relying on international law immunities to avoid prosecutions by international 
tribunals depends on the nature of the tribunal: how it was established and whether the State of the 
official sought to be tried is bound by the instrument establishing the tribunal. In this regard, there 
is a distinction between those tribunals established by Security Council Resolution (i.e. the ICTY 
and ICTR) and those established by treaty. Because of the universal membership of the UN and 
because decisions of the Council are binding on all UN members, the provisions of the Statutes of 
the ICTY and ICTR are capable of removing immunity with respect to practically all states. On 
the other hand, since treaties are only binding on the parties, a treaty establishing an international 
tribunal is not capable of removing an immunity which international law grants to officials of 
States that are not party to the treaty. These immunities are rights belonging to the non-party 




Lasting entitlement to immunities ratione personae granted by customary international law to 
incumbent Head of States of non-state parties to the ICC Statute seems to be the best reflection of 
the current state of law on immunities. Hence, it is submitted that the agreement between Sierra 
Leone and the UN establishing the SCSL can not take away from the incumbent President of 
                                                 
364 R. Y. Jennings and A.Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (1996), 1034; A. Cassese, International 
Criminal Law, Oxford University Press (2008), p. 265; the Yerodia case, para. 53.  
365 Cassese supra note 48. 
366 Racsmany supra note 126, p. 314. 
367 See confirmation of immunity ratione personae by all national courts so far (e.g. in cases of  Castro, Qaddafi). 
368 See supra note 364. 
369 Akande supra note 56, p. 417 (emphasis added). 
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another country the immunity ratione persone granted under customary international law without 
more (e.g. the consent of Liberia).  
 
It is submitted that the SCSL’s interpretation of the Yerodia case led to an incorrect conclusion 
about immunity ratione personae of an incumbent Head of State. The SCSL’s decision neither 
adequately interpreted nor usefully applied the criterion of ‘certain international courts’. This 
decision was more of a declaration than the result of a well considered judicial deliberation. 
 
Admittedly, the SCSL was not in an easy position as its legal basis and any obligations under 
international law are complicated by the hybrid nature of that body. Still, as restrictive as it may 
be, it is proposed that the SCSL should have confirmed the immunity ratione personae enjoyed 
by Taylor while in office.370  
 
8.2 Another Route to Proceed - Immunity Ratione Materiae 
 
Nevertheless, there was another route for the SCSL to take in order to be legally consistent with 
the current state of law on immunities and at the same time to address the alleged responsibility 
of Taylor for international crimes. The SCSL already anticipated this holding at the end of its 
decision in the Taylor case ‘…it is apt to observe that the Applicant had at the time the 
Preliminary Motion was heard ceased to be a Head of State. The immunity ratione personae 
which he claimed had ceased to attach to him. Even if he had succeeded in his application the 
consequence would have been to compel the Prosecutor to issue a fresh warrant.’371 
                                                 
370 As submitted by Wirth: “Whereas some precedents could be interpreted as . . . allowing prosecutions even against 
persons protected by immunity ratione personae, it remains doubtful whether these precedents are in accordance with 
the hierarchy of values recognized by modern international law. The highest of these values is the maintenance of 
peace, and immunity ratione personae, protecting the most important representatives and decision-makers of a state, 
helps to safeguard the ability of a state to contribute to the maintenance of international and internal peace. In fact, in 
a situation where the highest functionaries of a state were arrested or otherwise seriously constrained in the exercise 
of their functions by a foreign state, the risk of war would be obvious.” In: Wirth, S.Wirth,‘Immunity for Core 
Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgement in the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 European Journal of Interntional Law 877, p. 888. 
In contrast, Kleffner argues that: “is it not as obvious as suggested that granting immunity to those who are likely to 
be most responsible . . . is unsettling orderly international relations any less than hampering the conduct of a State on 
the international plane. After all, these crimes are recognized by the international community to ‘threaten the peace, 
security and well-being of the world’.” In: J. K. Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National 
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86, p. 105.  
371 Prosecutor v. Taylor, para. 59. 
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Due to the different rationales for the two kinds of immunity international law recognizes that 
once a state official is out of office there is no longer a need for absolute immunity since he or 
she is no longer representing a state as such. It follows that the only immunity which Taylor 
would be left with after he stepped down from the presidency is immunity ratione materiae. This 
brings us back to the distinction between private and official acts.   
  
The Indictment372 stated that Taylor’s support of the rebels in Sierra Leone was motivated by the 
desire to obtain access to the mineral wealth (in particular the diamond wealth) of Sierra Leone. 
The SCSL inquired during the proceedings whether acts so motivated are, acts in an official 
capacity. Interestingly, the OTP replied that Taylor is charged in his private capacity, in which 
‘he embarked on a common aim with others to steal diamonds and begin a war to that end.’373 
The OTP further stated that functional immunity could not apply and that Taylor was not acting 
as head of state but privately through agents in Sierra Leone.  
 
Even though one may accept that one of the Taylor’s motives or wishes was to increase his 
private wealth through obtaining control over Sierra Leone’s diamond resources, it is hard to 
maintain that Taylor committed the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in a ‘private 
capacity’. Indeed, he has been accused of using his powerful position in Liberia and the region 
for aiding and abetting in (and profiting from) the war in Sierra Leone.    
 
                                                 
372 Specific charges contained in the indictment against Charles Taylor are (1) Violations of Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II including acts of terrorism; collective punishments; violence to 
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder; outrages upon personal dignity; 
violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons. (2) Crimes against humanity including 
extermination; murder; rape; sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence; other inhumane acts. (3) Other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law including conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities;  intentionally directing attacks 
against personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission. See Prosecutor v. Taylor (SCSL-
2003-01-I), Indictment  (7 March 2003). The Indictment was amended on 16 March 2006.  
373 See Response by Desmond de Silva, QC for the Prosecution, Report on Proceedings before the Appeals Chamber 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (1 November 2003).  
available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/WhatHappening/ReportAppealHearings01NOV03.html (last 
accessed 12 June 2006). The author of this thesis conducted questioning of several scholars and practitioners, with 
answers to the examined question going both ways. For example the response to the question whether Taylor is 
prosecuted for crimes committed in private or official capacity by Prof. David Crane (who acted as the Chief 
Prosecutor in the Taylor case) was “for both” (i.e. for abuse of the state power and for his private criminal 
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The better explanation, which was already presented in the chapter dealing with distinction 
between official and private acts, would be that international crimes can indeed be committed in 
an official capacity. This is however not to say that they qualify as official acts to be accordingly 
covered by functional immunity. The state sovereignty inspiring the immunity ratione materiae 
cannot prevail in cases of prosecution of international crimes, because international law at the 
same time establishes individual criminal responsibility for those crimes.374  
 
Relevant international instruments, starting with the end of the First World War and its Versailles 
Treaty, the Nuremberg Charter and Nuremberg Principles adopted after the Second World War, 
the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and various hybrid tribunals (East Timor, Kosovo), the 
Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture and other sources  illustrate state practice 
and opinio juris indicating that there exists a rule of customary international law which removes 
immunity ratione materiae in case of grave breaches of international law. The Pinochet case 
proves that immunity ratione materiae was not granted even before national courts (albeit on the 
basis of the Torture Convention). 
 
Importantly, the Defence in the Taylor case explicitly recognized and accepted the above 
proposition by stating that Taylor’s entitlement to enjoy “functional immunity [is] subject to one 
exception, namely in the case of perpetration of international crimes.”375  
 
By correctly applying the law as it currently stands, both sets of requirements may be protected in 
a more balanced way. With these arguments, we can move to conclude that the SCSL should 
confirm Taylor’s immunity ratione personae at the time of his initial indictment while 
recognizing that he would not enjoy exemption on the basis of immunity ratione materiae from 




                                                                                                                                                              
enterprise). The indictment nevertheless alleged that Taylor committed the crimes alleged “rather in a private 
capacity”. This well illustrates the difficulty in providing clear answers.  
374 Nouwen supra note 49. 
375 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Applicants Reply to Prosecution Response to Applicants Motion, p. 4 (30 July 2003).  
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9.1 Concluding Remarks for the Taylor case 
 
 
Laws are like the spider’s webs: they stand firm when any light and yielding object falls upon them, while 
a larger thing breaks through them and makes off.376   
 
 
There is little doubt that Taylor case before the SCSL could have presented an opportunity to 
elaborate on the current state of law on immunities and to clarify or justify different approaches 
taken by national and international courts on which the SCSL relied. Has it done so, or has it 
perhaps wasted an opportunity?  
 
The central issue of this thesis was whether Taylor, as president of Liberia at the time of issuance 
of the indictment, was entitled to claim immunity before the SCSL in light of the fact that the 
SCSL had been established by a bilateral treaty between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, to 
which Liberia was not a party. This legal issue is important also from the practical perspective for 
similar cases which may arise before other courts. The topicality of this issue can be especially 
seen in the increased activities of the first permanent criminal court - the ICC.  
 
The same questions in the context of immunities of third states not parties to the Rome Statute 
may appear before the ICC, particularly in the situation when there is no referral by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.377 Even in the situation where there is actually a 
referral by the Security Council, as is the case with the current President of Sudan, Al-Bashir, 
some authors argue that there must be explicit removal of immunity in the respective Resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII powers in order to deny immunity ratione personae to a serving 
                                                 
376 Solon c.630- 560 B.C., quoted from ‘Philosophy and Catholic Christian’, Diocesan Circular (September 2007), p. 
2, available at http://www.anglicancatholic.ca/diocirc/200709circ.pdf  (last accessed  26 June 2008). See also R. 
Fredona, R. ‘Carnival of Law: Bartolomeo Scala’s Dialogue De Legibus Et Judiciis’, Viator, Brepols Publishers, 
Volume 39, (2008), pp. 193-213. 
377 Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, can refer a specific  
situation “in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed” to the Prosecutor. This mechanism 
can trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC without consent of the concerned State (which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute). For deeper discussion see, V. Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Relationship between the Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court’, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Weltpolitik (2001), available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/crisis/2001relationship.htm (last accessed 17 February 2008). 
 102 
President of a state which is not a party to the Rome Statute.378 The aim of this thesis was also to 
contribute to the discussion on the emergence of various aspects of procedure in this area.    
 
The first part of this thesis focused on identifying the legal basis and manner of the establishment 
of the SCSL, which had important implications for the nature and extent of immunity. The 
second part of the thesis revealed the close interconnection between the legal basis with the issue 
of withdrawal of immunity for incumbent Heads of State. The SCSL did not fully take account of 
its special legal basis. By ignoring its bilateral treaty nature, the SCSL failed to properly assess 
what are the implications of its legal basis for the rules of international law on incumbent head of 
state immunity.  
 
Since the SCSL, inspired by the ICJ reasoning in the Yerodia case, connected the issue of 
denying the immunity to Taylor with the international legal basis of the SCSL, it came as no 
surprise that the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL determined that the SCSL is indeed an 
international criminal court. As the consequence of its international legal basis, the SCSL held 
that it can invoke Article 6 (2) of its Statute in order to deny immunity to the then-serving 
president of Liberia. The SCSL thus denied immunity ratione personae to Taylor.  
 
While this thesis approved the international legal basis of the SCSL, the legal reasoning on the 
basis of which the SCSL arrived at the conclusion was found to be open to dispute. Moreover, the 
consequences it attached to its legal basis from the immunity perspective were subject to 
criticism and found to be incorrect. More elaborate reasoning and judicial clarification of 
contentious issues were needed, bearing in mind that until the establishment of the SCSL, it had 
never been considered that the legal basis of an international criminal court could be an 
agreement between the UN and one or more states.  
 
The considerable attention given to the binding effects of Resolution 1315 (2000) was justified 
by the fact that the SCSL attempted to establish its international legal basis under Chapter VII 
powers. It seems that the SCSL was trying to ‘cure’ the shortcomings of a merely bilateral 
                                                 
378 Nouwen supra note 49. In the view of the author of this thesis, as long as there is a Resolution under Chapter VII 
powers, it should suffice for denial of immunity even if not explicitly mentioned.   
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agreement by trying to imply binding effects of Resolution 1315 (2000) in order to justify the 
denial of immunity of a Head of State of another country. If the SCSL could indeed prove its 
legal basis under Chapter VII powers, it would have had important implications for immunity 
afforded by contemporary international law to serving Heads of State.  
 
This argument is supported by the approach adopted by the ICTY with respect to Article 7 (2) of 
its Statute. This provision arguably relates only to the fact that the accused cannot claim its 
official position as a substantial defence, which would in turn mean that there is criminal 
responsibility for such acts (in that sense Article 7 (2) removes immunity ratione materiae); 
however for so long as the Head of State is in power, there is a procedural bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over these acts (in that sense Article 7(2) preserves immunity ratione personae). 
 
Nevertheless, the ICTY implicitly interpreted Article 7(2) as not only the attribution of criminal 
responsibility but also referring to immunity ratione personae. Even if such a broad interpretation 
is accepted, the crucial difference is that the ICTY was established by Resolution under Chapter 
VII as opposed to the SCSL, which was established by a bilateral agreement.  
 
The ICTY could thus arguably be more relaxed and adopt a rather flexible interpretation of its 
Statute with Chapter VII backing, which allows to affect the rights of all member states, even 
against their will or without their consent. So while it is true that Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute 
is taken verbatim from Article 7 (2) of the ICTY Statute (which is the same as Article 6(2) of the 
ICTR Statute), the SCSL should not interpret this provision as affecting rights of thirds parties, as 
opposed to the ICTY. 
 
Resolution 1315 (2000), which recommended the establishment of the SCSL, was not adopted 
under Chapter VII powers despite the attempt of the SCSL to prove otherwise. Moreover, the 
SCSL was not even established by any SC Resolution (in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR). The 
SCSL was established by a bilateral agreement pursuant to Resolution 1315 (2000). For these 
reasons, it is not possible to imply binding effects of  Resolution 1315 (2000) for the purposes of 
denying immunity to high ranking state officials as was in the case of the establishment of the 
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ICTY and ICTR. The SCSL should instead direct its attention to the agreement establishing the 
court, whose binding effects for third parties were arguably harder to prove.  
 
Moreover, it is surprising that despite the attempt to establish its international legal basis under 
Chapter VII powers, the SCSL has not subsequently relied on this argument for purposes of 
denying immunity ratione persoane to Taylor. The SCSL rather focused its attention to the 
distinction between national and international criminal courts made by the ICJ in the Yerodia 
case.379  
 
By attempting to fit itself into a category of ‘certain international criminal courts’, a phrase used  
by the ICJ in the Yerodia case, the SCSL limited its legal argumentation to the finding that it is 
indeed  an international court with powers to deny immunity to serving Heads of State. Yet, the 
mere fact that the legal basis of a certain judicial body is characterized as international does not 
automatically mean that any Head of State should be denied immunity before such a court.  
 
Not all immunities are irrelevant before any court that may be characterized as ‘international’. As 
shown by State practise, statutes of international criminal courts, case-law of both national and 
international courts and scholarly opinions, not all immunities before all courts can be eliminated 
even for prosecution of crimes under international law. A claim to immunity is indeed to be 
treated differently, not only before national courts as opposed to international courts, but 
importantly for our purposes, also before some international courts as opposed to other 
international courts. The approach surely depends also on the kind of immunity the state official 
may invoke.  
 
As for the immunity ratione personae, this immunity constitutes a general rule of customary 
international law and is therefore relevant not only before domestic courts, but also before 
international courts “unless the status and nature of the international court justifies a different 
conclusion”.380 Any exception to this general rule, which remains so far fully applicable before 
domestic courts, must be legally justified in the case of international courts.381 
                                                 
379 Frulli supra note 17. 




The proposition that immunities ratione personae do not apply before international tribunals 
depends on the manner of the court’s establishment as well as identification of the exact legal 
basis for denying immunity. In addition, the establishing instrument of the court must bind the 
concerned state.382  
 
As was shown in the chapter dealing with international criminal tribunals, both ad hoc criminal 
tribunals and the ICC provide for the exception to the general rule. The legal basis for this 
exception is either a Security Council Chapter VII resolution or an international treaty. Moreover, 
even if there is an explicit exception to immunity to which states agreed by becoming a party to 
the ICC Rome Statute, it applies only to contracting parties.  
 
Lasting entitlement to immunities ratione personae granted by customary international law to 
incumbent Heads of State of non-state parties before the ICC seems to be the best reflection of 
the current state of law on immunities.383 By analogy, the agreement between Sierra Leone and 
the UN establishing the SCSL cannot, without more or of itself, take away from the incumbent 
President of another country the immunity ratione personae granted under customary 
international law.  
 
In sum, neither the agreement, nor the Statute of the SCSL should be made opposable towards 
Liberia for the purposes of denying immunity ratione personae. Even if they were, an additional 
argument can be raised, i.e. that Article 6 (2) fails to explicitly address immunity ratione 
personae. Furthermore, as already mentioned above, the SCSL is not in the same position as the 
ICTY with respect to Chapter VII powers, which could arguably justify the broad interpretation 
of the ICTY Statute.  
 
Despite the fact that the following conclusion may appear too restrictive, it is proposed that, 
under given circumstances, the SCSL should have confirmed the immunities ratione personae 
enjoyed by Taylor while in office as this approach best reflects the current state practise.  
                                                 




Nevertheless, there was another route for the SCSL to take in order to be legally consistent with 
the current state of law on immunities and at the same time address the alleged responsibility of 
Taylor for international crimes. International law recognizes that once a state official is out of 
office there is no longer a need for absolute immunity since he or she is no longer representing a 
state as such. The only protection which remains is for acts committed in an official capacity. It 
follows that the only immunity which Taylor could invoke while out of office is immunity 
ratione materiae, which is based on different rationale than immunity ratione personae.  
 
Immunity ratione personae is granted to state officials irrespective of the nature of the acts. It can 
therefore be invoked, one may add unfortunately, even in the case of international crimes. On the 
other hand, immunity ratione materiae is precisely concerned with the nature of the acts. It 
applies only to acts which can be qualified as official acts. At the same time, international 
criminal law establishes individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. Therefore, 
there cannot simultaneously coexist both individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes and immunity ratione materiae for international crimes, even if these crimes were 
committed in an official capacity, or to be more precise, in the abuse of official capacity.  
  
Relevant international instruments, starting with the end of the First World War and its Versailles 
Treaty, the Nuremberg Charter and Nuremberg Principles adopted after the Second World War, 
the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and various hybrid tribunals (East Timor, Kosovo), the 
Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture and other sources  illustrate state practice 
and opinio juris indicating that there exists a rule of customary international law which removes 
immunity ratione materiae in case of grave breaches of international law. The Pinochet case 
proves that immunity ratione materiae was not recognized even before national courts (albeit on 
the basis of the Torture Convention).The Defence in the Taylor case explicitly recognized and 
accepted the above proposition by stating that Taylor’s entitlement to enjoy “functional immunity 
[is] subject to one exception namely in the case of perpetration of international crimes.”384  
 
By correctly applying the norms forming the relevant current international law, both sets of 
                                                 
384 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Applicants Reply to Prosecution Response to Applicants Motion, p. 4 (30 July 2003).  
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requirements may be protected in a more balanced way. With these arguments, we can move to 
conclude that the SCSL should confirm Taylor’s immunity ratione personae at the time of his 
initial indictment while recognizing that he would not enjoy exemption on the basis of immunity 
ratione materiae from the SCSL’s jurisdiction should a new indictment be issued.  
 
Some argue that the manner in which the SCSL was established was completely unrelated to the 
issue of immunity: instead, the initial desire was to separate the proceedings from domestic 
criminal law and the legal system of Sierra Leone.385 This may well be so. It can even explain 
some of the difficulties with which the SCSL was confronted. Unfortunately, it does not justify in 
some respects unfounded reasoning of the SCSL in the Taylor case.  
 
Any constitutive instruments of international criminal tribunals should preferably anticipate 
problems and try to address principal issues such as jurisdiction and immunities beforehand in 
order to avoid the uncertainty, which often makes the court adopt too creative reasoning, which is 
hard to justify even by employing a teleological interpretation of certain provisions. This is surely 
a lesson to be learned for establishing a similar forum for the prosecution of international crimes 
elsewhere.  
 
The Taylor case well illustrated the collision of two competing interests in contemporary 
international law: the growing acceptance of individual international accountability for crimes 
under international law and a system of immunities deriving its origins, as most often claimed, 
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States. Which interest should prevail? And does it 
matter?  It will be always difficult to reach a proper balance between the two.  
 
However, one may argue that there is no need for ‘respect’ or ‘dignity’ of the Head of State who 
suppresses its own people and abuses its official position in order to engage in commission of 
worse crimes such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.386 In this respect, 
international criminal law expresses something universal, which is deeply rooted in moral 
philosophy - condemnation of acts of (in Arendt’s phrasing) extreme evil.387  
                                                 
385 Chatham supra note 6. 
386 Sands supra note 190. 
387 A. M. Drumbl,, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, Cambridge University Press (2007), p. 182. 
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It should be at the same time recognized that “criminal law in general, and international criminal 
law in particular, will never be a panacea for the ills of the world.”388 But, if international 
criminal law is designed to punish ‘extraordinary’ as opposed to ‘ordinary’ crimes, it should 
aspire to show that as “those who bear the greatest responsibility”389 attempt to place themselves 
beyond the reach of law, “the law adapts to bring them back within its grasp.”390  
 
9.2 The way forward: Thoughts de lege ferenda 
 
By way of a more general conclusion, the following remarks are admittedly departing from the 
current law into the realm of what might be termed “wishful legal thinking”391, to trends in 
international law pointing towards recognition of the rights of victims of international crimes, 
even if punishing the highest representative of the state can threaten the norm of sovereignty.392 
In fact, the notion and scope of sovereignty is increasingly being challenged in many inter-related 
areas.393 
 
State sovereignty, in Kofi Annan’s view, is being redefined and “States are now widely 
understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa... When we read 
the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human 
beings, not to protect those who abuse them.”394 For Kofi Annan and many others, “sovereignty 
                                                 
388 Ibid., p. 38. For example Koskenniemi suggests that “international law fundamentally is a European tradition 
derived from a desire to rationalize society through law.” He however concludes that “the fact that international law 
is a European language does not even slightly stand in the way of its being capable of expressing something 
universal.” In: M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe: Beetween Tradition and Renewal’, 16 European 
Journal of International Law 113,114 (2005); M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall 
of International Law 1870-1960 (2001).   
389 The term is used in the SCSL Statute as guidance for the court regarding its personal jurisdiction. 
390 Sands supra note 190.  
391 R. Piotrowicz, supra note 345, quoted from K. Hailbronner, ‘Non-Refoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: 
Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking’, (1986) 26 Virginia Journal of International Law 857, p. 
872. 
392 Cassese: “One still has to strive to replace the Westphalian model of international society, geared to reciprocity 
and largely based on mutual respect among sovereign states, with the Kantian model, which hinges on a set of 
universal values transcending the immediate interests of each state, and which therefore moves pride of place to 
community interests.” supra note 5, p. 1. 
393 See e.g. the emergence of the concept of The Responsibility to Protect, Report of The International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf (last accessed 23 
February 2008) 
394 K. Annan, The Economist, 1999.  
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is not becoming less relevant; it remains the ordering principle of international affairs. However, 
it is “the peoples’ sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty.’”395  
 
This is an expression of a “struggle between international law as primarily state and sovereignty 
based regime and international law reaching beyond the state and defining justice by taking into 
account not only the interests of the sovereign state, but also the individual human being.”396  The 
status of sitting Heads of State is certainly one of the remaining parts of this struggle. The scope 
of immunity is being increasingly contested, as the jurisprudence shows, but is far from settled. 
Further evolution of State practice is needed before a straightforward consensus may emerge.397  
 
Yet there is already an existing consensus between most civilized States acknowledging “a 
seriousness of the duty incumbent upon state authorities to respect the core human rights of those 
within their power”398, which is transformed into accountability of states for human rights 
violations. Most states already accept the notion of accountability for human rights violations, 
which indeed can be seen as a restriction on state sovereignty.399   
 
In this context, it is difficult to see how holding one person individually criminally responsible 
for crimes under international law can impact on state sovereignty more than finding a whole 
state responsible for human rights violations (including paying compensations which is actually 
not the case so far in international criminal proceedings, although the ICC Rome Statute already 
anticipates this possibility for victims).  
 
It is suggested that the rationale for preserving immunities should be re-evaluated, especially with 
respect to practise before national courts. ‘Seriousness of the duty incumbent upon state 
authorities’ should be transformed into individual criminal responsibility of those individuals 
who are the highest representatives of this very state authority via abrogation of both immunity in 
                                                 
395 E. Larking, ‘Human rights and the principle of sovereignty: a dangerous conflict at the heart of the nation state?’, 
 Australian Journal of Human Rights 15 (2004).   
396 J. Bröhmer, ‘Immunity of a Former Head of State General Pinochet and the House of Lords: Part Three’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law 13  (2000),  p. 234.    
397 Racsmany supra note 126. 
398 R. Piotrowicz, ‘The governments, the Lords, the ex-president and his victims: limitations to the immunity of 
former heads of state’, The Australian Law Journal 73 (1999), p. 484.   
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cases of commission of international crimes (providing there is a court which has a jurisdiction to 
start with). Immunity can be preserved for all instances of illegal activity except one - 
international crimes. This restriction would be narrow enough to ensure prosecution and 
punishment of international crimes without substantial impact on sovereignty and damaging the 
conduct and smooth functioning of the state’s (foreign) relations. 
 
For now, more moral than legal arguments can be found in support of the reduction of personal 
immunity. Indeed, old doctrines die hard.400 States fear that by rejecting immunity, domestic 
courts could be overloaded with cases brought against Heads of State by former victims, human 
rights organizations, or anyone with a ‘cause’.401 Another fear is that prosecutions can be abused 
for political purposes or that they can lead to instability or even armed conflict between states.402 
Admittedly, these fears are real. Nonetheless “the moral and legal weight behind individual 
accountability for international crimes regardless of official capacity is of such substance that it 
mandates an evaluation of the trade-offs involved in accepting the risks of impunity in order to 
preserve comity.”403  
 
As three of the judges of the ICJ in their joint Separate Opinion in the Yerodia case observed “the 
law reflects a balancing of different community interests, and therefore is in constant 
evolution.”404  These strong dissenting opinions, taken with the Pinochet ruling, support hopes 
that not only NGOs and academics, but perhaps even states, will start to realize that there is no 
more need to protect those who are given the opportunity to represent and rule a nation of people, 
but, in that position, do serious harm to (often its own) people.405 The highest state 
representatives should accordingly be held to the very highest standards of international law, not 
the lowest.406  
                                                                                                                                                              
399 Especially in the situations where the ultimate decision about the particular breach of human rights lies with 
international judicial body, e.g. European Court of Human Rights. 
400 Robertson supra note 205. 
401 Philippine Statute on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious International Crimes, 
Comment on House Bill No. 4998 (22 June 2006), available at 




404 The Yerodia case, para. 75.  




A day may thus come when states agree to abolish personal immunity not only before 
international, but also national courts. Because the law, as Justice Jackson believed, must not 
only be dynamic, adaptable and capable of changing to different circumstances. The law should 
indeed be obliged to do so because as he stressed “unless we are prepared to abandon every 
principle of growth for international law, we cannot deny that our own day has the right to 
institute customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer and 
strengthened international law.”407 This newer, stronger international law might then help the law 
to stand firm not only when ‘light and yielding objects fall upon it’, but also to ensure that ‘a 



















                                                 
407 Report of Robert H. Jackson To the President, Released by the White House on June 1945, Excerpted from 
Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1071. See also R. Jackson, ‘Report to President Truman on the Legal 
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